Date: 20010810
Docket: 2000-1748-IT-I;
2000-2109-IT-I
BETWEEN:
BERNARD GAGNÉ,
LUCIE TRUDEL,
Appellants,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasonsfor Judgment
P. R. Dussault, J.T.C.C.
[1] These appeals were heard on common evidence under the Court's informal procedure.
[2] Bernard Gagné is appealing a determination of child tax benefit in respect of his son, Félix-Léonard, for the 1996, 1997 and 1998 base taxation years. In making the determination, the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") adjusted the amount of the benefit and reduced it to zero.
[3] Mr. Gagné is also appealing assessments in which the Minister refused to allow him the equivalent-to-spouse tax credit in respect of his son, Félix-Léonard, for the 1996, 1997 and 1998 taxation years.
[4] Lucie Trudel is appealing a determination of child tax benefit in respect of her sons David and Samuel for the 1996, 1997 and 1998 base taxation years. In making the determination, the Minister adjusted the amount of the benefit and reduced it to zero.
[5] Ms. Trudel is also appealing the assessments for the 1996, 1997 and 1998 taxation years in which the Minister disallowed the equivalent-to-spouse tax credit.
[6] Finally, Ms. Trudel is appealing two determinations by the Minister that she was ineligible for the goods and services tax ("GST") credit in respect of the 1996 and 1997 taxation years.
[7] In making these determinations and assessments, the Minister assumed that Mr. Gagné and Ms. Trudel lived in a common-law relationship in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Consequently, when net family income is taken into account, the two appellants are ineligible for the child tax benefit and Lucie Trudel is ineligible for the GST credit. The Minister's refusal to allow either appellant the equivalent-to-spouse tax credit is based on the fact that each appellant was living with a common-law spouse during the years at issue.
[8] In respect of Lucie Trudel, the facts assumed by the Minister for the purposes of the assessments and determinations are set out in subparagraphs 12(a) to (e) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. Those subparagraphs read as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
12. In issuing and maintaining the notices of reassessment, the notices of child tax benefit and the notices of redetermination, the Minister assumed, inter alia, the following facts:
(a) the appellant and Bernard Gagné lived in the same residence at 1088 rue de Corbon in Boucherville during the years at issue and still live in the same residence;
(b) the Boucherville residence does not contain two separate dwelling units;
(c) through an audit by the Minister, the following information was compiled;
(i) the appellant and Bernard Gagné admitted that they had earlier lived together as common-law spouses, and the appellant has lived in the residence at 1088 rue de Corbon in Boucherville since July 1992,
(ii) when Bernard Gagné worked in Sainte-Foy (from October 1992 to April 1994), he kept his Rue de Corbon, Boucherville, mailing address,
(iii) the appellant admitted before Denis Durocher, J. of the Superior Court in 1993 that she was seeing a friend with whom she planned to live in Québec,
(iv) Bernard Gagné returned in April 1994 to live at 1088 rue de Corbon in Boucherville,
(v) notwithstanding Bernard Gagné's claim that his relationship with the appellant had been broken off, he has accepted, from April 1994 to the present, living in the same residence with his and the appellant's children,
(vi) the appellant has accepted living with her children in the Boucherville residence despite the fact that Bernard Gagné's son has had behavioural problems,
(vii) financial responsibilities were shared during the years at issue, and
(viii) property and resources were shared during the years at issue;
(d) the appellant had three children from a relationship with Tony Bergamo;
(e) the Minister considered that the appellant and Bernard Gagné lived in a common-law relationship during the 1996, 1997 and 1998 taxation years, which led to the following adjustments:
(i) refusal to allow the appellant the equivalent-to-spouse tax credit for the 1996, 1997 and 1998 taxation years,
(ii) in computing the child tax benefit for the 1996, 1997 and 1998 base taxation years, taking the net family income into account reduced the annual child tax benefit amount to zero:
|
1996 1997 1998 Appellant 38,078 29,033 41,691 Bernard Gagné 45,877 52,258 53,926 83,955 81,291 95,617 |
(iii) for the 1996 and 1997 taxation years, taking the net family income into account resulted in the appellant's being ineligible for the GST tax credit payments.
[9] With respect to Bernard Gagné, the facts assumed by the Minister for the purposes of the assessments and determinations are set out in subparagraphs 8(a) to (e) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal. They are essentially the same as those found in subparagraphs 12(a) to (e) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal in the case of Lucie Trudel, subject to the following two variations:
(1) subparagraph 8(d) reads as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
from a relationship with Sylvie Vachon the appellant had two children, including a boy named Félix-Léonard who was born in 1982;
2) there is no subparagraph equivalent to subparagraph 12(e)(iii) found in the Reply to the Notice of Appeal in the case of Ms. Trudel.
[10] Subparagraphs (c)(i) and (c)(v) to (c)(viii) are denied by the appellants.
[11] Ms. Trudel and Mr. Gagné both testified. Louise Girard testified for the respondent.
[12] Ms. Trudel began with an account of the circumstances of her meeting Mr. Gagné. In 1988, Ms. Trudel separated de facto from her husband; she retained custody of her three children. In 1989, one of Ms. Trudel's children contracted leukemia, and she made frequent use of a babysitter who was available day and night so that she could take care of her sick child. Mr. Gagné, who was unmarried, also had two children for whom he was having child care provided by the same person. That was when the appellants got to know each other and became friends, but they did not date. At that time, Ms. Trudel's son was hospitalized and she had to take leave from work for two years. The two appellants' children saw one another frequently and Ms. Trudel said that she and Mr. Gagné also began to see each other because he showed her a great deal of friendship and tenderness. She said that, at the time, she confused love and friendship. Thus, when the time came for her to decide whether to renew her lease, she agreed to Mr. Gagné's suggestion that she move in with him. She moved on June 26, 1992, to live with Mr. Gagné.
[13] Ms. Trudel said she realized that what she had thought was love was in reality not love. She then became aware that there were significant differences in their lifestyles, particularly because of her numerous visits to the hospital. Mealtimes and family discipline were also different. Moreover, while recognizing that Mr. Gagné had many good qualities, she spoke of his instability with regard to employment, which she found unacceptable.
[14] Indeed, shortly after Ms. Trudel moved in with him, Mr. Gagné found himself without a job and had to look for employment outside Boucherville. In October 1992, he accepted a job in Ste-Foy near Québec and left the house to take up his new duties. For Ms. Trudel, leaving Boucherville would not be an easy matter in view of the medical follow-up being provided for her son at the Maisonneuve-Rosemont hospital and also because he needed home schooling. The fact that the babysitter lived nearby was another important factor. Although she seems to have considered following Mr. Gagné to Québec, Ms. Trudel, who was then experiencing some problems with her former spouse, said she opted for stability and security. Thus, she decided to continue to live in Boucherville with her children in Mr. Gagné's house where she now occupied the master bedroom by herself. Mr. Gagné had put the house up for sale, however, and returned there [TRANSLATION] "from time to time." Ms. Trudel said that she was there to receive potential purchasers and that she was paying rent at the time.
[15] In April 1994, Mr. Gagné lost his job again and returned to live in his house at Boucherville. Ms. Trudel said that Mr. Gagné's daughter then decided to go to live with her mother, thus freeing up a bedroom in the house. It is not known exactly who occupied that bedroom from then on. Following discussions with Mr. Gagné, Ms. Trudel decided to continue to live in the house. She felt at home there because she paid rent and her share of the household expenses, including electricity and cable expenses, for example. Otherwise, she said, she took care of her own children, did not share other expenses with Mr. Gagné and did not take advantage of any financial benefits that he may have been able to give her. All in all, according to Ms. Trudel, household expenses were shared, with each person being on his own regarding all other expenses, such as motor vehicle expenses, for example. Ms. Trudel said that she also did the grocery shopping for herself and her children and that she kept a monthly record of the meals eaten by Mr. Gagné and his children, so that each appellant paid his share of the food expenses.
[16] Ms. Trudel also spoke of an agreement signed with Mr. Gagné for renting his house after his return to Boucherville in 1994. An agreement that was apparently signed on January 3, 1995, is in fact attached to her Notice of Appeal. It provided that [TRANSLATION] "the rental payable will be 50%, or one half, of the mortgage payment and will vary if there is a change in the mortgage payment over the years." The agreement also provided for 90 days' notice in the event the house was sold and for the Trudel family's right to continue to live in the house on the same terms for a period of one year in the event of Mr. Gagné's death.
[17] Ms. Trudel also stated that the rent she was paying now was not as high as what she used to pay, since the mortgage payments had decreased and Mr. Gagné had agreed that she could in fact pay less rent in view of her limited resources. Furthermore, Mr. Gagné admitted that he had never reported the rent in his income tax return.
[18] The appellants shared expenses for the services of a house cleaner as well as electricity, telephone and cable expenses. The furnishings were what each had owned before moving in together in 1992. The appellants also acknowledged that they had bought a washing machine and a dryer together since they both used those appliances. Ms. Trudel had sold hers and Mr. Gagné's had to be replaced.
[19] Both Ms. Trudel and Mr. Gagné maintained they were independent and had no spouse. They described themselves as being housemates, with each taking responsibility for his own family expenses. Ms. Trudel said that she did not have a special relationship with anyone. Mr. Gagné said he had friends of both sexes. He mentioned no special relationship. However, the appellants admitted that they had gone out together on occasion although they said they had also gone out with other persons. According to their testimony, they had taken some trips with their respective children, but rarely both families together. A trip by the two families to the Gaspé area was mentioned. Ms. Trudel also referred to another trip that she made alone with Mr. Gagné to Detroit, San Francisco, Vancouver and Banff. Her airline ticket was allegedly paid for through the air miles accumulated by Mr. Gagné, who travelled a great deal. Otherwise, she had paid her share of the expenses for that trip. Ms. Trudel also said that they might have spent an occasional weekend together at Mr. Gagné's parents' cottage, for example. The appellants initially preferred not to answer the question of whether they had had sexual relations. Ms. Trudel later altered her position and admitted that they had, but only on rare occasions. According to her, this would have happened perhaps once a year, after a birthday dinner for example.
[20] After the hearing, the appellants, with the consent of counsel for the respondent, forwarded to the Court bank books and bank statements, personal banking records and grocery bills. A number of these documents concerned years other than those at issue. However, in a personal banking record marked [TRANSLATION] "Lucie Trudel - Nov. 95 @ July 96", which actually appears to cover the period from November 1995 to July 1997, one can see entries of regular payments every two weeks, sometimes made directly to Mr. Gagné and sometimes to the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) as a mortgage payment. Those documents show, for example, that Ms. Trudel made payments of $254 every two weeks until February 1997, and $226.93 thereafter. The payments then went down to $208.56 and then up to $222.33 in 2000 and 2001. Although it is clear that each appellant had his own bank account, one cannot fail to notice that Mr. Gagné seems to have personally paid many expenses, including some personal expenses of Ms. Trudel's for which she subsequently reimbursed him by cheque.[1] I will simply add here that such financial arrangements seem to extend far beyond the mere payment of rent and the sharing of household expenses one would see in the case of housemates.
[21] As for the food bills, they are current and do not relate to the years at issue. They have simply been accumulated in an envelope on which is indicated the number of meals eaten daily by each appellant and their children. In her testimony, Ms. Trudel explained that each of them thus contributed to the food budget based on that fairly rough calculation of their respective consumption.
[22] Louise Girard, a team leader (Child Tax Benefit) with the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, testified for the respondent. Her file notes concern her conversations with Ms. Trudel and Mr. Gagné. They confirm the initial relationship between the appellants, the departure of Mr. Gagné in 1992, his return in 1994, and the cohabitation and common use of the house space by the two families. Ms. Trudel apparently stated, however, that Mr. Gagné slept in what she described as his office, which was not mentioned at the hearing. Ms. Trudel also disclosed to Ms. Girard that she paid rent to Mr. Gagné and half of the electricity, telephone and cable expenses. The same was true for the services of a house cleaner, which were provided every two weeks. Ms. Trudel also referred to the joint purchase of a washing machine and dryer. She said that she was usually the one who took care of the grocery shopping. Meals were not necessarily eaten together. However, if Mr. Gagné and his children were present at a mealtime, they all ate together and costs were shared. Occasional outings to a restaurant or the movies with or without the children were also mentioned.
[23] As for Mr. Gagné's return in 1994 and their subsequent relationship, Ms. Trudel said that she had made a place for herself in the house during those years and that the children had been more accepting of the situation ever since she and Mr. Gagné had ceased living in a conjugal relationship. Ms. Trudel also said that she was not involved in any [TRANSLATION] "love relationship"and that she did not know what the situation was with Mr. Gagné in that regard.
[24] As for Mr. Gagné, he apparently said that he stayed with his parents in Longueuil from November 1997 to June 1998, while his son attended a school in that city. He explained that he returned to Boucherville on weekends or went to his parents' home north of Montreal. However, he did not provide any evidence in support of those statements. At the hearing, this fact was mentioned, but no specific dates or detailed explanations were provided.
[25] Ms. Girard concluded that the appellants, who cohabited, were living in a conjugal relationship because there was sharing of financial responsibilities and of property and resources.
Analysis
[26] Subsection 252(4) of the Income Tax Act[2] (repealed by S.C. 2000, c. 12, s. 141(2), applicable to the 2001 and subsequent taxation years) defined the term "spouse" as follows for the years at issue:
252(4) In this Act,
(a) words referring to a spouse at any time of a taxpayer include the person of the opposite sex who cohabits at that time with the taxpayer in a conjugal relationship and
(i) has so cohabited with the taxpayer throughout a 12-month period ending before that time, or
(ii) would be a parent of a child of whom the taxpayer would be a parent, if this Act were read without reference to paragraph (1)(e) and subparagraph (2)(a)(iii)
and, for the purposes of this paragraph, where at any time the taxpayer and the person cohabit in a conjugal relationship, they shall, at any particular time after that time, be deemed to be cohabiting in a conjugal relationship unless they were not cohabiting at the particular time for a period of at least 90 days that includes the particular time because of a breakdown of their conjugal relationship.
[27] The notion of de facto spouse flows then, according to this definition, from that of "conjugal relationship", which was considered by Judge Lamarre Proulx in Milot v. R., [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2247; original French version [1995] A.C.I. no 412 (QL). Referring to the analysis of Knoppers, Bernard and Shelton, Les personnes et les familles, Tome 2, Les éditions Adage, Judge Lamarre Proulx states, at page 2250 (para. 11), that "cohabitation is fundamental in a conjugal relationship and in conjugal conduct. That conduct may be determined through sexual relations, emotional and intellectual exchange, financial support and common knowledge." On this issue, the judge refers more particularly, at page 2250 (para. 12), to the analysis of Payne and Payne who, in Introduction to Canadian Family Law, Carswell, 1994, review the seven factors stated by the Ontario District Court in Moldowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (3d) 376. The same factors were again considered in Lavoie v. Canada, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 2137; original French version [1999] A.C.I. no 688 (QL).
[28] At pages 38 and 39 of their analysis, Payne and Payne itemize these factors as follows:
Not all arrangements whereby a man and a woman live together and engage in sexual activity will suffice to trigger statutory support rights and obligations.28 As was observed by Morrison J.A., of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal :
I think it would be fair to say that to establish a common law relationship there must be some sort of stable relationship which involves not only sexual activity but a commitment between the parties. It would normally necessitate living under the same roof with shared household duties and responsibilities as well as financial support.29
More specific judicial guidance as to what constitutes cohabitation or a conjugal or marriage-like relationship is found in a judgment of the Ontario30 District Court, wherein Kurisko D.C.J. identified the following issues as relevant:
1. Shelter
(a) Did the parties live under the same roof?
(b) What were the sleeping arrangements?
(c) Did anyone else occupy or share the available accommodation?
2. Sexual and Personal Behaviour:
(a) Did the parties have sexual relations? If not, why not?
(b) Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?
(c) What were their feelings toward each other?
(d) Did they communicate on a personal level?
(e) Did they eat their meals together?
(f) What, if anything, did they do to assist each other with problems or during illness?
(g) Did they buy gifts for each other on special occasions?
3. Services:
What was the conduct and habit of the parties in relation to:
(a) preparation of meals;
(b) washing and mending clothes;
(c) shopping;
(d) household maintenance; and
(e) any other domestic services?
4. Social:
(a) Did they participate together or separately in neighbourhood and community activities?
(b) What was the relationship and conduct of each of them toward members of their respective families and how did such families behave towards the parties?
5. Societal:
What was the attitude and conduct of the community toward each of them and as a couple?
6. Support (economic):
(a) What were the financial arrangements between the parties regarding the provision of or contribution toward the necessities of life (food, clothing, shelter, recreation, etc.)?
(b) What were the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership of property?
(c) Was there any special financial arrangement between them which both agreed would be determinant of their overall relationship?
7. Children:
What was the attitude and conduct of the parties concerning the children?
As Kurisko D.C.J. further observed, the extent to which each of the aforementioned seven different components will be taken into account must vary with the circumstances of each particular case.
__________
28 See Jansen v. Montgomery (1982), 30 R.F.L. (2d) 332 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
29 Soper v. Soper (1985), 67 N.S.R. (2d) 49, at 53 (C.A.).
30 Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (3d) 376, at 381-382 (Ont. Dist. Ct.). See also Gostlin v. Kergin (1986), 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 264, at 267-268 (C.A.).
[29] In M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the factors listed in Moldowich, specifying at pp. 50-51 that "these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal". At page 51, the Court added the following:
Certainly an opposite-sex couple may, after many years together, be considered to be in a conjugal relationship although they have neither children nor sexual relations. Obviously the weight to be accorded the various elements or factors to be considered in determining whether an opposite-sex couple is in a conjugal relationship will vary widely and almost infinitely.
[30] In the case at bar, the appellants admitted that they had previously lived in a conjugal relationship in 1992. After an absence of approximately one and a half years, Mr. Gagné returned to live with Ms. Trudel in his Boucherville house where, during the years at issue, they cohabited, with their respective children, with the exception of Mr. Gagné's daughter who apparently went to live with her mother. The appellants claim that their relationship changed at that time and that they no longer lived in a conjugal relationship. According to them, they were each independent, and Ms. Trudel was only a tenant while Mr. Gagné was the landlord. The evidence however reveals a common living arrangement for two families that went well beyond what each states to have been the case. First, the appellants shared household expenses on a fifty-fifty basis, although they maintained that what was involved was only an agreement concerning the rent that Ms. Trudel undertook to pay. In actual fact, Ms. Trudel paid half of the mortgage payments and Mr. Gagné indeed agreed to her paying a lesser amount inasmuch as the payments had decreased because of the reduction in interest. According to Ms. Trudel, he agreed to this arrangement because of her limited resources. The space was used by the two families and the furnishings consisted of what each had owned before they lived together. The appellants also purchased together some household appliances, namely, a washing machine and a dryer. This was certainly a case of sharing of resources and of a degree of financial support on the part of Mr. Gagné with respect to the amount of "rent" he required from Ms. Trudel.
[31] With regard to food, it was Ms. Trudel who did the grocery shopping and prepared the meals, first of all for herself and her family. However, Mr. Gagné and his children, when they were there, ate their meals with Ms. Trudel and her family. Mr. Gagné reimbursed Ms. Trudel on a pro rata basis for what he consumed. Again, this involves pooling resources and sharing expenses.
[32] The personal bank statements also show many payments made by Ms. Trudel to Mr. Gagné, either in reimbursement of expenses he incurred for her and her children, or in payment of her share of certain expenses. In a blended family to which each partner comes with his own offspring, I do not find it unusual that they should share expenses for accommodations and food on a fifty-fifty or a pro rata basis and that each parent should remain primarily responsible for other expenses specific to himself or his children. In order for people to be considered to be living in a conjugal relationship, it is not necessary that the sharing be absolute and equal in every respect.
[33] Taking into account the cohabitation, the use of space and furniture by the two families, the joint purchase of some household appliances, the fact that some meals were eaten together and housing and food expenses were shared, the exchange of services and the financial arrangements for purchases (Ms. Trudel paid for the groceries and was then reimbursed, and the same was true of Mr. Gagné in respect of other common expenses or personal expenses of Ms. Trudel and her children), it cannot be concluded that each family operated individually and independently, as Ms. Trudel stated was the case.
[34] If to that are added the trips, the weekends and the joint outings to the movies and the restaurant, even if they occurred only occasionally, it becomes even harder to find that the appellants were not living in a conjugal relationship. And, since it must be mentioned, the fact that they continued to have sexual relations, even if very infrequently, during the years at issue, definitely does not support such a conclusion. The length of the relationship is also a factor worthy of note.
[35] To be sure, it is difficult in the case at bar to pin down the true nature of the relationship maintained by the two appellants. However, I do not think that they have produced sufficient evidence to satisfy me on a balance of probabilities and in the light of the factors considered heretofore by the courts that they were not living in a conjugal relationship during the years at issue. Therefore, they must be considered as spouses during the 1996, 1997 and 1998 taxation years and base taxation years.
[36] The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of August 2001.
"P. R. Dussault"
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true on this 28th day of November 2001.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
2000-1748(IT)I
BETWEEN:
BERNARD GAGNÉ,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on common evidence with the appeals of
Lucie Trudel (2000-2109(IT)I)
on April 26, 2001, at Montréal, Quebec, by
the Honourable Judge P. R. Dussault
Appearances
For the Appellant: The Appellant himself
Counsel for the Respondent: Annick Provencher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax Act for the 1996, 1997 and 1998 taxation years are dismissed.
The appeal from a determination of child tax benefit in respect of the 1996, 1997 and 1998 base taxation years is dismissed.
The whole in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of August 2001.
|
"P. R. Dussault" |
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 28th day of November 2001.
Erich Klein, Revisor
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
2000-2109(IT)I
BETWEEN:
LUCIE TRUDEL,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on common evidence with the appeals of
Bernard Gagné (2000-1748(IT)I)
on April 26, 2001, at Montréal, Quebec, by
the Honourable Judge P. R. Dussault
Appearances
For the Appellant: The Appellant herself
Counsel for the Respondent: Annick Provencher
JUDGMENT
The appeals from the assessments made under the Income Tax Act for the 1996, 1997 and 1998 taxation years are dismissed.
The appeal from a determination of child tax benefit in respect of the 1996, 1997 and 1998 base taxation years is dismissed.
The appeals from determinations concerning payment of the goods and services tax ("GST") credit in respect of the 1996 and 1997 taxation years are dismissed.
The whole in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of August 2001.
|
"P. R. Dussault" |
J.T.C.C.
Translation certified true
on this 28th day of November 2001.
Erich Klein, Revisor
[1] In the personal banking record entitled "Lucie Trudel — Nov. 95 @ July 96", which actually seems to cover, as mentioned earlier, the period from November 1995 to July 1997, there are numerous examples, including the following: February 16, 1996 (cheque #026) $455.32, March 15, 1996 (cheque #35) $1,001.00, March 23, 1996 (cheque #43) $445.36, April 28, 1996 (cheque #61) $728.80, June 3, 1996 (cheque #79) $491.07, September 10, 1996 (cheque #131) $251.89, October 17, 1996 (cheque #135) $852.98, December 7, 1996 (cheque #153) $593.60, December 29, 1996 (cheque #161) $829.21, January 23, 1997 (cheque #167) $294.00, January 22, 1997 (cheque #176) $102.49. There are also numerous examples of this way of doing things in the personal banking record [TRANSLATION] "Lucie Trudel — July 98 — April 2001", although this record concerns to a large extent years that are not at issue in the case at bar.
[2] R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (hereinafter the Act).