Docket: IMM-657-02
Ottawa, Ontario, this 21st day of January, 2003
Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BEAUDRY
BETWEEN:
PREMELA RAVEENDRAN, PRAVEEN RAVEENDRAN,
Through his Litigation Guardian
PREMELA RAVEENDRAN
Applicants
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] The present case is an application on the part of two persons. Premela Raveendran (the "principal applicant") and her son Praveen Raveendran (the "minor applicant") (together, the "applicants") are seeking judicial review of a determination of the Convention Refugee Determination Division ("CRDD" or the "Board) of the Immigration and Refugee Board ("IRB"). The Board determined that the applicants are not Convention refugees.
ISSUE
[2] The question before me is whether the panel of the CRDD, which rendered the decision under review, committed an error of law or an unreasonable finding of fact, as alleged by the applicants, which would justify the intervention of this Court in the decision.
[3] This application is granted for the reasons set out below.
BACKGROUND
[4] The applicants are citizens of Sri Lanka. They are Tamil in origin and hail from northern Sri Lanka._ The CRDD decision for which they seek review is in fact the second decision that the CRDD has made with respect to these applicants. I will expand on this circumstance further in these reasons.
[5] The applicant submitted the Personal Information Form (PIF) to support her first refugee claim in 1996. She submitted another PIF in support of her second claim in 2000. The 2000 PIF was accompanied by the one submitted for the first claim.
[6] In presenting her original claim, the principal applicant specified that she was from a district known as Valvettithurai, where a militant group known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE") has a strong presence. She claimed that her parents and other relatives supported another Tamil group, described only as TULF, and that she joins them in supporting the efforts to create a separate state for Tamils.
[7] In her first PIF, the principal applicant describes the instances in which she and her family were forced to relocate because of fighting between the Sri Lankan Army ("SLA") and the LTTE. A group known as the IPKF targeted those who were suspected of supporting the LTTE, including the principal applicant and her family.
[8] The principal applicant reported that throughout the 1990s, she and her family suffered at the hands of the LTTE and Sri Lankan authorities. They were forced to hand over material possessions and money to the LTTE; the LTTE tried to force the principal applicant to attend classes organized by the group; LTTE members captured and detained the husband of the principal applicant. Following his release, he was arrested and briefly held by police on suspicion of being an LTTE member.
[9] The principal applicant, her son and her husband left Sri Lanka in January 1996. Her husband could not accompany her to North America, as he had been held at the airport over concerns related to the validity of his passport. He reached Canada at a later time. Although his claim was heard together with the first claim of the principal applicant and her son, his was not a claimant before the CRDD in the decision that is the subject of the present case.
[10] The initial claim of the principal applicant and her son was denied in a CRDD decision issued in 1999. As they were required to leave Canada, they went to Buffalo, New York on May 3, 2000. They returned to Niagara Falls, Ontario on August 3, 2000, and presented a new refugee claim to the Senior Immigration Officer ("SIO") on duty at that location.
[11] In the second claim, the principal applicant stressed that since she was from Valvettithurai, and since her identity cards show that she is from that area, she may face problems upon her return to Sri Lanka because officials may presume that she is an LTTE member or supporter. She noted at her hearing, through counsel, that the panel deciding the first claim declined to address this objective fear, as it had already decided that her credibility was insufficient to justify a finding of subjective fear of persecution.
[12] The principal applicant also expressed a fear that if she were to be detained, she would be raped, as many women are according to her evidence. She also fears that the SLA or the LTTE could harm her at any time, as the family has been previously affected by the actions of these groups. In addition, she stated that she was worried for her son, as children as young as ten years of age are recruited or killed by the LTTE. Her son was eight years old at the time of the hearing.
[13] The principal applicant made two other points to support her fears of returning to Sri Lanka. She stated that the length of her stay in North America would lead the SLA and the LTTE to believe that she had a sizeable amount of money, or at least access to money. This could attract unwanted attention to her. It was also pointed out that since her first claim, Sri Lanka passed the Immigrants and Emigrants Act. Although it was passed in 1998, enforcement of the law began only in 2000. Tamils returning to Sri Lanka who have been deported from the countries in which they sought asylum are particularly targeted for arrest under the law. The law does not provide for bail for those charged under it, and those who are charged are almost always convicted and sentenced to at least the minimum term of imprisonment of one year.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
First claim
[14] On February 17, 1999, a two-member panel of the CRDD decided that the principal applicant and her husband and son were not Convention refugees. Suspicion was cast about the honesty of the principal applicant's responses with respect to the length of her stay in the United States. The panel found that all of the child's clothing was made in the U.S., but the principal applicant had removed the tags and labels from them. She explained at the second hearing that she did this because the agent who had arranged for her departure from Sri Lanka recommended that she do so, as those who have spent time abroad face problems upon return to Sri Lanka.
[15] The panel pointed to other discrepancies in the statements of the husband of the principal claimant, and concluded at page 5 (Applicant's Record, page 195):
As the panel has concluded that the testimony of Mr. Velupillai is not credible, his wife's and child's claims, which are based on his alleged experiences, also cannot be based on trustworthy or credible evidence. In addition, the wife's testimony and declarations are not credible and cannot serve to corroborate her husband's story.
Consequently, none of the claimants is deemed to be a "Convention refugee".
[16] An application for judicial review of that decision was filed with this Court. However, leave was not granted as no application record had ever been filed by the applicants.
Second claim
[17] It is this claim which is the subject of the present case. Only the principal applicant and her son were parties to this claim; the husband of the principal applicant was not.
[18] Following a hearing before a two-member panel of the CRDD on November 21, 2001, the panel issued its decision on January 25, 2002. The panel decided that the applicants were not Convention refugees.
[19] The panel had identified res judicata as an issue, noting that this Court addressed this issue in Vasquez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 160 F.T.R 142 (F.C.T.D.), and that this was the second claim for refugee status presented by the applicants.
[20] The panel held that the principles in Vasquez, supra, applied. Even though the judicial review application was not perfected, notwithstanding the fact that the principal applicant had paid counsel to do so, the panel stated that leave might not have been granted in any event. The panel cautioned that the claim before it was not an appeal of the previous decision, nor was it a de novo hearing. It stated that in order for a repeat claim to be validly brought, evidence would have to be presented that could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence prior to the original hearing. The panel therefore focussed on whether evidence existed that could not have been presented to the previous panel, even with due diligence, and whether changes in country conditions or in the circumstances of the applicant would warrant a positive determination at that time even though the previous determination had been negative.
[21] The panel found that no new evidence that could not have been presented to the first panel was offered to it, other than a statement by the principal applicant that the ruling of the first panel did not specifically mention that the principal claimant had lived in Velvattithurai. The panel also noted that while the principal applicant testified that fighting had intensified at times since she left, it could not be found, given the ebbs and flows in the patterns of conflict in Sri Lanka, that the fighting had intensified to such an extent that it would be wrong to deny her claim at that time and expect her to return to northern Sri Lanka.
[22] With respect to the Immigrants and Emigrants Act, the panel expressed its finding on this matter at page 4 of its reasons:
The claimants also submitted that since the last hearing, the Sri Lankan Government had enacted changes to their Emigration Act (sic), that makes it illegal to leave Sri Lanka using false documents and that the claimants would face imprisonment upon returning. The panel does not find this submission to be persuasive. The documentary evidence found in exhibit R-1 does not indicate that all returning Tamil Sri Lankan citizens, who have left their country using illegal documents, are imprisoned nor failed asylum seekers for that matter. The panel further notes that the law is of general application. The panel does not find this factor of potential imprisonment is sufficient to warrant a positive finding in the present case.
[23] The panel noted that the applicant had testified that if she were to return to Sri Lanka alone, she would be at greater risk, and the LTTE would question her as to the whereabouts of her husband and children. She expressed fear that the LTTE would force her to work to earn money for them, and that if she were to return to an area under the control of the LTTE with her husband and children, they would be forced to work for the LTTE, and the LTTE would also compel the children to undergo military training. The panel held that these were not new elements of evidence of changed circumstances particular to the claimant that only arose since her last hearing and that would warrant a favourable decision. Accordingly this evidence was not upheld in her favour.
[24] In addition to res judicata, the other main issue, as outlined by the panel at this hearing, was the failure of the principal applicant and her son to seek asylum in the United States during her stay there. The panel referred to the testimony of the principal applicant that she had been advised not to make such a claim in the United States, and that she had a chance of making a successful claim if she were to return to Canada. The panel drew an adverse credibility inference from the failure of the applicants to make a claim in the United States. They stated that the negative determinations of credibility in the previous hearing also led to the drawing of this influence.
[25] Finally, the panel expressed its opinion that it was not plausible that a thirty-three-year-old woman, which the principal applicant was at the time, and an eight-year-old child, would fit the profile of persons having anything legitimate to fear from Sri Lankan authorities. On these bases the claim was dismissed and the applicants were held not to be Convention refugees.
SUBMISSIONS
Applicant
a) Ignoring New Evidence
[26] The panel found that even though fighting in Sri Lanka has continued and intensified since the applicants left that country, there was no evidence brought by the applicants that changes in conditions in Sri Lanka since the determination of the first claim were such that they would be more affected personally by those changes. The applicants submit, however, that the board ignored new evidence of increased targeting of civilians by Sri Lankan security forces. In particular, in 1999, the principal applicant's house had been bombed by the Sri Lankan Navy, leaving her with no home left to go to in that country.
[27] The panel also ignored documentary evidence showing that women, in particular young Tamil women from northern Sri Lanka, are at risk of abuse, including rape, by security forces. Evidence was also brought regarding human rights abuses against children, including torture and murder. The finding of the panel that the applicants do not fit the profile of LTTE supporters ignores this fresh, relevant evidence. It is therefore an error of the sort which led to the Court setting aside the decision of a panel in Rosales v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 72 F.T.R. 1 (F.C.T.D.).
b) Illegal Departure from Sri Lanka
[28] The finding of the panel on this issue is quoted above. It contains at least two major errors. One is that it suggests that the panel required the applicants to show that all Tamil citizens or asylum seekers returning to their country are imprisoned, thereby requiring the applicants to show not merely a probability but a certainty of future persecution. This is an incorrect burden of proof. The other error of the panel was to characterize the law as one of "general application". This assertion is contradicted by the evidence that was before the panel, which shows that Tamils who have sought asylum elsewhere are the targets for enforcement of this law.
c) Failure to claim in the U.S.
[29] The principal applicant explained that she did not claim in the United States because she was advised not only that she could return to Canada after ninety days and make another claim, but also that Tamils are not accepted in the U.S. and that she would therefore be sent back. When an applicant explains conduct that is in question, the explanation must be properly considered by the panel. The explanation of the principal applicant for her decision not to claim asylum in the U.S. was reasonable. However, the panel focussed on the interaction of the principal applicant with her counsel and overlooked her testimony that she had been told by church workers and refugees in the U.S. not to claim asylum in that country. The finding of the panel was therefore unreasonable and cannot stand.
Respondent
a) Lack of Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
(i) Lack of Subjective Risk
[30] The panel was entitled to consider the failure of the applicant to claim refugee status in the United States. It did not err in finding that this decision on the part of the principal applicant was not consistent with someone who genuinely feared persecution and needed protection. The panel did consider the explanations of the principal applicant for her failure to claim refugee protection in the United States, contrary to the submission of the applicant. The panel was entitled to make the finding that it made on this issue based on the evidence.
(ii) Lack of Objective Risk
[31] The panel, in finding that the applicants did not fit the profile of LTTE supporters, preferred the evidence in the RCO Disclosure Package, submitted by the Refugee Claims Officer. The panel believed that this evidence was more objective than the documentary evidence offered by the applicants. The decision to prefer certain evidence over others is a matter of weighing evidence, which is within the purview of the panel. As long as its findings are rationally based on the material before it, the decision of the panel should not be interfered with. In any event, the applicants ought to have submitted the RCO Disclosure Package to this Court with their application if they wished to argue with the findings of the panel based on it. They did not do so.
[32] In light of the above, it must be concluded that the panel did consider whether there was an objective basis to the claim of the principal applicant that she and her son would face a well-founded risk of persecution if returned to Sri Lanka. The subjective and objective fear of the applicants were considered.
[33] In Mylvaganam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1195 (T.D.) (QL), and Seevaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 167 F.T.R. 130 (F.C.T.D.), the decisions of the respective panels were overturned. Those panels, having found that the applicants before them were not credible, ended their analyses prematurely, without considering whether there was an objective basis. These decisions are not applicable to the present case in light of the effort by the panel to consider both the subjective and objective fear of the applicants.
b) Analysis of New Evidence
[34] The allegation of the principal applicant that a key piece of evidence was overlooked cannot be supported. The fact that the home of the applicants was allegedly destroyed in 1999 does not establish an objective basis for a fear of persecution based on imputed political opinion or membership in a particular social group. By the admissions of counsel for the applicants, the house had been deserted for many years and was in a zone of high-intensity conflict. It cannot therefore be concluded that the applicants were specifically targeted; therefore, the applicants have failed to establish that the panel overlooked or ignored a key piece of evidence.
c) Laws of General Application
[35] The panel did not make a reviewable error in its interpretation of the Immigrants and Emigrants Act. It found that the applicants had violated a law of general application and found that they would be prosecuted rather than persecuted for violating that law. The documentary evidence does not establish that the applicants would be specifically targeted by the law for reasons related to a Convention ground. The law is neutral and is one of general application.
Applicant's Reply
[36] The respondent failed to show that the panel considered the evidence, which overwhelmingly indicated that the principal applicant, a young woman from northern Sri Lanka and from Velvattithurai in particular, was at risk of persecution in Sri Lanka. The panel did not explain that it preferred the RCO Disclosure Package over the evidence of the applicants because it was more objective; it simply stated that it accepted the evidence in that package without addressing the documentary evidence as a whole, which contained strong evidence that the applicants were at risk in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the panel did not cite any references to support its finding that the applicants did not fit the profile of LTTE supporters.
[37] Mylvaganam, supra and Seevaratnam, supra are applicable to the case at bar. In the present case, as in the cases cited, the CRDD found the applicants not to be credible and failed to consider whether they were objectively at risk. This panel refused to consider that question based on its interpretation of Vasquez, which was in error.
[38] The respondent has not denied that the panel overlooked the destruction of the principal applicant's house in Sri Lanka. The applicants do not need to show that they were specifically targeted in Sri Lanka. She are part of a group that is persecuted on the basis of a Convention ground and can therefore establish a refugee claim on that basis. The applicant advanced that argument in support of her claim. The panel ought to have stated that the bombing of the principal applicant's house was not for a reason related to the Convention if it held that view. The reasons show that, in fact, the panel did not consider it.
[39] The applicants did not need to show that the Immigrants and Emigrants Act specifically targeted them for persecution. They needed only to show that there was more than a mere possibility that they would face persecution based on their identity as Tamils. The evidence shows that the law is used selectively against Tamils who have tried and failed to claim refugee protection in Western countries, and that their treatment frequently amounted to persecution.
[40] The reasons of the panel do not support the submissions of the respondent that the panel considered the advice given to the applicant by refugees and church workers in the U.S. that if she were to claim asylum there, it would be denied and she would be sent back. The passage of the reasons quoted by the respondent supports the submission of the applicant that the panel only considered the advice given by counsel. The panel also does not explain how a decision not to claim refugee status in a country that will refuse it and deport the applicant is inconsistent with a genuine fear of persecution.
Respondent's Further Memorandum of Argument
[41] The onus of proof is on the applicants to establish that they have a right to come into Canada and, in the context of a refugee claim, to provide clear and convincing proof of the foundation of their claim for refugee status. The onus is therefore on the applicants, not the respondent, to demonstrate that the panel failed to consider all the documentary evidence before it. The panel found that according to the documentary evidence in the RCO Disclosure Package, neither applicant fit the profile of an LTTE supporter. This was a reasonable finding and the applicants have advanced no evidence to back up their claim that the panel erred. The evidence emphasized by the applicants may have highlighted documentation of particular incidents involving women and children, but this does not establish that they fit the profile of LTTE supporters.
[42] It is not reasonable to expect the panel to make reference to particular documents in stating its finding that there was no evidence in the RCO Disclosure package. It was only reasonable and logical for it to refer to the entire package when discussing the context of that package.
[43] The panel clearly considered whether or not there was an objective basis for the alleged fear of persecution. The panel simply found, after a careful review of all of the evidence, that the applicants had not established an objective basis for their alleged well-founded fear of persecution.
[44] What the applicants are attempting to do is to impugn the decision of the panel whose decision is under review in the instant case by making arguments with respect to the decision of the panel that decided their first claim. That decision has been upheld by this Court, and it is not now open to the applicants to attempt to impugn that decision in order to find fault with the decision under review.
[45] The panel did not commit an error by failing to summarize all of the evidence in its written reasons. The panel is entitled to prefer certain documentary evidence over other evidence, and is not obliged to refer to all of the evidence: Hassan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 147 N.R. 317 (F.C.A.). Indeed, a presumption exists to the effect that all documentary evidence was taken into account: Florea v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 598 (F.C.A.) (QL).
[46] The evidence highlighted by the applicants does not establish that the Immigrants and Emigrants Act is selectively applied. This argument is not supported by any evidentiary foundation, and the applicants have failed to establish that the panel erred in its interpretation of the documentary evidence regarding the Immigrants and Emigrants Act or its finding that this is a law of general application.
ANALYSIS
New Evidence
[47] The period between the decision in the first claim and that in the second claim was three years, not just ninety days. During that period, a great deal of additional evidence became available with respect to conditions in Sri Lanka. In addition, as will be discussed below, there were opportunities during this period to observe the practical effects of the Immigrants and Emigrants Act, which had only been passed by the Sri Lankan government in 1998 and was not yet being enforced with the same assiduity with which it was subsequently applied.
[48] The effects of the law are only one example of the new evidence that was made available after the hearing of the first claim. Many of the specific events of which the applicants have submitted reports took place between the hearings of the first and second claims.
[49] In Seevaratnam and Mylvaganam, the applicants in those cases had documentary evidence that confirmed their identities and the risks faced by those similarly situated to them. The decisions of the respective panels in those cases were set aside for failure to consider this evidence. What was said in these cases can be said in the case at bar. Having accepted the identity of the applicants as Tamils, the panel ought to have considered the evidence pointing to the persecutory treatment of Tamils in northern Sri Lanka. The objective bases of the claims of the applicants were not adequately considered.
[50] The applicants have submitted that fighting in their region has intensified since the last claim, and that, among other developments since then, their house was destroyed by Sri Lankan military personnel. At page 4 of the reasons, the panel states:
In regard to whether there are any changes in country conditions in Sri Lanka, or whether there are any changes to the circumstances particular to the claimant subsequent to the last negative determination that would warrant a positive determination today, the claimant alleged that fighting has continued and intensified since she left Sri Lanka, however, there was no indication given that the claimants would be more effected (sic) personally by any changes. The panel notes that the nature of the conflict in the north of Sri Lanka between the government forces and the LTTE has many ebbs and flows and periods of intense fighting in localized locations and then even periods of cease fires. The panel finds that the claimant did not provide credible or trustworthy evidence to persuade the panel that the fighting has intensified to such a degree in the north of Sri Lanka since she left and since she made her last claim, that it would be wrong to deny her claim at this date and to expect her to return to the north of Sri Lanka.
[51] The decision with respect to the weight to be given the evidence rests with the panel, and the panel is not required to mention every piece of evidence simply to establish that it was considered. However, the assertion of the panel that the applicants provided absolutely no credible or trustworthy evidence to support their claims that the situation has worsened, without further justification, cannot stand. The Certified Record of the CRDD contains a great deal of documentary evidence that was available to this panel and which shows that attacks against civilians and destruction of property were particularly frequent and destructive in the Jaffna peninsula, where Velvattithurai is located and where most Sri Lankan Tamils live. This evidence came from a variety of sources, not just one or two interest groups. If the panel did not accept this evidence as credible or trustworthy, it was open to them to make that finding, but that finding would seem patently unreasonable without ample justification indicating that at least a perfunctory glance was given to the mounds of evidence supporting the arguments of the applicant.
[52] The panel also stated this conclusion at page 6 of its reasons:
[...] A review of the documentary evidence provided by the RCO Disclosure Package of July 2001 [...], does not indicate that a 33 year-old female Tamil and her 8 year-old son would fit the profile of supporters of the LTTE. The panel accepts the objective evidence in the RCO Disclosure Package. The panel does not find that it is plausible that a woman fitting the claimant's age and profile would have anything to fear from the Sri Lankan government authorities.
[53] The applicant correctly notes that the panel did not say that it preferred the RCO Disclosure Package over other documentary evidence, and that it did not say that it was making reference to that source of evidence rather than others because it was more objective. The panel has arrived at a conclusion that is not supported by the totality of the evidence before it. Documentary evidence submitted by the applicants includes reports that the heaviest fighting to date took place in November 1999 (Certified Record, page 246). Other reports describe the detention of a mother of two for two years on suspicion that she had been supporting LTTE members by providing food to them, and the recruitment of children by LTTE members who visit their schools.
[54] The conclusion of the panel that the applicants did not "fit the profile" of LTTE supporters has relatively little meaning without at least some explanation of what the "profile" is like, in the view of the panel. In addition, the evidence suggests that Sri Lankan authorities do not make a concerted attempt to "profile" who does or who does not support the LTTE. The documentary evidence shows that arrests have been made against persons who are simply suspected of supporting the LTTE in any manner. No reference in these reports is made to any profile.
[55] Should another panel, considering the evidence before this Court, come to the same conclusion as this panel; that is, that the evidence does not disclose an objective basis for the applicants' fear of persecution, that finding will be open to them to make. However, in light of this panel's incomplete analysis and reasoning, whose incomplete state can be gleaned from a plain reading of the reasons of the panel, its findings with respect to the evidence cannot be allowed to stand.
Immigrants and Emigrants Act
[56] The findings of the panel in this regard, as quoted above, are in error. The applicants are not required to prove that all Sri Lankan Tamils returning to the country following failed asylum claims are arrested and detained. They need only to demonstrate a reasonable probability that they could be unfairly targeted by this law on Convention grounds.
[57] This Court has already held that the Immigrants and Emigrants Act is not, in practice, a law of general application. In Balasubramaniyam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 952, 16 Imm. L.R. (3d) 292, the decision of a Post Claim Determination Officer (PCDO) was under review. At paragraph 11, Hansen J. made these remarks with respect to that law:
I accept that the Immigrants and Emigrants Act of Sri Lanka, on its face, is an ordinary law of general application to all citizens of Sri Lanka. I also accept that the penalty provisions of the Act are equally applicable to all those found guilty of an offence under the Act. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the enforcement of the Act is racially neutral, that the penalty itself does not constitute an extreme sanction, or that the incarceration following conviction will not result in inhumane treatment. [emphasis in the original]
Since the hearing of the first claim, evidence has come to light with respect to the selective enforcement of this law and the treatment of those who are charged and convicted under it. To state that it is a law of general application ignores the reality of its use as a tool of persecution, as disclosed by the evidence offered by the applicant in this case, and by previous determinations of this Court. The determination of the panel must be reconsidered in light of these elements.
Failure to claim refugee protection in the United States
[58] The panel, in its discussion of the decision of the applicants not to claim refugee protection in the United States and the advice on which that claim was based, mentioned only that the applicant had spoken with counsel. The panel stated that she "may have received that advice or may not have". The panel went on to state that it expects that a refugee would take "every reasonable opportunity" to seek international protection.
[59] In my view, a subjective determination of what constitutes a reasonable opportunity is appropriate in this case. The principal applicant understood, based on the advice that she claims to have received from other refugees and church workers, that there was a chain of causality between making a claim for asylum in the United States and being sent back to Sri Lanka, where her fears of torture and mistreatment could materialize. This explanation with the other elements already mentioned by the applicant satisfies me that she had a well-founded fear of persecution by being returned to Sri Lanka.
[60] For these reasons, the judicial review is allowed. The decision of the CRDD issued January 25, 2002 is set aside and this matter is remitted to another panel of the CRDD for re-hearing and re-determination in a manner consistent with these reasons.
[61] The parties had the opportunity to raise serious questions of general importance for certification and none were proposed. Therefore, no serious question of general importance will be certified.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. The judicial review is allowed.
2. The decision of the CRDD issued January 25, 2002 is set aside and this matter is remitted to another panel of the CRDD for re-hearing and re-determination in a manner consistent with these reasons.
3. No serious question of general importance is certified.
_______________________
Judge
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: IMM-657-02
STYLE OF CAUSE:PREMELA RAVEENDRAN et al
Applicants
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: January 9, 2003
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: The Honourable Mr. Justice Beaudry
DATED: January 21, 2003
APPEARANCES BY:
Mr. D. Clifford Luyt FOR THE APPLICANT
Ms. Patricia MacPhee FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Mr. D. Clifford Luyt FOR THE APPLICANT
Jackman, Waldman & Associates
Toronto, Ontario
Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Toronto, Ontario
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Date: 20030121
Docket: IMM-657-02
BETWEEN:
PREMELA RAVEENDRAN et al
Applicants
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER