Date: 20031219
Docket: T-66-02
Citation: 2003 FC 1503
Ottawa, Ontario, this 19th day of December, 2003
Present: The Honourable Justice James Russell
BETWEEN:
LINDA HIEBERT
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister of National Revenue ("Minister"), dated December 13, 2001, ("Decision") whereby the request of Linda Hiebert ("Applicant") for remission of penalty pursuant to subsection 3.3(1) of the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.) ("Act") was refused. The Applicant also makes application for a declaration that ss. 124 and 127 of the Act are unconstitutional on the ground that the sections are arbitrary, a denial of natural justice and a violation of s. 7 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
BACKGROUND
[2] The Applicant purchased a business in 1990 which involved the importation of men's dress shirts from Hong Kong. In the course of operating the business, the Applicant imported articles of clothing in response to custom orders from clients in the Winnipeg area. Between 1992 and 1997, the Applicant undervalued imported shirts on 79 occasions. The value for duty of those shirts totalled $266,677.54. The amount of revenue that was unpaid as a result of the undervaluations was $68,839.19.
[3] On December 8, 1997, the Minister determined that the Applicant, through her brokers, had undervalued goods being imported, with the result that the Minister served a Notice of Ascertained Forfeiture ("Notice") on the Applicant under s. 124 of the Act. An ascertained forfeiture is a process whereby, if it is impractical or impossible to seize forfeited goods, a certain amount of money is demanded in lieu of seizure. In the Notice, the Applicant was requested to pay $206,517.57 in lieu of actual seizure of the goods.
[4] Penalties under ss. 109.1 , 109.11, or 109.2 of the Act were not assessed against the Applicant.
[5] In the Notice the Minister advised the Applicant that the sole manner of review available to the Applicant was an application to the Minister pursuant to s. 129 of the Act. Section 129 of the Act stipulates that a person may, within thirty days after the date of the Notice, request a decision of the Minister under s. 131. The Applicant made such a request.
[6] The Applicant notes that the Minister's statement on the Notice did not disclose that the Minister's powers under s. 131 of the Act in response to a s. 129 application do not include the power to review the amount of the penalty imposed under s. 124 of the Act.
[7] The Applicant requested several extensions of time to provide submissions for the Minister's review of his decision under s. 131 of the Act. The Applicant's submissions were finally completed on July 1, 2000.
[8] The Applicant, through her broker, made an application pursuant to s. 129 for reconsideration of the penalty imposed under s. 124 of the Act.
[9] Subsequently, in support of the application made by her broker, the solicitor for the Applicant filed representations with the Minister seeking a reconsideration of the amount of the penalty imposed on December 8, 1997.
[10] On July 20, 2001, the Applicant was advised by the Minister that her application was dismissed. The Minister advised the Applicant that she could appeal to the Federal Court in accordance with s. 135 of the Act.
[11] On October 23, 2001, the Applicant, on the advise of counsel, determined that an appeal to the Federal Court under s. 135 was not available with respect to the quantum of the assessment. So the Applicant made application under ss. 3.3(1) of the Act to the Minister under the fairness policy seeking a reduction of the sum payable under the Notice dated December 8, 1997.
[12] On December 13, 2001, the Minister's representative advised the Applicant that the Minister would not reduce the sum payable since, in the view of the Minister, an ascertained forfeiture did not constitute a penalty. This Decision is the subject of this Application. The Minister again directed the Applicant that the only appeal from his Decision lay in accordance with s. 135 of the Act to the Federal Court.
PERTINENT LEGISLATION
[13] The relevant sections of the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960, c. 44) are as follows:
| 1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely,
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law;
... 2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to
...
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations;
|
|
1. Il est par les présentes reconnu et déclaré que les droits de l'homme et les libertés fondamentales ci-après énoncés ont existé et continueront à exister pour tout individu au Canada quels que soient sa race, son origine nationale, sa couleur, sa religion ou son sexe :
a) le droit de l'individu à la vie, à la liberté, à la sécurité de la personne ainsi qu'à la jouissance de ses biens, et le droit de ne s'en voir privé que par l'application régulière de la loi;
...
2. Toute loi du Canada, à moins qu'une loi du Parlement du Canada ne déclare expressément qu'elle s'appliquera nonobstant la Déclaration canadienne des droits, doit s'interpréter et s'appliquer de manière à ne pas supprimer, restreindre ou enfreindre l'un quelconque des droits ou des libertés reconnus et déclarés aux présentes, ni à en autoriser la suppression, la diminution ou la transgression, et en particulier, nulle loi du Canada ne doit s'interpréter ni s'appliquer comme
...
e) privant une personne du droit à une audition impartiale de sa cause, selon les principes de justice fondamentale, pour la définition de ses droits et obligations; |
|
|
|
|
[14] The relevant sections of the Customs Act, R.S., 1995, c. 1 (2nd Supp.) are as follows:
| 3.3 (1) The Minister or any officer designated by the Minister for the purposes of this section may at any time waive or cancel all or any portion of any penalty or interest otherwise payable by a person under this Act.
109.1 (1) Every person who fails to comply with any provision of an Act or a regulation designated by the regulations made under subsection (3) is liable to a penalty of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars, as the Minister may direct.
Failure to comply
(2) Every person who fails to comply with any term or condition of a licence issued under this Act or the Customs Tariff or any obligation undertaken under section 4.1 is liable to a penalty of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars, as the Minister may direct.
Designation by regulation
(3) The Governor in Council may make regulations
(a) designating any provisions of this Act, the Customs Tariff or the Special Import Measures Act or of any regulation made under any of those Acts; and
(b) establishing short-form descriptions of the provisions designated under paragraph (a) and providing for the use of those descriptions....
109.11 [Repealed, 2001, c. 25, s. 62]
Definition of "designated goods"
109.2 (1) In this section, "designated goods" includes firearms, weapons, ammunition and any other goods classified under Chapter 93 of the List of Tariff Provisions set out in the schedule to the Customs Tariff or under tariff item No. 9898.00.00 of that List.
Contravention relating to tobacco products and designated goods
Assessment
109.3 (1) A penalty to which a person is liable under section 109.1 or 109.2 may be assessed by an officer and, if an assessment is made, an officer shall serve on the person a written notice of that assessment by sending it by registered or certified mail or delivering it to the person.
Limitation on assessment
(2) A person shall not be assessed penalties under both sections 109.1 and 109.2 in respect of the same contravention of this Act, the Customs Tariff or the Special Import Measures Act or the regulations made under those Acts.
Penalty in addition to other sanction
(3) An assessment under subsection (1) may be made in addition to a seizure under this Act or a demand for payment under section 124, in respect of the same contravention of this Act or the regulations.
Sufficiency of short-form description
(4) The use on a notice of assessment of a short-form description established under paragraph 109.1(3)(b) or of a description that deviates from that description without affecting its substance is sufficient for all purposes to describe the contravention.
...
110. (1) An officer may, where he believes on reasonable grounds that this Act or the regulations have been contravened in respect of goods, seize as forfeit
(a) the goods; or
(b) any conveyance that the officer believes on reasonable grounds was made use of in respect of the goods, whether at or after the time of the contravention.
Seizure of conveyances
(2) An officer may, where he believes on reasonable grounds that this Act or the regulations have been contravened in respect of a conveyance or in respect of persons transported by a conveyance, seize as forfeit the conveyance.
Seizure of evidence
(3) An officer may, where he believes on reasonable grounds that this Act or the regulations have been contravened, seize anything that he believes on reasonable grounds will afford evidence in respect of the contravention.
Notice of seizure
(4) An officer who seizes goods or a conveyance as forfeit under subsection (1) or (2) shall take such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to give notice of the seizure to any person who the officer believes on reasonable grounds is entitled to make an application under section 138 in respect of the goods or conveyance.
...
123. The forfeiture of goods or conveyances seized under this Act or any money or security held as forfeit in lieu of such goods or conveyances is final and not subject to review or to be restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with except to the extent and in the manner provided by sections 127.1 and 129.
124. (1) Where an officer believes on reasonable grounds that a person has contravened any of the provisions of this Act or the regulations in respect of any goods or conveyance, the officer may, if the goods or conveyance is not found or if the seizure thereof would be impractical, serve a written notice on that person demanding payment of (a) an amount of money determined under subsection (2) or (3), as the case may be; or
(b) such lesser amount as the Minister may direct.
(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(a), an officer may demand payment in respect of goods of an amount of money of a value equal to the aggregate of the value for duty of the goods and the amount of duties levied thereon, if any, calculated at the rates applicable thereto
(a) at the time the notice is served, if the goods have not been accounted for under subsection 32(1), (2) or (5) or if duties or additional duties have become due on the goods under paragraph 32.2(2)(b) in circumstances to which subsection 32.2(6) applies; or
(b) at the time the goods were accounted for under subsection 32(1), (2) or (5), in any other case.
(3) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(a), an officer may demand payment in respect of a conveyance of an amount of money of a value equal to the value of the conveyance at the time the notice is served, as determined by the Minister.
(4) For the purpose of calculating the amount of money referred to in subsection (2), where the value for duty of goods cannot be ascertained, the value of the goods at the time the notice is served under subsection (1), as determined by the Minister, may be substituted for the value for duty thereof.
(4.1) Sections 117 and 119 and subsection (2) apply to a contravention of this Act or the regulations in respect of goods that have been or are about to be exported, except that the references to "value for duty of the goods" in those provisions are to be read as references to "value of the goods".
(4.2) For the purposes of subsection (4.1), the expression "value of the goods" means the total of all payments made or to be made by the purchaser of the goods to or for the benefit of the vendor.
(4.3) If the value of the goods cannot be determined under subsection (4.2), the Minister may determine that value.
(5) Service of the notice referred to in subsection (1) is sufficient if it is sent by registered mail addressed to the person on whom it is to be served at his latest known address.
(6) A person on whom a notice of ascertained forfeiture has been served shall pay, in addition to the amount set out in the notice, interest at the prescribed rate for the period beginning on the day after the notice was served and ending on the day the amount is paid in full, calculated on the outstanding balance. However, interest is not payable if the amount is paid in full within thirty days after the date of the notice.
...
127. The debt due to Her Majesty as a result of a notice served under section 109.3 or a demand under section 124 is final and not subject to review or to be restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with except to the extent and in the manner provided by sections 127.1 and 129.
127.1 (1) The Minister, or any officer designated by the Minister for the purposes of this section, may cancel a seizure made under section 110, cancel or reduce a penalty assessed under section 109.3 or an amount demanded under section 124 or refund an amount received under any of sections 117 to 119 within thirty days after the seizure, assessment or demand, if
(a) the Minister is satisfied that there was no contravention; or
(b) there was a contravention but the Minister considers that there was an error with respect to the amount assessed, collected, demanded or taken as security and that the amount should be reduced.
(2) If an amount is returned to a person under paragraph (1)(a), the person shall be given interest on that amount at the prescribed rate for the period beginning on the day after the amount was originally paid by that person and ending on the day it was returned.
...
129. (1) The following persons may, within ninety days after the date of a seizure or the service of a notice, request a decision of the Minister under section 131 by giving notice in writing, or by any other means satisfactory to the Minister, to the officer who seized the goods or conveyance or served the notice or caused it to be served, or to an officer at the customs office closest to the place where the seizure took place or closest to the place from where the notice was served:
(a) any person from whom goods or a conveyance is seized under this Act;
(b) any person who owns goods or a conveyance that is seized under this Act;
(c) any person from whom money or security is received pursuant to section 117, 118 or 119 in respect of goods or a conveyance seized under this Act; or
(d) any person on whom a notice is served under section 109.3 or 124.
(2) The burden of proof that notice was given under subsection (1) lies on the person claiming to have given the notice.
...
131. (1) After the expiration of the thirty days referred to in subsection 130(2), the Minister shall, as soon as is reasonably possible having regard to the circumstances, consider and weigh the circumstances of the case and decide
(a) in the case of goods or a conveyance seized or with respect to which a notice was served under section 124 on the ground that this Act or the regulations were contravened in respect of the goods or the conveyance, whether the Act or the regulations were so contravened;
(b) in the case of a conveyance seized or in respect of which a notice was served under section 124 on the ground that it was made use of in respect of goods in respect of which this Act or the regulations were contravened, whether the conveyance was made use of in that way and whether the Act or the regulations were so contravened; or
(c) in the case of a penalty assessed under section 109.3 against a person for failure to comply with subsection 109.1(1) or (2) or a provision that is designated under subsection 109.1(3), whether the person so failed to comply.
(d) [Repealed, 2001, c. 25, s. 72]
(1.1) A person on whom a notice is served under section 130 may notify the Minister, in writing, that the person will not be furnishing evidence under that section and authorize the Minister to make a decision without delay in the matter.
(2) The Minister shall, forthwith on making a decision under subsection (1), serve on the person who requested the decision a detailed written notice of the decision.
(3) The Minister's decision under subsection (1) is not subject to review or to be restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with except to the extent and in the manner provided by subsection 135(1).
...
133. (1) Where the Minister decides, under paragraph 131(1)(a) or (b), that there has been a contravention of this Act or the regulations in respect of the goods or conveyance referred to in that paragraph, and, in the case of a conveyance referred to in paragraph 131(1)(b), that it was used in the manner described in that paragraph, the Minister may, subject to such terms and conditions as the Minister may determine,
(a) return the goods or conveyance on receipt of an amount of money of a value equal to an amount determined under subsection (2) or (3), as the case may be;
(b) remit any portion of any money or security taken; and
(c) where the Minister considers that insufficient money or security was taken or where no money or security was received, demand such amount of money as he considers sufficient, not exceeding an amount determined under subsection (4) or (5), as the case may be.
(1.1) If the Minister decides under paragraph 131(1)(c) that the person failed to comply, the Minister may, subject to any terms and conditions that the Minister may determine,
(a) remit any portion of the penalty assessed under section 109.3; or
(b) demand that an additional amount be paid.
If an additional amount is demanded, the total of the amount assessed and the additional amount may not exceed the maximum penalty that could be assessed under section 109.3. (2) Goods may be returned under paragraph (1)(a) on receipt of an amount of money of a value equal to
(a) the aggregate of the value for duty of the goods and the amount of duties levied thereon, if any, calculated at the rates applicable thereto
(i) at the time of seizure, if the goods have not been accounted for under subsection 32(1), (2) or (5) or if duties or additional duties have become due on the goods under paragraph 32.2(2)(b) in circumstances to which subsection 32.2(6) applies, or
(ii) at the time the goods were accounted for under subsection 32(1), (2) or (5), in any other case; or
(b) such lesser amount as the Minister may direct.
Return of a conveyance under paragraph (1)(a)
(3) A conveyance may be returned under paragraph (1)(a) on receipt of an amount of money of a value equal to
(a) the value of the conveyance at the time of seizure, as determined by the Minister; or
(b) such lesser amount as the Minister may direct.
Amount demanded in respect of goods under paragraph (1)(c)
(4) The amount of money that the Minister may demand under paragraph (1)(c) in respect of goods shall not exceed an amount equal to the aggregate of the value for duty of the goods and the amount of duties levied thereon, if any, calculated at the rates applicable thereto,
(a) at the time of seizure or of service of the notice under section 124, if the goods have not been accounted for under subsection 32(1), (2) or (5) or if duties or additional duties have become due on the goods under paragraph 32.2(2)(b) in circumstances to which subsection 32.2(6) applies; or
(b) at the time the goods were accounted for under subsection 32(1), (2) or (5), in any other case.
Amount demanded in respect of conveyance under paragraph (1)(c) (5) The amount of money that the Minister may demand under paragraph (1)(c) in respect of a conveyance shall not exceed an amount equal to the value of the conveyance at the time of seizure or of service of the notice under section 124, as determined by the Minister.
(6) For the purpose of calculating the amount of money referred to in subsection (2) or (4), where the value for duty of goods cannot be ascertained, the value of the goods at the time of seizure or of service of the notice under section 124, as determined by the Minister, may be substituted for the value for duty thereof.
(7) If an amount of money is demanded under paragraph (1)(c) or (1.1)(b), the person to whom the demand is made shall pay the amount demanded together with interest at the prescribed rate for the period beginning on the day after the notice is served under subsection 131(2) and ending on the day the amount has been paid in full, calculated on the outstanding balance of the amount. However, interest is not payable if the amount demanded is paid in full within thirty days after the notice is served. ...
135. (1) A person who requests a decision of the Minister under section 131 may, within ninety days after being notified of the decision, appeal the decision by way of an action in the Federal Court in which that person is the plaintiff and the Minister is the defendant.
(2) The Federal Court Act and the Federal Court Rules applicable to ordinary actions apply in respect of actions instituted under subsection (1) except as varied by special rules made in respect of such actions. |
|
3.3 (1) Le ministre ou l'agent qu'il charge de l'application du présent article peut, en tout temps, annuler tout ou partie des pénalités ou intérêts à payer par ailleurs par une personne en application de la présente loi, ou y renoncer.
109.1 (1) Est passible d'une pénalité maximale de vingt-cinq mille dollars fixée par le ministre quiconque omet de se conformer à une disposition d'une loi ou d'un règlement, désignée par un règlement pris en vertu du paragraphe (3).
Défaut de se conformer
(2) Est passible d'une pénalité maximale de vingt-cinq mille dollars fixée par le ministre quiconque omet de se conformer à une condition d'un agrément octroyé en vertu de la présente loi ou du Tarif des douanes ou à une obligation prévue dans un engagement accepté en vertu de l'article 4.1.
Prescription par règlement
(3) Le gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement :
a) désigner toute disposition de la présente loi, du Tarif des douanes ou de la Loi sur les mesures spéciales d'importation, ou de leurs règlements d'application;
b) formuler les descriptions abrégées des dispositions désignées en vertu de l'alinéa a) et prévoir l'utilisation de ces descriptions. ...
109.11 [Abrogé, 2001, ch. 25, art. 62]
Définition de « marchandises désignées »
109.2 (1) Pour l'application du présent article, « marchandises désignées » s'entend notamment des armes à feu, des armes, des munitions et des autres marchandises classées dans le Chapitre 93 de la liste des dispositions tarifaires de l'annexe du Tarif des douanes ou dans le no tarifaire 9898.00.00 de cette liste.
Infraction liée à des produits du tabac ou à des marchandises désignées
Cotisation
109.3 (1) Les pénalités prévues aux articles 109.1 ou 109.2 peuvent être établies par l'agent. Le cas échéant, un avis écrit de cotisation concernant la pénalité est signifié à personne ou par courrier recommandé ou certifié par l'agent à la personne tenue de la payer.
Restriction
(2) Une infraction à la présente loi, au Tarif des douanes, à la Loi sur les mesures spéciales d'importation ou à leurs règlements d'application ne peut faire l'objet à la fois de la pénalité prévue à l'article 109.1 et de celle prévue à l'article 109.2.
Pénalité supplémentaire
(3) Une saisie effectuée en vertu de la présente loi ou l'avis réclamant un paiement en vertu de l'article 124 relativement à une infraction donnée à la présente loi ou à ses règlements d'application n'empêche pas l'établissement d'une pénalité en vertu du paragraphe (1) pour la même infraction.
Emploi de la description abrégée
(4) Pour caractériser une contravention, il suffit d'en reporter sur l'avis de cotisation la description abrégée visée à l'alinéa 109.1(3)b) ou toute autre description qui n'en diffère pas quant au fond.
...
110. (1) L'agent peut, s'il croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, à une infraction à la présente loi ou à ses règlements du fait de marchandises, saisir à titre de confiscation :
a) les marchandises;
b) les moyens de transport dont il croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, qu'ils ont servi au transport de ces marchandises, lors ou à la suite de l'infraction.
Saisie des moyens de transport
(2) L'agent peut, s'il croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, à une infraction à la présente loi ou à ses règlements du fait d'un moyen de transport ou des personnes se trouvant à son bord, le saisir à titre de confiscation.
Saisie des moyens de preuve
(3) L'agent peut, s'il croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, à une infraction à la présente loi ou à ses règlements, saisir tous éléments dont il croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, qu'ils peuvent servir de moyens de preuve de l'infraction.
Avis de la saisie
(4) L'agent qui procède à la saisie-confiscation prévue au paragraphe (1) ou (2) prend les mesures convenables, eu égard aux circonstances, pour aviser de la saisie toute personne dont il croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, qu'elle a le droit de présenter, à l'égard des biens saisis à titre de confiscation, la requête visée à l'article 138.
...
123. La confiscation des marchandises ou des moyens de transport saisis en vertu de la présente loi, ou celle des sommes ou garanties qui en tiennent lieu, est définitive et n'est susceptible de révision, de restriction, d'interdiction, d'annulation, de rejet ou de toute autre forme d'intervention que dans la mesure et selon les modalités prévues aux articles 127.1 et 129.
124. (1) L'agent qui croit, pour des motifs raisonnables, à une infraction à la présente loi ou à ses règlements du fait de marchandises ou de moyens de transport peut, si on ne les trouve pas ou si leur saisie est problématique, réclamer par avis écrit au contrevenant :
a) soit le paiement du montant déterminé conformément au paragraphe (2) ou (3), selon le cas;
b) soit le paiement du montant inférieur ordonné par le ministre.
(2) Pour l'application de l'alinéa (1)a), s'il s'agit de marchandises, le paiement que peut réclamer l'agent est celui du total de leur valeur en douane et des droits éventuellement perçus sur elles, calculés au taux applicable :
a) au moment de la signification de l'avis, si elles n'ont pas fait l'objet de la déclaration en détail ou de la déclaration provisoire prévues au paragraphe 32(1), (2) ou (5) ou si elles sont passibles des droits ou droits supplémentaires prévus à l'alinéa 32.2(2)b) dans le cas visé au paragraphe 32.2(6);
b) au moment où elles ont fait l'objet de la déclaration en détail ou de la déclaration provisoire prévues au paragraphe 32(1), (2) ou (5), dans les autres cas.
(3) Pour l'application de l'alinéa (1)a), s'il s'agit de moyens de transport, le paiement que peut réclamer l'agent est celui de leur contre-valeur, déterminée par le ministre, au moment de la signification de l'avis.
(4) Dans les cas où, pour les calculs visés au paragraphe (2), il est impossible d'établir la valeur en douane des marchandises, on peut y substituer leur valeur, déterminée par le ministre, au moment de la signification de l'avis.
(4.1) Les articles 117 et 119 et le paragraphe (2) s'appliquent aux infractions à la présente loi ou aux règlements à l'égard de marchandises exportées ou sur le point de l'être, la mention de « valeur en douane des marchandises » valant mention de « valeur des marchandises » .
(4.2) Pour l'application du paragraphe (4.1), la valeur des marchandises est égale à l'ensemble de tous les paiements que l'acheteur a faits, ou s'est engagé à faire, au vendeur ou au profit de celui-ci à leur égard.
(4.3) Dans le cas où il est impossible d'établir la valeur des marchandises en application du paragraphe (4.2), le ministre peut déterminer cette valeur.
(5) Il suffit, pour que l'avis prévu au paragraphe (1) soit considéré comme signifié, qu'il soit envoyé en recommandé à la dernière adresse connue du destinataire.
(6) Le destinataire de l'avis est tenu de payer, en plus de la somme mentionnée dans l'avis, des intérêts au taux réglementaire, calculés sur le solde impayé pour la période allant du lendemain de la signification de l'avis jusqu'au jour du paiement intégral de la somme. Toutefois, aucun intérêt n'est exigible si la somme est payée intégralement dans les trente jours suivant la date de l'avis.
...
127. La créance de Sa Majesté résultant d'un avis signifié en vertu de l'article 109.3 ou d'une réclamation effectuée en vertu de l'article 124 est définitive et n'est susceptible de révision, de restriction, d'interdiction, d'annulation, de rejet ou de toute autre forme d'intervention que dans la mesure et selon les modalités prévues aux articles 127.1 et 129.
127.1 (1) Le ministre ou l'agent qu'il désigne pour l'application du présent article peut annuler une saisie faite en vertu de l'article 110, annuler ou réduire une pénalité établie en vertu de l'article 109.3 ou une somme réclamée en vertu de l'article 124 ou rembourser un montant reçu en vertu de l'un des articles 117 à 119, dans les trente jours suivant la saisie ou l'établissement de la pénalité ou la réclamation dans les cas suivants :
a) le ministre est convaincu qu'aucune infraction n'a été commise;
b) il y a eu infraction, mais le ministre est d'avis qu'une erreur a été commise concernant la somme établie, versée ou réclamée et que celle-ci doit être réduite.
(2) La somme qui est remboursée à une personne en vertu de l'alinéa (1)a) est majorée des intérêts au taux réglementaire, calculés à compter du lendemain du jour du paiement de la somme par cette personne jusqu'à celui de son remboursement.
...
129. (1) Les personnes ci-après peuvent, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la saisie ou la signification de l'avis, en s'adressant par écrit, ou par tout autre moyen que le ministre juge indiqué, à l'agent qui a saisi les biens ou les moyens de transport ou a signifié ou fait signifier l'avis, ou à un agent du bureau de douane le plus proche du lieu de la saisie ou de la signification, présenter une demande en vue de faire rendre au ministre la décision prévue à l'article 131 :
a) celles entre les mains de qui ont été saisis des marchandises ou des moyens de transport en vertu de la présente loi;
b) celles à qui appartiennent les marchandises ou les moyens de transport saisis en vertu de la présente loi;
c) celles de qui ont été reçus les montants ou garanties prévus à l'article 117, 118 ou 119 concernant des marchandises ou des moyens de transport saisis en vertu de la présente loi;
d) celles à qui a été signifié l'avis prévu aux articles 109.3 ou 124.
(2) Il incombe à la personne qui prétend avoir présenté la demande visée au paragraphe (1) de prouver qu'elle l'a présentée.
...
131. (1) Après l'expiration des trente jours visés au paragraphe 130(2), le ministre étudie, dans les meilleurs délais possible en l'espèce, les circonstances de l'affaire et décide si c'est valablement qu'a été retenu, selon le cas :
a) le motif d'infraction à la présente loi ou à ses règlements pour justifier soit la saisie des marchandises ou des moyens de transport en cause, soit la signification à leur sujet de l'avis prévu à l'article 124;
b) le motif d'utilisation des moyens de transport en cause dans le transport de marchandises ayant donné lieu à une infraction aux mêmes loi ou règlements, ou le motif de cette infraction, pour justifier soit la saisie de ces moyens de transport, soit la signification à leur sujet de l'avis prévu à l'article 124;
c) le motif de non-conformité aux paragraphes 109.1(1) ou (2) ou à une disposition désignée en vertu du paragraphe 109.1(3) pour justifier l'établissement d'une pénalité en vertu de l'article 109.3, peu importe s'il y a réellement eu non-conformité.
d) [Abrogé, 2001, ch. 25, art. 72]
(1.1) La personne à qui a été signifié un avis visé à l'article 130 peut aviser par écrit le ministre qu'elle ne produira pas de moyens de preuve en application de cet article et autoriser le ministre à rendre sans délai une décision sur la question.
(2) Dès qu'il a rendu sa décision, le ministre en signifie par écrit un avis détaillé à la personne qui en a fait la demande.
(3) La décision rendue par le ministre en vertu du paragraphe (1) n'est susceptible d'appel, de restriction, d'interdiction, d'annulation, de rejet ou de toute autre forme d'intervention que dans la mesure et selon les modalités prévues au paragraphe 135(1).
...
133. (1) Le ministre, s'il décide, en vertu des alinéas 131(1)a) ou b), que les motifs d'infraction et, dans le cas des moyens de transport visés à l'alinéa 131(1)b), que les motifs d'utilisation ont été valablement retenus, peut, aux conditions qu'il fixe :
a) restituer les marchandises ou les moyens de transport sur réception du montant déterminé conformément au paragraphe (2) ou (3), selon le cas;
b) restituer toute fraction des montants ou garanties reçus;
c) réclamer, si nul montant n'a été versé ou nulle garantie donnée, ou s'il estime ces montant ou garantie insuffisants, le montant qu'il juge suffisant, à concurrence de celui déterminé conformément au paragraphe (4) ou (5), selon le cas.
(1.1) Le ministre, s'il décide en vertu de l'alinéa 131(1)c) que la personne ne s'est pas conformée, peut, aux conditions qu'il fixe :
a) remettre à la personne une portion de la pénalité établie en vertu de l'article 109.3;
b) réclamer une somme supplémentaire.
Toutefois, la totalité de celle-ci et de la somme établie ne doit pas dépasser le montant maximal de la pénalité qui peut être établie en vertu de l'article 109.3.
(2) La restitution visée à l'alinéa (1)a) peut, s'il s'agit de marchandises, s'effectuer sur réception :
a) soit du total de leur valeur en douane et des droits éventuellement perçus sur elles, calculés au taux applicable :
(i) au moment de la saisie, si elles n'ont pas fait l'objet de la déclaration en détail ou de la déclaration provisoire prévues au paragraphe 32(1), (2) ou (5), ou si elles sont passibles des droits ou droits supplémentaires prévus à l'alinéa 32.2(2)b) dans le cas visé au paragraphe 32.2(6),
(ii) au moment où elles ont fait l'objet de la déclaration en détail ou de la déclaration provisoire prévues au paragraphe 32(1), (2) ou (5), dans les autres cas;
b) soit du montant inférieur que le ministre ordonne.
Restitution des moyens de transport
(3) La restitution visée à l'alinéa (1)a) peut, s'il s'agit de moyens de transport, s'effectuer sur réception :
a) soit de leur contre-valeur, déterminée par le ministre, au moment de la saisie;
b) soit du montant inférieur que celui-ci ordonne.
Réclamation : marchandises
(4) Le montant susceptible d'être réclamé en vertu de l'alinéa (1)c) ne peut, s'il s'agit de marchandises, dépasser le total de leur valeur en douane et des droits éventuellement perçus sur elles, calculés au taux applicable :
a) au moment de la saisie ou de la signification de l'avis prévu à l'article 124, si elles n'ont pas fait l'objet d'une déclaration en détail ou d'une déclaration provisoire prévues au paragraphe 32(1), (2) ou (5), ou si elles sont passibles des droits ou droits supplémentaires prévus à l'alinéa 32.2(2)b) dans le cas visé au paragraphe 32.2(6);
b) au moment où elles ont fait l'objet de la déclaration en détail ou de la déclaration provisoire prévues au paragraphe 32(1), (2) ou (5), dans les autres cas.
Réclamation : moyens de transport (5) Le montant susceptible d'être réclamé en vertu de l'alinéa (1)c) ne peut, s'il s'agit de moyens de transport, dépasser leur contre-valeur, déterminée par le ministre, au moment de la saisie ou de la signification de l'avis prévu à l'article 124.
(6) Dans les cas où, pour les calculs visés au paragraphe (2) ou (4), il est impossible d'établir la valeur en douane des marchandises, on peut y substituer leur valeur, déterminée par le ministre, au moment de la saisie ou de la signification de l'avis prévu à l'article 124.
(7) Les personnes à qui une somme est réclamée en application des alinéas (1)c) ou (1.1)b) versent avec la somme réclamée des intérêts au taux réglementaire, calculés sur les arriérés pour la période commençant le lendemain de la signification de l'avis prévu au paragraphe 131(2) et se terminant le jour du paiement intégral de la somme. Toutefois, aucun intérêt n'est exigible si la pénalité est payée intégralement dans les trente jours suivant la signification de l'avis.
...
135. (1) Toute personne qui a demandé que soit rendue une décision en vertu de l'article 131 peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la communication de cette décision, en appeler par voie d'action devant la Cour fédérale, à titre de demandeur, le ministre étant le défendeur.
(2) La Loi sur la Cour fédérale et les Règles de la Cour fédérale applicables aux actions ordinaires s'appliquent aux actions intentées en vertu du paragraphe (1), sous réserve des adaptations occasionnées par les règles particulières à ces actions. |
|
|
|
|
ISSUES
[15] The Applicant raises the following issues:
Whether the Minister erred in refusing to entertain the Applicant's request for fairness in accordance with subsection 3.3(1) of the Act.
Whether the Minister acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond his jurisdiction, or otherwise refused to exercise his jurisdiction, in refusing to exercise his discretion pursuant to subsection 3.3(1) of the Act.
Whether in refusing to review the matter of the penalty imposed under subsection 124 of the Act, the Minister acted in such a way as to fail to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or any other procedure that he was required by law to so observe.
Whether the imposition of the penalty by the Minister pursuant to section 124 of the Act was arbitrary, in violation of the Applicant's right to due process, and a denial of natural justice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[16] The Supreme Court of Canada in Dr. Q. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19, [2003] S.C.J. No. 18 at paras. 20-25 confirmed the ascendancy of the pragmatic and functional approach in the review of administrative decisions. This multi-factoral approach must be applied in order to determine the standard of review in every case where there is a review of an administrative decision-maker. In the present application, however, I find that conclusions are the same irrespective of the standard of review applied. I will, therefore, assess each of the issues raised by the Applicant against a standard of correctness.
ANALYSIS
Did the Minister err in refusing to consider the Applicant's request for fairness under subsection 3.3(1) of the Act on the basis that an ascertained forfeiture is not a penalty?
[17] The Minister refused to consider the Applicant's request for fairness under s. 3.3(1) of the Act on the grounds that an ascertained forfeiture does not constitute a penalty. The Applicant submits that any amount assessed by the Minister above and beyond the amount of duty otherwise payable by the Applicant constitutes a penalty because the additional amount is neither duty otherwise payable in accordance with the provisions of the Customs Tariff, or interest arising out of a non-payment of duty. The Applicant submits that any sum assessed in excess of the duty payable is a "punishment" imposed on a transgressor under the Act by the Minister.
[18] The Respondent notes that s. 3.3(1) allows the Minister to waive or cancel a penalty otherwise payable by a person under the Act. So the only question before the Court is whether an ascertained forfeiture is a penalty under the Act. If it is not, then the Respondent asserts that the Minister properly refused to consider waiving or cancelling the ascertained forfeiture, because his discretion to waive is limited to penalties and interest payable under the Act.
[19] The Applicant submits that this Court has stated that the imposition of an assessment pursuant to ss. 124(1) of the Act constitutes the imposition of a penalty (ACL Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) (1993), 68 F.T.R. 180 (F.C.T.D.) at 187). Hence, the Applicant argues that the additional amount assessed against the Applicant above the amount assessed under the Customs Tariff constitutes a penalty within the common and ordinary meaning of that word.
[20] The Applicant points out that the Act does not define the term "penalty." Hence, the Court must look to the plain meaning of the word in accordance with its common usage. (Sullivan and Driedger, On The Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Toronto, Butterworths, 2002) at p. 20).
[21] The Respondent points out that goods become forfeit from the time of contravention of the Act. No act or proceeding is necessary to effect the forfeiture. Forfeiture is merely the legal, inescapable consequence of the commission of the contravention, R. v. Mason, [1935] S.C.R. 513, He v. Canada, [2000] F.C.J. No. 93 (F.C.T.D.).
[22] The amount of money that an officer can demand in lieu of forfeited goods may not exceed the value for duty of those goods plus the duty levied on those goods. For example, in the present case, the ascertained forfeiture could not exceed $335,516.73.
[23] The Respondent submits that an ascertained forfeiture is final and can only be reviewed in the manner provided by s. 129. This is because Parliament clearly did not intend that a forfeiture be subject to review other than in the context of a request under s. 129.
[24] The Respondent points out that the Act does expressly provide for penalties in ss. 109.1, 109.11 (now repealed) and 109.2. These penalties are, as the term "penalty" suggests, a financial amount assessed against a person as a punishment for violation of the Act. These penalties may be assessed in addition to a seizure of forfeited goods. It is these penalties alone that can be the subject of a review under s. 3.3(1) of the Act.
[25] The Respondent notes that, in ss. 127 and 127.1 of the Act, notices of ascertained forfeiture under s. 124 are distinguished from penalties assessed under ss. 109.1, 109.11 and 109.2, thus indicating Parliament's intention that the amounts be considered different in nature. According to the Respondent, because a forfeiture does not amount to a penalty but is, rather, the legal, inescapable consequence of the commission of a contravention, the Minister was correct in refusing to apply s. 3.3(1) of the Act to the Applicant's ascertained forfeiture.
[26] The Applicant submits that the Minister has wrongfully declined jurisdiction in refusing to consider the request for fairness under ss. 3.3(1) and has fettered his discretion through an erroneous interpretation of the application of ss. 3.3(1). (Berthier v. Canada (Minister of Labour) (2000), 190 F.T.R. 149 (F.C.T.D.), Stark v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) (1997), 213 N.R. 75 (F.C.A.).
[27] With respect, I must disagree with the Applicant on this issue. The intentions of Parliament are clear in the wording and the scheme of the Act. Section 127 distinguishes clearly between an "amount demanded under s. 124" (i.e. on an ascertained forfeiture) and penalties described in other sections of the Act.
[28] The Act also provides a distinct way of dealing with ascertained forfeiture amounts in the event that there is a dispute over contravention or quantums. This is done by way of ss. 129, 131 and 133. Section 133 clearly gives the Minister the power to adjust any amount assessed by way of ascertained forfeiture.
[29] In the context of the scheme provided by the Act for dealing with penalties and other payment, the common usage and dictionary meanings of the term "penalty" are not particularly helpful as a means of gauging Parliamentary intent. Here, the statutory scheme and context yield a more cogent answer.
[30] The Applicant has suggested that MacKay J. in ACL Canada Inc., supra, came to a different conclusion and decided that a forfeiture (or sum substituted therefore) was indeed a penalty. But, upon review of that case, I am convinced that MacKay J. did not make such a finding. The distinction was not before him in that case and his use of the word "penalty" did not occur within the context of ss.3.3(1) of the Act.
[31] From this I conclude it was Parliament's intent to deal with sums assessed under the ascertained forfeiture procedure by way of ss. 129, 131 and 133 of the Act and not by way of s. 3.3(1).
[32] The Minister committed no reviewable error in informing the Applicant to this effect.
[33] For the same reasons, I find that the Minister did not act without jurisdiction, act beyond his jurisdiction, or otherwise refuse to exercise his jurisdiction under ss. 3.3(1) of the Act in relation to the Applicant's request.
Did the Minister err in refusing to review the matter of the penalty imposed under section 124 of the Act by failing to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or any other procedure that he was required by law to observe?
[34] The Applicant submits that, since imposition of the penalty pursuant to s. 124 is itself an arbitrary act, in the absence of any rights of appeal therefrom, the refusal of the Minister to reconsider his decision in response to the application made by the Applicant pursuant to ss. 3.3(1) of the Act denied the Applicant the opportunity to be heard both with respect to the initial imposition of the penalty and with respect to any reconsideration of that decision.
[35] Accordingly, the Applicant submits that, when the Minister refused to carry out a reconsideration of the imposition of the penalty in this case, the Minister failed to observe natural justice, procedural fairness, or any other procedure that he was required by law to observe.
[36] The Respondent submits that the Applicant's argument in this regard is essentially that the Minister arbitrarily assessed a penalty under s. 124, and then refused to reconsider that penalty under ss. 3.3(1). The Respondent notes that the Applicant's suggestion is that she was not given the right to participate in the making of the administrative decision, both in respect of the initial imposition of the ascertained forfeiture, and any reconsideration of that action. However, the Respondent takes the position that this matter is not before me on this Application, which deals with the ss. 3.3(1) decision only, and that the Applicant's assertions in this regard are incorrect.
[37] Although the ascertained forfeiture is not under review, the Respondent points out that it was not imposed in an arbitrary manner. The ascertained forfeiture took the place of an actual forfeiture of goods. Those goods were forfeit simply by virtue of their undervaluation.
[38] A review of whether the goods should have been forfeit did, in fact, occur. The Respondent notes that the Applicant took 2½ years to complete her submissions in this regard, and she was assisted by counsel throughout the process. Her submissions contained letters of reference, the transcript of the sentencing hearing for the Applicant on her criminal charge, the Applicant's background, and various other documents. The July 20, 2001, letter containing the Minister's decision on that question indicates that the material provided by the Applicant was reviewed. The Respondent submits that, as a result, the Applicant had ample opportunity to participate in the making of the decision and in fact took part in that decision.
[39] The Respondent contends that, in suggesting that the imposition of the ascertained forfeiture was arbitrary, and that as a result the failure to reconsider it under ss. 3.3(1) violates concepts of natural justice and procedural fairness, the Applicant is asking this Court to ignore the fact that the imposition of the ascertained forfeiture was indeed the subject of review by the Minister when the Applicant's submissions were considered.
[40] Additionally, the Respondent points out that, at the time the Minister issued his decision under s. 131 of the Act, he also issued a demand for payment under s. 133. Section 133 allows the Minister to consider whether too much or too little money was taken from the Applicant, once he has decided that a contravention has taken place. The amount of money that can be demanded of a person is limited to the duty value of the goods plus the duty levied thereon. The Respondent submits that this is the same limitation that appears in s. 124 of the Act.
[41] The Respondent notes that the s. 133 demand is contained in the Minister's July 20, 2001 letter, which also indicates that the documentation provided by the Applicant was reviewed.
[42] Therefore, the Respondent submits that the Applicant cannot now complain that the ascertained forfeiture was arbitrary and not subject to any review. Both the fact of the forfeiture and the amount of money demanded in lieu of seizure of the goods were reviewed by the Minister in the context of his s. 131 decision and s. 133 demand.
[43] The Applicant, who was assisted by counsel, chose not to seek judicial review of the s. 133 demand and neither the ascertained forfeiture, the Minister's s. 131 decision, nor the Minister's demand under s. 133 are under review as part of this Application.
[44] Once again, I have to agree with the Respondent in this regard. The Applicant's motion contains a request that ss. 124 and 127 of the Act be declared unconstitutional on the ground that the sections are arbitrary, a denial of natural justice and a contravention of s. 7 of The Constitution Act, 1982. But the only decision of the Minister this court is asked to review is the one "dated December 13, 2001 whereby the Applicant's request for remission of penalty pursuant to subsection 3.3(1) of The Customs Act was refused." I do not have before me either evidence or argument on other decisions that have been made in relation to the Applicant.
[45] The Applicant's real argument here is that she feels she was misled by the Minister's correspondence into following procedures that prevented a decision ever being made on the quantum aspect of the ascertained forfeiture. Her complaint was never that she had not contravened the Act; she merely wanted to question and have reconsidered the amount of the assessment. She communicated this to the Minister and, following the several decisions, she was notified about her rights of review under the Act. However, she feels she was misled because the procedures for review that the Minister brought to her attention could not lead to a reconsideration of the amount of the assessment, which was the only matter of concern to her.
[46] On the Notice, the Minister advised the Applicant that the sole manner of review available to her was an application under s. 129 of the Act. She was not advised that the Minister's powers under s. 131 of the Act did not allow the amount to be assessed.
[47] Consequently, when, through her broker, she made an application under s. 129 for reconsideration of the sum assessed under s. 124, her application was dismissed by the Minister who then advised her that an appeal lay to the Federal Court in accordance with s. 135 of the Act. What the Minister did not tell her was that such an appeal could not yield a review of the quantum of the assessment because the jurisprudence of the court associated with that section has concluded that a review of quantum is not available.
[48] This is why, at the end of the day, the Applicant concluded she had to apply to the Minister under ss. 3.3(1) of the Act, with a request that the fairness policy under that section be exercised over the sum assessed by ascertained forfeiture.
[49] I am certainly sympathetic to the Applicant's sense of frustration in this regard. But her lack of understanding concerning the appropriate procedure to follow cannot be laid at the feet of the Minister and I do not find the Minister's notices to the Applicant misleading in this regard.
[50] There is no evidence before me that the Applicant's submissions and documentation on the quantum issue were not considered by the Minister as part of the s. 131 application and the s. 133 determination of what sum the Applicant should pay. In fact, the decision of July 20, 2001 contains a demand under s. 133 and specifically informs the Applicant that the review undertaken by the Minister "was based on the documentation you provided as well as the official Agency reports."
[51] The Applicant was always at liberty to seek legal advice on the significance of the information and decisions obtained for the Minister. The fact that she failed to appreciate fully the scheme of the Act in so far as it applied to her situation does not assist her present application to have the Minister's ss. 3.3(1) decision reviewed, and it does not amount to a failure to observe natural justice, procedural fairness or the legal procedure on the part of the Minister.
Was the imposition of the penalty by the Minister pursuant to section 124 of the Act arbitrary, in violation of the Applicant's right to due process, and a denial of natural justice?
[52] The Applicant argues that the Act does not provide for any mechanism whereby the recipient of a notice of ascertained forfeiture can challenge the calculation of the amount of duty payable or any additional amount assessed under ss. 124(2) or 124(4) of the Act. The Applicant submits that this means that the Minister's determination could be excessive and result in the Crown acquiring monies to which it is not entitled.
[53] The Applicant submits that this renders the Minister's determination arbitrary because, if the amount of duty payable or the value of goods is calculated erroneously, any person in receipt of a Notice of Ascertained Forfeiture has no means under the Act to ensure that the amount payable is lawful.
[54] The Applicant further submits that the Minister's power to determine the amount in accordance with ss. 124(1) of the Act is arbitrary insofar as the Minister can impose whatever amount he or she wishes as a penalty without recourse to any provision of the Act or applicable regulations as to the quantum involved.
[55] The Applicant takes the position that s.127 of the Act precludes any appeal other than as prescribed by s. 129 of the Act and s. 129 does not allow for any appeal from the determination of the Minister as to the amount imposed under s. 124.
[56] The Applicant submits that an appeal under s. 129 of the Act is addressed by the Minister under s. 131, which permits the Minister to review whether a contravention of the Act has occurred, but does not provide any discretion with respect to the quantum of the amounts demanded pursuant to s. 124 (ACL Canada Inc., supra, at 197 and 199).
[57] The Respondent's position is that there is no arbitrariness involved. Once there is a contravention of the Act, the goods are forfeit and, instead of seizing goods, the Minister may issue an ascertained forfeiture, which amount must not exceed the value for duty of the goods plus the duty payable thereon. Whether the goods are indeed forfeit is the subject of Ministerial review under s. 131. In conjunction with that review, the Minister considers whether too much or too little money has been taken in respect of an ascertained forfeiture. In this case, the s. 131 and s. 133 decisions of the Minister were made after consideration of the Applicant's extensive submissions.
[58] The Respondent points out that, in fact, s. 133 of the Act provides a mechanism for the Minister to ensure that there was no error in calculation. Furthermore, in case there is any lingering concern, the Respondent points out that recent amendments to the Act provide for a review of the calculation of any amount assessed, collected, demanded or taken.
[59] The Applicant submits that, since an appeal under s. 131 cannot provide any redress to a party seeking a consideration of a penalty as to quantum, the imposition of that penalty in the absence of statutory or regulatory review is in and of itself arbitrary. Additionally, the Applicant contends that the power to impose a penalty, the quantum of which can be determined unilaterally by the Minister without any rights of appeal, violates the "due process" provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
[60] Relying upon R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 at 294, the Applicant further submits that the courts have held that the statutory provisions that violate the Bill of Rights are subject to the following consequences:
s. 2 is intended to mean and does mean that if a law of Canada cannot be "sensibly construed and applied" so that it does not abrogate, abridge or infringe one of the rights and freedoms recognized and declared by the Bill, then such law is inoperative "unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights"
[61] The majority judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada in Drybones, supra, was built on a foundation of significantly different circumstances than those present in the case before me. Drybones, supra, was based on the principle that an individual is denied equality before the law if it is made an offence punishable at law, on the basis of his/her race, for a person to do something which his/her fellow Canadians are free to do without having committed any offence or having been made subject to any penalty. At issue in Drybones, supra, was s. 94(b) of the Indian Act, which was found to be a provision that created such an offence. In Drybones, supra, it was held the s. 94(b) of the Indian Act could only be construed in such manner that its application would operate so as to abrogate, abridge or infringe one of the rights declared and recognized by the Canadian Bill of Rights. Section 94(b) of the Indian Act was therefore found to be inoperative.
[62] In Bear v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] F.C.J. No. 96 (F.C.A.) (Application for leave to appeal dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 115) the Federal Court of Appeal noted, in relation to paragraph 1(5) of the Bill of Rights, the limited applicability of Drybones, supra, to questions of equality in the administration of the law. As Strayer, J.A. held for the Court:
39. With respect, I believe that the Supreme Court jurisprudence following Drybones adequately demonstrated that paragraph 1(b) did not either explicitly or implicitly guarantee equal benefit of the law. In A.G. of Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349 it was stated, in a judgment supported by the majority of the Court, that paragraph 1(b) did not "invoke the egalitarian concept exemplified by the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ..." but guaranteed only "equality in the administration or application of the law by the law enforcement authorities and the ordinary courts of the land". (Lavell at 1365-66). Thus Drybones was explained as prohibiting the creation of offences for a category of persons defined by race for which other persons could not be brought before the courts. The Court likened this guarantee to the traditional concept of the "rule of law" which in its traditional sense has been taken to mean that everyone, whether citizen or ruler, is subject to the law and the courts. In Bliss v. A.G. of Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 the Supreme Court declined to apply paragraph 1(b) so as to invalidate certain provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act which gave some benefits to one class of women but not to others. The Court distinguished the situation in Drybones, involving the imposition of a penalty on one racial group which was not imposed on anyone else, from the situation in Bliss involving entitlement to benefits. It was not prepared to find a guarantee in paragraph 1(b) of equal benefit of the law. It was indeed against this jurisprudential background that subsection 15(1) of the Charter was drafted with the addition of "equality under the law" and "equal protection" and "equal benefit of the law". (See the discussion of this in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 170). In the post-Charter era when an attempt was made to invoke paragraph 1(b) of the Bill of Rights in respect of legislation differentiating among federally-appointed judges with respect to pension contributions, the Supreme Court declined to revisit this issue. In The Queen v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 90 Dickson C.J. after reviewing the jurisprudence on "equality before the law" under paragraph 1(b) of the Bill of Rights and noting the narrow interpretation which had been given to it, concluded as follows:
I believe the day has passed when it might have been appropriate to re-evaluate those concerns and to reassess the direction this Court has taken in interpreting that document.
40. I must therefore with respect disagree with the applications judge in his conclusion that the failure to extend CPP entitlement to the respondent was a denial of equality before the law within the meaning of paragraph 1(b) of the Bill of Rights. There was nothing here involving a difference in administration or enforcement of the law in respect of the respondent as compared to other Canadian workers in a manner analogous to the situation in Drybones. I believe it is fair to conclude from the jurisprudential history that it was not until the adoption of the Charter, and the coming into force of subsection 15(1) thereof in 1985, that a political will to guarantee equality under the law and equal benefit of the law was given constitutional effect.
[63] I also note the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 40 where Major J. delivered the judgement for the Court:
5. Do the due process protections of the Bill of Rights guard against the expropriation of property by passage of valid legislation? Although s. 1(a) of the Bill of Rights confers certain procedural protections - and may also confer certain substantive protections - I have concluded the answer is no.
6. The Bill of Rights allows the deprivation of the enjoyment of property only through due process of law. At issue in this appeal is the validity of a federal statute that purportedly extinguished the claims of disabled veterans to interest on their governmentally administered pensions.
...
10. The Bill of Rights is a federal statute that renders inoperative federal legislation inconsistent with its protections. It protects rights that existed when the Bill of Rights was enacted, in 1960. If Parliament wishes to circumvent the protections of the Bill of Rights, it must do so explicitly by stating that the legislation in question operates notwithstanding the Bill of Rights. In legislating the bar against claims for interest, Parliament did not explicitly enact this "notwithstanding" clause. As a result, the issue in this appeal is whether the due process rights respecting property that existed in 1960 and were entrenched by the Bill of Rights permit the Crown to deny its liability for the missing interest based on validly enacted legislation.
11. What protections for property are provided by due process?
12. Due process does not require that the veterans receive notice and a hearing before Parliament prior to the passage of expropriative legislation. As unfortunate as it is for the respondent, long-standing parliamentary tradition has never required that procedure.
13. Does due process in this case require an individual hearing before a tribunal? If the effect of legislation requires a hearing or adjudication then that must conform to Canadian jurisprudence demanding a fair hearing. But that is not what was legislated. Here, there is no dispute that if the law is operative, the veterans' rights to damages for the lost interest are extinguished.
14. Does the Bill of Rights require that Parliament give just compensation to the veterans? The governmental expropriation of property without compensation is discouraged by our common law tradition, but it is allowed when Parliament uses clear and unambiguous language to do so.
15. The Department of Veterans Affairs Act, s. 5.1(4) takes a property claim from a vulnerable group, in disregard of the Crown's fiduciary duty to disabled veterans. However, that taking is within the power of Parliament. The appeal has to be allowed.
[64] The Applicant submits that the power of the Minister to unilaterally determine the quantum of monies pursuant to s. 124 of the Act without any right of appeal violates the Applicant's right to the enjoyment of her property and the right not to be "deprived thereof except by due process of law" in accordance with the Bill of Rights.
[65] The Respondent contends that there is no violation of the Bill of Rights by virtue of the nature of ascertained forfeiture under the Act. First of all, the ascertained forfeiture is not a penalty but is the legal, inescapable consequence of the commission of a contravention. The Respondent further submits that there are two stages at which the question of whether goods are forfeit is considered, namely the s. 131 decision and the appeal that is allowed therefrom via s. 135. The s. 133 demand is a decision for which judicial review can be sought before this Court. (ACL Canada Inc., supra)).
[66] The Respondent contends, therefore, that the imposition of an ascertained forfeiture does not deprive the Applicant of her right to enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law.
[67] I am of the opinion that the imposition of a demand by the Minister pursuant to s. 124 of the Act is not arbitrary and, in this case, was not in violation of the Applicant's right to due process. No denial of natural justice took place. The ascertained forfeiture procedure is long-standing, it is equally applicable to everyone who contravenes the Act and, in the provisions of the Act that deal with the consequences of ascertained forfeiture, Parliament has provided both limitations and a scheme of due process that does not run foul of the Bill of Rights and is not arbitrary.
[68] Even if these matters were directly before me in this application, and this is dubious because only the Minister's 3.3(1) Decision is being reviewed, I am satisfied that the Applicant's rights have not been arbitrarily contravened in the case at bar.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. The application for judicial review is dismissed.
2. The Respondent shall have costs of the application.
"James Russell"
J.F.C.
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-66-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: LINDA HIEBERT v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
CANADA
PLACE OF HEARING: WINNIPEG
DATE OF HEARING: SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER : RUSSELL, J.
DATED: DECEMBER 19, 2003
APPEARANCES:
BARBARA SHIELDS FOR THE APPLICANT
TRACEY TELFORD FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
AIKINS, MACAULAY & THORVALDSON FOR THE APPLICANT
WINNIPEG, MB
MORRIS ROSENBERG FOR THE RESPONDENT
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF CANADA