Date: 19990429
Docket: IMM-2606-98
Between :
VENEGAS QUINTANA, LUZ OLIVIA
GALLEGUILLOS, PATRICIA
Applicants
- and -
THE MINISTER
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD, J. :
[1] The applicants, who are citizens of Chile, seek judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) dated April 15, 1998, in which the Board determined they were not Convention refugees as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act. The principal applicant, Mrs. Luz Olivia Venegas Quintana, and her minor daughter claimed refugee status by reason of the threats received from the principal applicant's ex-spouse.
[2] The Board rejected the principal applicant's claim mainly because she did not establish clear and convincing proof of the inability of the state of Chile to provide her its protection:
| La demanderesse a témoigné avoir cherché à obtenir protection des autorités en faisant appel à la police lorsque son ex-conjoint venait proférer des menaces contre elle et sa fille à partir de la rue face à sa résidence. Elle a précisé qu'à chaque fois, son ex-conjoint avait le temps de déguerpir avant l'arrivée de policiers. Ceux-ci cependant prenaient la déposition de la demanderesse sans pour autant que des procédures aient jamais été intentées contre son ex-conjoint. Par ailleurs, la demanderesse ne s'est jamais informée ni n'a jamais su qu'une loi contre la violence conjugale, appelée "Loi sur la violence intrafamiliale", avait été adoptée au mois d'août 1994 et qu'il avait été établi des refuges pour les victimes de violence conjugale. . . . |
| Nous concluons que la preuve documentaire au dossier démontre qu'il existe aujourd'hui au Chili un ensemble de structures gouvernementales en matière familiale qui, malgré les lacunes et faiblesses ci-dessus décrites, fonctionne adéquatement dans son ensemble, qui offrait, et offre encore, à la demanderesse des ressources qui auraient pu l'aider à résoudre la situation de violence familiale dans laquelle elle et sa fille se sont trouvées au Chili, mais dont elle ne s'est pas informée et dont elle ne s'est pas prévalue. |
| [. . .] |
| . . . Cependant, en négligeant de s'adresser aux autorités de son pays et de recourir aux structures mises en place par son gouvernement en matière de violence familiale, la demanderesse n'a pas donné aux autorités chiliennes l'occasion de lui fournir les services et de prendre les mesures qui s'imposaient afin de lui proposer des solutions et d'assurer sa protection et celle de sa fille dans la situation qu'elles vivaient. Par conséquent, dans ces circonstances, elle n'a pas fait la preuve "claire et convaincante" de l'incapacité de l'État chilien d'assurer sa protection. . . . |
[3] The Federal Court of Appeal in M.E.I. v. Villafranca (1992), 150 N.R. 232 stated as follows regarding a state's ability to protect its citizens at page 233:
| The burden of showing that one is not able to avail oneself of the protection of one's own state is not easily satisfied. The test is an objective one and involves the claimant showing either that he is physically prevented from seeking his government's aid (clearly not the case here) or that the government itself is in some way prevented from giving it. |
| No government that makes any claim to democratic values or protection of human rights can guarantee the protection of all of its citizens at all times. Thus, it is not enough for a claimant merely to show that his government has not always been effective at protecting persons in his particular situation. . . . |
| (My emphasis.) |
[4] In Kadenko et al. v. Canada (Solliciteur général) (1996), 206 N.R. 272, Décary J.A. for the Federal Court of Appeal also gave similar reasons at page 274:
| When the state in question is a democratic state, as in the case at bar, the claimant must do more than simply show that he or she went to see some members of the police force and that his or her efforts were unsuccessful. The burden of proof that rests on the claimant is, in a way, directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question: the more democratic the state's institutions, the more the claimant must have done to exhaust all the courses of action open to him or her. . . . |
[5] Applying those principles to the factual situation as it is established by the evidence in the case at bar, I am of the opinion that the applicants have not discharged their burden of showing that the inferences drawn by the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, could not reasonably have been drawn. It appears from the evidence as a whole, including the transcript of the hearing before the tribunal, that the latter based its decision on significant evidence in the record and that it could therefore reasonably conclude as it did. For example, as it appears from the documentary evidence, there is a network of governmental resources available to the victims of domestic violence in Chile:
| - The existence of the law against domestic violence, adopted in 1994, which provides the procedure to denounce acts of domestic violence, designate the competent jurisdiction and its powers. |
| - The establishment of a network of resources for the victims of domestic violence by the Government and the SERNAM (national service for women). |
| - The fact that all police stations have the responsibility and the powers to act in cases of domestic violence. More specifically, the Santiago police station, where the applicant lived, has a special responsibility in this matter. |
[6] Under such circumstances, I cannot find that it was unreasonable for the Board to recognize that, despite some weaknesses of the system, it does function and that the Chilean Government shows its willingness to resolve the problem of domestic violence. In my view, the Board could reasonably presume that the State of Chile was able to protect its citizens in the absence of a complete breakdown of the State apparatus, as established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at 723.
[7] Consequently, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
April 29, 1999