Date: 20031204
Docket: IMM-6211-02
Citation: 2003 FC 1409
Between:
Ala Ben Tahar BLIDI
Applicant
-and-
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD J.:
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision by a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) officer, Vicky Hajdamacha, dated October 28, 2002, that the applicant is not a Convention refugee or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of sections 96 and 97, respectively, of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.
[2] The applicant, Ala Ben Tahar Blidi, is a 24-year-old Tunisian citizen. He arrived in Canada on September 13, 2000 with a visitor's visa that expired on September 21, 2000.
[3] The applicant claimed refugee status on January 19, 2001, alleging that he had a well-founded fear of persecution because of the lack of freedom of expression and the miserable living conditions in Tunisia.
[4] The PRRA officer found that the applicant would not be at risk of persecution or torture, danger to his life or cruel and unusual punishment if he were sent back to Tunisia. According to the officer, the subjective fear of the applicant was not credible.
[5] The assessment of credibility is a question of fact and it is not up to this Court to substitute its findings for that of the PRRA officer unless the applicant can show that her decision was based on an erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before her (paragraph 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7). The PRRA officer has specialized knowledge and she has the power to weigh the evidence as long as her inferences are not unreasonable (see Aguebor v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1993), 160 N.R. 315 (F.C.A.)) and her reasons are given in clear and unmistakable terms (Hilo v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1991), 15 Imm.L.R. (2d) 199 (F.C.A.)).
[6] The applicant submits that the PRRA officer erred in determining that his fear of persecution is a generalized fear. Under the definition of "Convention refugee", the persecution alleged by the applicant must be connected to one of the grounds in the Convention and cannot simply be based on a general fear. The Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, also stated at page 732:
. . . the international community did not intend to offer a haven for all suffering individuals. The need for "persecution" in order to warrant international protection, for example, results in the exclusion of such pleas as those of economic migrants, i.e., individuals in search of better living conditions, and those of victims of natural disasters, even when the home state is unable to provide assistance . . .
[7] In this case, the applicant did not establish, either in his Personal Information Form (PIF) or in his PRRA application that he himself had criticized the Tunisian government or that he had failed to report dissenters to the Tunisian authorities. It is well established that claimants like the applicant must show that there is a reasonable or even serious possibility that he will be persecuted (Adjei v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1989] 2 F.C. 680 (C.A.)). Here, no evidence was adduced to establish that the applicant would be persecuted for one of the grounds in the Convention.
[8] Furthermore, a Convention refugee must have a subjective fear of persecution. In Kamana v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1695 (F.C.T.D.), my colleague, the Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer, found that the lack of evidence "going to the subjective element of the claim is a fatal flaw which in and of itself warrants dismissal of the claim, since both elements of the refugee definition - subjective and objective - must be met". In this case, the applicant did not adduce any evidence to support his claim of a subjective fear of persecution should he return to Tunisia. He seems to allege that he will be persecuted by the Tunisian government because of the statements in his PIF, which was allegedly stolen. He did not, however, offer any evidence to support this allegation; in fact, according to his PRRA application, his documents were simply lost. The PRRA officer was not wrong, therefore, to find that the theft of the applicant's PIF and the applicant's being reported to the government are purely speculative.
[9] Finally, the delay in filing a claim can have a negative impact on the assessment of the credibility of the subjective fear of an applicant because a person who truly fears being persecuted would file a refugee claim at the first opportunity. In this case, the applicant waited four months before making his claim and the PRRA officer was entirely justified in considering this delay in her assessment of subjective fear.
[10] For all of these reasons, the intervention of this Court is not appropriate and the application for judicial review is dismissed.
"Yvon Pinard"
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
December 4, 2003
Certified true translation
Kelley A. Harvey, BA, BCL, LLB
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-6211-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: Ala Ben Tahar BLIDI v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: November 12, 2003
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: The Honourable Mr. Justice Pinard
DATED: December 4, 2003
APPEARANCES:
Jean Baillargeon FOR THE APPLICANT
Jocelyne Murphy FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Jean Baillargeon FOR THE APPLICANT
Sillery, Québec
Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario