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Date: 20010119


Docket: T-1002-00


BETWEEN:


EDUARDO SEBRANGO RODRIGUEZ

Applicant




- and -




THE MINISTER OF

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION



Respondent


     REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

HENEGHAN J.

[1]      Mr. Eduardo Sebrango Rodriguez (the "Applicant") appeals from the decision of Citizenship judge Suzanne Pinel dated May 8, 2000. In her decision, the Citizenship judge refused the Applicant's application for Canadian citizenship.

FACTS

[2]      The Applicant is a Cuban national. On August 1, 1997 he married a Canadian citizen in Cuba and came to Canada as a landed immigrant on June 7, 1998. He is a professional soccer player who has represented Cuba at the highest levels. He is employed as a professional soccer player in Canada. He is the father of a Canadian born child. Since his marriage, the Applicant has diligently tried to obtain the necessary documentation from the Cuban government that would allow him to live in Canada and to enter and depart Cuba without hindrance. Similarly, the Applicant wishes to travel freely in pursuit of his employment as a soccer player and to be in possession of the full rights of a Canadian citizen, rather than merely holding status as a landed immigrant.

[3]      The Citizenship judge reviewed the Applicant's application for citizenship and concluded that he had met all the requirements of section 5(1) of the Act, except the residency requirement. On the evidence before her, she concluded that the Applicant was required to establish residency of 1095 days in Canada prior to making his application for citizenship. Since the Applicant had arrived in Canada only on June 7, 1998 he had not met the residency requirements before making his application September 30, 1999.

[4]      The Citizenship judge then considered whether this was a case in which she could exercise the discretion conferred by section 5(4) of the Act which provides as follows:


5(4) In order to alleviate cases of special and unusual hardship or to reward services of an exceptional value to Canada, and notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Governor in Council may, in his discretion, direct the Minister to grant citizenship to any person and, where such a direction is made, the Minister shall forthwith grant citizenship to the person named in the direction

5(4) Afin de remédier à une situation particulière et inhabituelle de détresse ou de récompenser des services exceptionnels rendus au Canada, le gouverneur en conseil a le pouvoir discrétionnaire, malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi,

d'ordonner au ministre d'attribuer la citoyenneté à toute personne qu'il désigne; le ministre procède alors sans délai à l'attribution.

[5]      The Citizenship judge found, on the basis of the materials and submissions before her, that the Applicant had not shown that he would suffer severe and unusual hardship if Canadian citizenship was not granted at this time. The main reason presented to the Citizenship judge for the exercise of her discretion under the Act was the difficulty experienced by the Applicant in the course of his travel as a professional soccer player. The evidence before the Citizenship judge was that the Applicant experienced delays in passing through international borders because he merely holds a special visa as a Canadian resident, not a Canadian passport.

ANALYSIS

[6]      This appeal from the decision of the Citizenship judge is governed by section 21 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7. Pursuant to Rule 300(c) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, an appeal from the decision of a Citizenship judge is now conducted by way of application. It is a review based on the record before the Citizenship judge and not a trial de novo; see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Chan [1998] F.C.J. No. 742.

[7]      On the hearing of this appeal, the Applicant focused on the fact that he now has the opportunity to be considered as a member of the Canadian National Team for the 2002 World Cup Soccer finals. He argued that the potential for his appointment to the team depends upon his status as a Canadian citizen and submits that the failure of the Citizenship judge to grant him citizenship at this time constitutes severe and unusual hardship to him, in his personal circumstances. In this regard, he relies upon the decision in Mady (Re), [1978] F.C.J. No. 914 , in which a young Romanian athlete sought Canadian citizenship in order to participate in the 1980 Olympic Games.

[8]      The problem with this submission is that the evidence and arguments supporting it were not raised before the Citizenship judge. Pursuant to the current jurisprudence of this court, the issue cannot now be addressed on an appeal from the decision in question.

[9]      The Applicant agrees with the recitation of the facts found in the decision of the Citizenship judge and does not allege any particular error on her part in reaching her conclusion. The foundation of the present appeal is essentially a request for reconsideration of the exercise of discretion vested in the Citizenship judge pursuant to section 5(4) of the Act. However, in the absence of any breach of procedural fairness or evidence that the Citizenship judge considered irrelevant matters in reaching her conclusion, this Court is without authority to interfere with the decision that has been made. This Court is limited to simply reviewing the process followed by the Citizenship judge in making her decision.

[10]      In my opinion, the Citizenship judge considered all the relevant factors, including the status of the Applicant as a professional soccer player whose work requires him to undertake international travel. It appears that the Citizenship judge was not aware of the possible participation of the Applicant in the Canadian National Team for the World Cup Games in 2002. If this was a factor in the Applicant's initial application for citizenship, he should have raised it before the Citizenship judge, and can do so , upon any subsequent application for the exercise of discretion in applying for Canadian citizenship. This fact cannot be considered by this Court in this appeal.

[11]      In conclusion, I find that there is no basis to intervene in the decision which has been made and this application is dismissed, no order as to costs.

                                 "E. Heneghan"

     J.F.C.C.

Toronto, Ontario

January19, 2001





















FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record

COURT NO:                      T-1002-00

STYLE OF CAUSE:                   EDUARDO SEBRANGO RODRIGUEZ

Applicant

                         -and-


                         THE MINISTER OF

                         CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION


Respondent

DATE OF HEARING:              TUESDAY, JANUARY 9, 2001
PLACE OF HEARING:              OTTAWA, ONTARIO

REASONS FOR ORDER

AND ORDER BY:                  HENEGHAN J.

                            

DATED:                      FRIDAY, JANUARY 19, 2001

APPEARANCES BY:              Eduardo Sebrango Rodriguez
                             For the Applicant, on his own behalf
                         Marie Crowley

    

                             For the Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:          Eduardo Sebrango Rodriguez

                         62 Woodburn Drive

                         Gloucester, Ontario

                         K1B 3A7

                             For the Applicant, on his own behalf
                         Morris Rosenberg

                         Deputy Attorney General of Canada

                             For the Respondent

                         FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

                                 Date: 20010119

                                    

         Docket: T-1002-00

                         Between:

                         EDUARDO SEBRANGO RODRIGUEZ

Applicant

                         -and-


                         THE MINISTER OF

                         CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION


Respondent

                        

        

                         REASONS FOR ORDER

                         AND ORDER

                        
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