Date: 20031216
Docket: IMM-4502-02
Citation: 2003 FC 1466
Ottawa, Ontario, this 16th day of December, 2003
Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE O'REILLY
BETWEEN:
TIEN LUU
Applicant
and
THE MINISER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1] Tien Luu was born in Vietnam. He arrived in Canada with his family in 1984, having been sponsored by his older brother. He committed a number crimes over the past decade or so and the Minister took steps to remove him from Canada pursuant to the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, s. 27(1)(d) and s. 32(2) (relevant enactments are set out in an Annex). In September 2001, an adjudicator ordered Mr. Luu's deportation.
[2] Mr. Luu immediately filed a notice of appeal of the deportation order. The appeal was scheduled to be heard by the Immigration Appeal Division in October 2002. In the interim, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 ("IRPA") came into force, specifically, on June 28, 2002. IRPA contains a number of transitional rules, including provisions relating to the continuation or discontinuation of appeals launched under the previous legislation. In September 2002, the Registrar of the Immigration Appeal Division informed Mr. Luu, citing the transitional rules of IRPA, that his appeal was discontinued. Mr. Luu argues that the Registrar misinterpreted those rules. Further, he argues that if the Registrar's decision was correct, then the transitional rules violate the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C., 1960, c. 44 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
[3] I find that the Registrar erred in his interpretation of the transitional rules in IRPA. Accordingly, Mr. Luu is entitled to have his appeal heard and to remain in Canada until it is decided.
Issue
[4] This case raises an issue that has been considered and decided by several of my colleagues: Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FCT 634, [2003] F.C.J. No. 811 (QL) (T.D.); Jones v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FCT 661, [2003] F.C.J. No. 876 (QL) (T.D.); Cartwright v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FCT 792, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1024 (QL) (T.D.); Nokhodchari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FCT 803, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1075 (QL) (T.D.); Amado-Cordeiro v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FC 847, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1087 (QL) (T.D.); Esteban v.Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2003 FC 930, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1181 (QL) (T.D.). The question is whether the transitional rule in s. 196 of IRPA extinguishes appeals by persons in Mr. Luu's situation.
[5] The transitional rules under IRPA relating to appeals to the Appeal Division can be summarized as follows:
1. The general rule is that appeals filed before IRPA came into effect are continued: s. 192. In other words, rights of appeal are generally preserved by IRPA.
2. There is an exception to the general rule. According to s. 196 of IRPA, appeal rights are lost where two conditions exist:
(i) The appellant would not be entitled to an appeal according to the new rules in IRPA. Under section 64 of IRPA, no appeal is available to a person who is inadmissible to Canada because of security concerns, violations of human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality; and
(ii) The appellant was not "granted a stay" under the former Act (which provided for stays in various situations, discussed in more detail below).
[6] It is only the second condition that is in issue here. Mr. Luu comes within s. 64 of IRPA and clearly would not have a right to appeal under the new law. I need say no more about that aspect of s. 196.
[7] The question, then, is whether the second condition exists in Mr. Luu's case: Was he "granted a stay" under the former Act? If so, he would continue to enjoy a right of appeal. If he was not "granted a stay", then the exception to the general rule stipulates that he has lost his right of appeal.
[8] The former Act contained various provisions respecting stays. There were two kinds:
· those imposed by a decision-maker, such as the Appeal Division itself (e.g.: s. 73(1)(c), (d)); and
· those imposed automatically upon a certain event taking place, such as the filing of a notice of appeal (e.g.: s. 49(1)(b)).
[9] The respondent argues that it is only the first kind of stay that matters for purposes of s. 196 of IRPA. In other words, it is only where a person was granted a stay by a decision-maker that IRPA will preserve his or her appeal rights. If a person's stay of removal came about because of an automatic rule of law, such as a stay resulting from the filing of a notice of appeal, the person's appeal rights would be lost because the conditions set out in s. 196 would be satisfied.
[10] The respondent's argument turns on the meaning of the word "granted". It argues that only a person or body can "grant" something. A person who obtains a stay by operation of law cannot be said to have been "granted" a stay. According to this interpretation, persons who obtained automatic stays under the former Act have lost their appeal rights (assuming the other condition under s. 196 has also been met).
[11] I cannot find any basis for concluding that the word "granted" in s. 196 requires a decision by a human actor. To my mind, to say that a person was "granted a stay" by the provisions of a statute does no violence to the English language. And the French version of s. 196 is even clearer: the corresponding words are "il ne fait pas l'objet d'un sursis", which are clearly not limited to stays granted by a person or body.
[12] The respondent argues that if s. 196 is read so as to include automatic as well as discretionary stays then the section would be rendered completely superfluous: few, if any, persons would fall under the exception because all those who filed notices of appeal under the former Act would have their appeals preserved. This, the respondent argues, could not have been the intent of Parliament when it enacted this exception.
[13] As mentioned, the general rule under IRPA is that appeal rights are preserved. An exception is created by s. 196. To my mind, it is perfectly consistent with the clearly expressed policy of preserving appeal rights to create an exception that is drawn narrowly. In any case, the exception would still have meaning. Snider J. noted in Medovarski, above, that persons who had appeals reinstated after IRPA came into force would be caught by s. 196 (at para. 43). I would also note that there are some exceptions to the automatic stays provided under the former Act (s. 49(1.1)).
[14] Accordingly, I find that Mr. Luu has not been stripped of his right of appeal. He was granted a stay by virtue of s. 49(1)(b) of the Immigration Act when he filed his notice of appeal and, therefore, does not fall within the terms of s. 196 of IRPA. I will grant his application for judicial review. It is unnecessary for me to address Mr. Luu's other arguments.
[15] The parties asked me to state a question of general importance in the same terms as in Medovarski, supra:
Does the word "stay" in section 196 of the IRPA contemplate a stay that came into effect under the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 as a result of the operation of paragraph 49(1)(b)?
[16] I will certify this question.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT IS that:
1. The application for judicial review is granted.
2. The applicant has a right of appeal preserved by s. 192 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.
3. The applicant is entitled to remain in Canada until his appeal has been heard and disposed of according to s. 49(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.
4. The following question has been certified:
Does the word "stay" in section 196 of the IRPA contemplate a stay that came into effect under the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 as a result of the operation of paragraph 49(1)(b)?
"James W. O'Reilly"
Judge
Annex
| Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2
Reports on permanent residents
27. (1) An immigration officer or a peace officer shall forward a written report to the Deputy Minister setting out the details of any information in the possession of the immigration officer or peace officer indicating that a permanent resident is a person who
...
(d) has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament, other than an offence designated as a contravention under the Contraventions Act, for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been, or five years or more may be, imposed;
Where person is a permanent resident 32. (2) Where an adjudicator decides that a person who is the subject of an inquiry is a permanent resident described in subsection 27(1), the adjudicator shall, subject to subsections (2.1) and 32.1(2), make a deportation order against that person.
Stay of execution 49. (1) Subject to subsection (1.1), the execution of a removal order made against a person is stayed ... (b) in any case where an appeal from the order has been filed with the Appeal Division, until the appeal has been heard and disposed of or has been declared by the Appeal Division to be abandoned;
Exception 49. (1.1) Subsection (1) does not apply to
(a) a person residing or sojourning in the United States or St. Pierre and Miquelon who is the subject of a report made pursuant to paragraph 20(1)(a); or
(b) a person who has been determined to be not eligible to make a claim to be a Convention refugee by reason of paragraph 46.01(1)(b) and who is to be removed to a country with which the Minister has entered into an agreement under section 108.1 for sharing the responsibility for examining refugee claims. Disposition of appeal 73. (1) The Appeal Division may dispose of an appeal made pursuant to section 70
(c) in the case of an appeal made pursuant to paragraph 70(1)(b) or 70(3)(b) respecting a removal order, by directing that execution of the order be stayed; or
(d) in the case of an appeal made pursuant to paragraph 70(1)(b) or 70(3)(b) respecting a conditional removal order, by directing that execution of the order on its becoming effective be stayed.
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27
No appeal for inadmissibility 64. (1) No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality.
Immigration Appeal Division 192. If a notice of appeal has been filed with the Immigration Appeal Division immediately before the coming into force of this section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act by the Immigration Appeal Division of the Board. *[Note: Section 192 in force June 28, 2002, see SI/2002-97.]
Appeals 196. Despite section 192, an appeal made to the Immigration Appeal Division before the coming into force of this section shall be discontinued if the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of this Act.
*[Note: Section 196 in force June 28, 2002, see SI/2002-97.]
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Loi sur l'immigration, L.R.C. 1985, c.h. I-2
Rapports défavorables: résidentspermanents 27. (1) L'agent d'immigration ou l'agent de la paix doit faire part au sous-ministre, dans un rapport écrit et circonstancié, de renseignements concernant un résident permanent et indiquant que celui-ci, selon le cas:
[...]
d) a été déclaré coupable d'une infraction prévue par une loi fédérale, autre qu'une infraction qualifiée de contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions :
i) soit pour laquelle une peine d'emprisonnement de plus de six mois a été imposée,
ii) soit qui peut être punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à cinq ans;
Résidents permanents 32 .(2) S'il conclut que l'intéressé est un résident permanent se trouvant dans l'une des situations visées au paragraphe 27(1), l'arbitre, sous réserve des paragraphes (2.1) et 32.1(2), prend une mesure d'expulsion contre lui.
Sursis à l'exécution 49. (1) Sauf dans les cas mentionnés au paragraphe (1.1), il est sursis à l'exécution d'une mesure de renvoi: [...] b)en cas d'appel, jusqu'à ce que la section d'appel ait rendu sa décision ou déclaré qu'il y a eu désistement d'appel;
Exception 49. (1.1) Le sursis d'exécution ne s'applique pas dans les cas suivants: a) l'intéressé fait l'objet du rapport prévu à l'alinéa 20(1)a) et réside ou séjourne aux États-Unis ou à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon;
b) la revendication a été jugée irrecevable au titre de l'alinéa 46.01(1)b) et l'intéressé doit être renvoyé dans un pays avec lequel le ministre a conclu un accord en vertu de l'article 108.1 en vue du partage de la responsabilité de l'examen des revendications du statut de réfugié au sens de la Convention. Décision en matière d'appel 73. (1) Ayant à statuer sur un appel interjeté dans le cadre de l'article 70, la section d'appel peut:
c) soit, s'il s'agit d'un appel fondé sur les alinéas 70(1)b) ou 70(3)b) et relatif à une mesure de renvoi, ordonner de surseoir à l'exécution de celle-ci; d) soit, s'il s'agit d'un appel fondé sur les alinéas 70(1)b) ou 70(3)b) et relatif à une mesure de renvoi conditionnel, ordonner de surseoir à l'exécution de celle-ci au moment où elle deviendra exécutoire.
Règlements sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, DORS/2001, ch. 27
Restriction du droit d'appel 64. (1) L'appel ne peut être interjeté par le résident permanent ou l'étranger qui est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux, grande criminalité ou criminalité organisée, ni par dans le cas de l'étranger, son répondant.
Anciennes règles, nouvelles sections 192. S'il y a eu dépôt d'une demande d'appel à la Section d'appel de l'immigration, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, l'appel est continué sous le régime de l'ancienne loi, par la Section d'appel de l'immigration de la Commission. *[Note_: Article 192 en vigueur le 28 juin 2002, voir TR/2002-97.]
Appels 196. Malgré l'article 192, il est mis fin à l'affaire portée en appel devant la Section d'appel de l'immigration si l'intéressé est, alors qu'il ne fait pas l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi, visé par la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi. |
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FEDERAL COURT
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: IMM-4502-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: TIEN LUU v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2003
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AND JUDGMENT BY: THE HON. MR. JUSTICE O'REILLY
DATED: TUESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2003
APPEARANCES BY:
Mr. Cecil L. Rotenberg, Q.C.
Mr. Ron Poulton FOR THE APPLICANT
Mr. Ian Hicks FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Mr. Cecil L. Rotenberg
Barristers & Solicitors
Suite 803 255 Duncan Mill Road
Toronto, ON M3B 3H9 FOR THE APPLICANT
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada FOR THE RESPONDENT