Date: 20031107
Docket: IMM-7524-03
Ottawa, Ontario, this 7th day of November, 2003
Present: The Honourable Mr. Justice Pinard
Between:
CLARENCE ALVIN WOODS
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
Upon motion on behalf of the applicant for an Order staying the exclusion order made against him in this matter until the final disposition of his Application for Leave and for Judicial Review.
ORDER
The motion is dismissed.
JUDGE
Date: 20031107
Docket: IMM-7524-03
Citation: 2003 FC 1308
Between:
CLARENCE ALVIN WOODS
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD J.:
[1] This is a motion on behalf of the applicant for an Order staying the exclusion order made against him in this matter until the final disposition of his Application for Leave and for Judicial Review.
[2] I have serious doubts as to the existence of a serious issue in this matter. However, the motion can otherwise be dismissed on the ground that the applicant has failed to establish that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is returned to his country of origin, the United States of America.
[3] Irreparable harm must be much more substantial harm and more serious than purely personal inconvenience (see Mikhailov v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 642 (Q.L.) (T.D.) and Louis v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1101 (Q.L.) (T.D.)). Harm which amounts to no more than the usual consequences of deportation is not the type contemplated by the jurisprudential tripartite test (see RJR - MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 and Toth v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1988] F.C.J. No. 587 (QL) (C.A.)). As my colleague Pelletier J., as he then was, stated in Melo v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 403 (QL) (T.D.):
[21] . . . if the phrase "irreparable harm" is to retain any meaning at all, it must refer to some prejudice beyond that which is inherent in the notion of deportation itself. To be deported is to lose your job, to be separated from familiar faces and places. It is accompanied by enforced separation and heartbreak. . . .
[4] In this case, mere inconvenience to the applicant's common-law relationship in Ottawa is clearly insufficient to establish irreparable harm. There is no serious likelihood that the applicant's life or safety would be jeopardized. Finally, even if the applicant is removed from Canada, he will still be in a position to pursue his judicial review application. The applicant's counsel can certainly receive evidence and instructions from his client from the United States of America. If the applicant is ultimately successful in these proceedings, it is unlikely that it will be impossible for him to come back to Canada.
[5] Furthermore, given the above circumstances, the balance of convenience favours the respondent, as the latter is under a statutory obligation to ensure that the applicant's removal is carried out as soon as reasonably possible (subsection 48(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27).
[6] Consequently, the motion is dismissed.
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
November 7, 2003
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-7524-03
STYLE OF CAUSE: CLARENCE ALVIN WOODS v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: November 6, 2003
REASONS FOR ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PINARD
DATED: November 7, 2003
APPEARANCES:
Warren L. Creates
Kimberly A. Barber FOR THE APPLICANT
Alexander Gay FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Perley-Robertson, Hill & McDougall LLP FOR THE APPLICANT
Barristers & Solicitors
Ottawa, Ontario
Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario