Federal Court Decisions

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     Date: 19990922

     Docket: T-35-99


Between:

     JUBAIL MOTORS COMPANY,

     Plaintiff,

     AND

     ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,

     Defendant.


     REASONS FOR ORDER


RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY:


[1]      This case concerns a motion by the defendant to dismiss the amended application for judicial review ("the application") filed by the plaintiff. This motion is in the form of a preliminary motion to strike and will be dealt with as such.

[2]      According to the defendant, the application is doomed to failure on its face and should be dismissed: as the plaintiff Jubail Motors Company is not directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought withing the meaning of s. 18.1(1) of the Federal Court Act, it does not have the legal standing to make such an application. Additionally, the grounds of review suggested by Jubail Motors Company are manifestly without foundation and with no chance of success.

[3]      It is clear that for the defendant to be successful in the instant motion its conclusion must be plain and obvious. Any motion to strike in connection with an application for judicial review must be exceptional, in order to promote one of the primary purposes of such an application, namely to move the application along to the hearing on the merits as quickly as possible.

[4]      As Strayer J. mentioned in Bull (David) Laboratories (Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc. et al. (1994), 176 N.R. 48:

     ...[T]he focus in judicial review is on moving the application along to the hearing stage as quickly as possible. This ensures that objections to the originating notice can be dealt with promptly in the context of consideration of the merits of the case.

(See also Merck Frosst Canada Inc. et al. v. Minister of National Health and Welfare et al. (1994), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 245, at 248, and Glaxo Wellcome Inc. et al. v. Minister of National Health and Welfare et al., an unreported judgment of this Court on September 6, 1996, case T-793-96.)

Analysis

[5]      Based on the action taken by the Internal Revenue Service ("the I.R.S.") in response to the request for information received from the defendant, it seems reasonable to the Court at this stage to conclude that this request for information directly affects the plaintiff, not merely Gabriel Azouz.

[6]      It appeared that in acting on the defendant's request for information the I.R.S. asked a branch of the National Bank of Canada in New York for information not on the plaintiff in its relations with Mr. Azouz but on the plaintiff directly and primarily. The I.R.S. summons to the National Bank of Canada contains the following paragraph:

     All records in your possession, custody or control relative to any and all accounts (including joint accounts) that may be owned, controlled or operated by or on behalf of Gabriel Azouz, Jubail Motors, G.H.A. Motor Trade Corporation, Motor Trade Canada, Motor Trade Corporation (Motortrade Corporation) and John Kahhale, for the period January 1, 1992 to the present, to include, but not limited to the following. . .

     (My emphasis)

[7]      As I see it, therefore, it cannot clearly be said that the plaintiff is not directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought.

[8]      This conclusion also could not be drawn from the fact that the plaintiff in its pleadings hints at the possibility that the request for information by the defendant affects either the plaintiff or a corporation named Jubail Motors Establishment for Commercial Engines. It appeared from the argument in the record to date that the defendant had wind of the existence of these two corporations with the names alleged in 1992. Since the summons refers simply to Jubail Motors, the plaintiff considered that it was entitled to consider that it was affected at this stage. I do not think that by this proceeding the plaintiff is engaging in a fishing expedition or intending to plead on behalf of another.

[9]      Additionally, as regards the grounds of review raised by the plaintiff, I do not consider these are aspects which in the event that the defendant is successful on the merits could be seen as so improper and unacceptable as to influence the procedure of an application for judicial review (see the comments of Strayer J. in Pharmacia, supra, at 54 and 55).

[10]      This motion will accordingly be dismissed, with costs to follow. Counsel for each party will have 20 days from the date of the order accompanying these reasons to submit to the Court - jointly if possible - a schedule for further action to be taken in the case at bar.

[11]      An order will be made accordingly.


Richard Morneau

Prothonotary

MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC

September 22, 1999


Certified true translation


Bernard Olivier, LL. B.




     Federal Court of Canada Trial Division




     Date: 19990922

     Docket: T-35-99

Between:

JUBAIL MOTORS COMPANY,

     Plaintiff,

AND

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,

     Defendant.













     REASONS FOR ORDER




     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

     NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

COURT FILE No.:      T-35-99

STYLE OF CAUSE:      JUBAIL MOTORS COMPANY,

     Plaintiff,

             AND

             ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,

     Defendant.


PLACE OF HEARING:      Montréal, Quebec

DATE OF HEARING:      September 20, 1999

REASONS FOR ORDER BY: RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY

DATE OF REASONS FOR ORDER:      September 22, 1999


APPEARANCES:

Michel Mathieu      for the plaintiff

Pierre Lamothe      for the defendant


SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Sweibel, Novek      for the plaintiff

Michel Mathieu

Montréal, Quebec

Morris Rosenberg      for the defendant

Deputy Attorney General of Canada





     Date: 19990922

     Docket: T-35-99


MONTRÉAL, QUEBEC, SEPTEMBER 22, 1999

Before:      RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY


Between:

     JUBAIL MOTORS COMPANY,

     Plaintiff,

     AND

     ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA,

     Defendant.

     ORDER

     This motion is dismissed with costs to follow. Counsel for each party shall have 20 days from the date of this order to submit to the Court - jointly if possible - a schedule for further action to be taken in the case at bar.


Richard Morneau

Prothonotary

Certified true translation


Bernard Olivier, LL. B.

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