Date: 20041028
Docket: T-1491-00
Citation: 2004 FC 1530
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL J. CULHANE
Plaintiff
- and -
ATP AERO TRAINING PRODUCTS INC.,
REILLY JAMES BURKE
Defendants
Assessment Officer
[1] The Plaintiff's action, for declaratory and injunctive relief and for damages all relative to the Competition Act and the provision of free on-line Canadian aviation examination guides on the internet, was dismissed with costs. The Defendants argued generally for maximum allowances in their bill of costs under Column III as a function of complexity, novelty and difficulty. The Plaintiff, who is also a barrister and solicitor, represented himself, conceded certain of the disbursements and suggested lower allowances for certain fee items, some of which the Defendants accepted, leaving the items below in issue. I advised the parties that I did not need to hear argument on item 24 (counsel fees for travel to discovery and trial) as I would disallow the 12 units claimed. That is, the Federal Courts Act, ss. 4 and 5.1 defining the Court and Rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 defining an assessment officer mean that the terms "Court" and "assessment officer" refer to separate and distinct entities. The Court did not exercise its discretion for said fees under item 24 and I do not have authority in the absence of exercise of such discretion to allow anything.
Counsel Fees
Item 3: 6 units claimed for amendment to a pleading; available range 2-6 units (hereafter,
the numbers in brackets following the claimed units represent the available range)
Item 7: 5 units claimed for discovery of documents (2-5)
Item 8: 5 units claimed for preparation for examinations for discovery (2-5)
Item 9: 3 units claimed per hour (16 hours) for attendance on discovery (0-3)
Item 10: 6 units claimed for preparation for pre-trial conference (3-6)
Item 11: 3 units claimed per hour (1 hour) for attendance on pre-trial conference (1-3)
Item 12: 3 units claimed for notice to admit facts and notice for production (1-3)
Item 13(b): 3 units claimed per day (7 days) for preparation for trial after the first day (2-3)
Item 14(a): 3 units claimed per hour (48 hours) for first counsel at trial (2-3)
Item 15: 7 units claimed for written (closing) argument (3-7)
Item 26: 6 units claimed for assessment of costs (2-6)
The Plaintiff's Position
[2] The Plaintiff argued generally that the Defendants' efforts to respond to this litigation did not justify maximum allowances and suggested 3 units for each of items 3, 7 and 8. The Plaintiff asserted that item 9 actually addresses two separate discoveries and therefore less should be allowed for the Defendants' examination given that their counsel had to be there only to respond as required as opposed to actually leading questions. As these discoveries were straightforward, allow 4 hours x 2 days x 2 units per hour = 16 units, and 4 hours x 2 days x 1 unit per hour = 8 units respectively for the discoveries of the Plaintiff and Defendants. For items 10 and 11, the Plaintiff suggested 3 units and 1 unit respectively because only the Defendants' counsel attended the pre-trial conference, contrary to the requirement of Rule 260 that the clients also attend. This hindered progress, for which the Court admonished the Defendants. As well, there were few pages in the Defendants' pre-trial conference memorandum. The Plaintiff suggested 1 unit for item 12 because the Defendants admitted very little.
[3] The Plaintiff suggested 2 units per day for item 13(b). For item 14(a), and by factoring out lunch and coffee breaks as not allowable, the Plaintiff used the trial transcript to calculate a total of 36 hours 42 minutes for actual trial in session, as compared to the 48 hours claimed. The claim of 6 hours for September 24, 2003, versus the actual 2 hours 57 minutes, is the biggest discrepancy. The Plaintiff argued for a further reduction of 8 hours 11 minutes to preclude any allowance for Aaron Drake, the Defendants' expert, as a function of Rule 400(3)(i) (unnecessary lengthening of the trial). The Defendants' pre-trial conference memorandum did not mention potential expert evidence. The court record reflects the Defendants' agreement to 5 days as the duration of trial and to a time limit for the filing of an expert report: neither limit was met. After several months of correspondence, the Defendants produced their expert report only two months before the commencement of trial thereby leaving insufficient time for the Plaintiff to obtain his own expert. The Plaintiff argued that, although he did not object at the time to this breach of procedure because he wanted to get on with the hearing, it should now be an inhibiting factor in assessing costs. As well, it was a factor, but not the only one, in the extra 3 days required for trial. The Plaintiff suggested 2 units per hour for item 14(a), regardless of whether I disallow the hours associated with Mr. Drake.
[4] The Plaintiff suggested 3 units for item 15 because the key event was simply his failure to prove his case at trial. The Plaintiff argued for the minimum 2 units for item 26 given the Defendants' conduct in creating the possibility of unnecessary duplication of assessments by proceeding now without waiting for the outcome of his outstanding appeal.
The Defendants' Submissions
[5] The Defendants argued for maximum item 3 units because the retention of counsel by the Plaintiff after his initial pleading added considerable complexity and an entirely new cause of action, ie. interference with economic activity. Item 7 work justifies the maximum because, although the number of documents were pared down to 77 at trial, there were many boxes of documents during discovery, including those relating to damages and to relevant publications by others in the aviation field additional to those of the parties. Items 8 and 9 work justify the maximums as a function of the number of documents, the extended business history between the parties first as partners and then as competitors, changing technology, a novel fact situation not addressed before by the Court and the numerous allegations concerning the Defendants' conduct. As well, although the discoveries were courteous, the effort required of the Defendants' counsel during discovery of his clients equalled that during discovery of the Plaintiff because the latter's counsel was very competent.
[6] Relative to items 10 and 11, the Defendants asserted that they failed to attend the pre-trial conference because of last minute difficulties and not because they were being uncooperative. Their absence did not hinder progress given useful results in narrowing issues and establishing parameters for experts and for the separate reference on damages. At the time, the novel circumstances of an internet business model made identification of a relevant expert difficult. There was no intent to "ambush" the Plaintiff and the suggestion in paragraph 15 of the Defendants' pre-trial conference memorandum, that this matter could be heard in a summary manner, indicates a willingness to move expeditiously. For item 12, the Defendants conceded that 2 units would be appropriate and argued that, although its responding document was brief, each admission required careful consideration.
[7] The Defendants argued for the maximum for item 13(b) because of the complexity and novel nature of the evidence and legal issues in the absence of precedents for this type of business model. The maximum units and full 6 hours per day should be allowed under item 14(a) as a function of complexity and because counsel still works with the evidence during breaks to prepare for resumption. For example, the Plaintiff alleged loss of sales of five of his publications, but he also had many other publications. Their production was sought throughout, but they were only received by order during trial and had to be evaluated while conducting the trial. These late disclosures contributed both to complexity and the extra days at trial and should also be a factor in the item 13(b) and item 15 allowances. It is clear from the Court's ruling on Mr. Drake's qualifications as an expert and the reliance in its decision on his evidence that his broad background in internet business contexts and his opinion were relevant and useful for the outcome. The Defendants argued for a maximum item 15 allowance because the Court found the written argument useful in resolving the complex issues. The allowance for item 26 should reflect the complexity apparent in this assessment of costs.
Assessment
[8] Generally, I think that the potential uses and impact of internet business are evolving and therefore related litigation may be novel in some respects as here, for example, concerning loss leaders and predatory pricing. However, that is not to say that all litigation addressing novel issues is complex. Here, electronic merchandising via the internet created key issues, but the material in the court record disclosing underlying factors such as customer relations, product return policies etc. suggests to me that some pre-internet business practices or concerns continue unchanged. I will give some weight to the Defendants' position concerning novelty, but not to the extent sought.
[9] I concluded at paragraph [7] in Bruce Starlight et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2001] F.C.J. 1376 (A.O.) that the same point in the ranges throughout the columns in the Tariff need not be used as each item for the services of counsel must be considered in its own circumstances, and that some generalization is required between the available values in ranges. I accept the Defendants' position on item 3 and allow the 6 units claimed. Document and oral discovery in litigation are integral both for crystallization of issues and for gauging the relative strengths of the opposing positions. I think that the role of counsel, during discovery of one's client, is more active than that advanced in the Plaintiff's premise, ie. by necessarily clarifying questions and answers, deciding whether to refuse to answer, shaping undertakings etc., all designed to protect the client's interest. However, as I am not convinced here that maximum allowances are warranted, I allow 4 units for each of items 7 and 8 and 2 units per hour throughout for item 9.
[10] I allow 4 units for item 10. I realize that unforeseen circumstances can interfere with scheduled obligations. The court record discloses progress flowing from the pre-trial conference. However, given the case management philosophy in the rules exemplified, for example, by the mandatory requirement in Rule 260 for attendance by the client, I find that the Defendants must bear some consequences for non-compliance and I allow only the 1 unit per hour suggested by the Plaintiff for item 11. I allow 2 units for item 12.
[11] I allow the 3 units claimed per day for item 13(b). Relative to item 14(a), I have consistently held in the past that an appearance at a hearing necessarily includes some time in the courtroom identifying oneself with the Court Registrar and waiting for the call of the case, none of which is preparation time addressed by other items. Therefore, the abstract of hearing is a useful, but not absolute, guide for assessing attendance at hearing, particularly relative to short breaks. Abstracts of hearing generally do not reflect the lunch breaks or brief recesses. As appropriate, I apply that same approach to the information in the trial transcript. For the reasons below, I find that Mr. Drake's participation was relevant. The transcript discloses that non-luncheon breaks ranged in duration from 10 to 33 minutes. I think that 41 hours would be reasonable, in place of the 48 hours claimed, which I allow at 3 units per hour. I allow 6 units for item 15. This assessment of costs was not particularly difficult, but the Rule 420 issues were important. I allow 5 units for item 26.
Disbursements
$640.60 claimed for trial transcript
$5,000.00 claimed for the expert report and testimony
The Plaintiff's Position
[12] The Plaintiff argued that the absence of the extraordinary circumstances contemplated by Caricline Ventures Ltd. v. ZZTY Holdings Ltd. [2002] F.C.J. No. 1524 (A.O.) at para. [27] precludes any allowance for trial transcript. Trial transcript ordered at an advanced stage of trial is not warranted.
[13] The Plaintiff relied upon his submissions above in opposing any allowance for the expert, Mr. Drake. However, if found relevant, his accounts should still be reduced because the lack of notice in the pre-trial conference and the late delivery of the actual report precluded the Plaintiff from securing his own expert. In some ways, his evidence concerning overhead actually assisted the Plaintiff's case but, given his lack of aviation expertise, neither side really needed him. The trial judge did not rely on him in the sense of "relevant, persuasive and, to a significant extent, determinative" in Kirkbi AB v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2002] F.C.J. No. 1474 (F.C.T.D.) at para. [21] and therefore Mr. Drake was irrelevant to the outcome. For example, his evidence as referred to in para. [10] of the Court's decision concerning the identification and linking of e-mail addresses with product marketing was simply common sense in this internet age of junk messages, was beyond the parameters established in the ruling on his qualifications and, in simply confirming the well-established notion of "loss leaders", was irrelevant for any decision on predatory pricing. Similarly, relative to the four-part threshold for gauging interference with the Plaintiff's economic interest in para. [42] of the Court's decision, Mr. Drake was only marginally relevant for conclusions concerning "loss leaders" in para. [45], but was completely irrelevant in the consideration of the other three parts of said threshold.
[14] The Plaintiff noted that the Court qualified Mr. Drake as a lay expert and not as a function of academic qualifications. It was his first such role and therefore cryptic entries such as "Re Culhane Trial" and "3 days of Trial Preparation and Review" for claims of $2,000.00 and $1,500.00 respectively in his first two invoices prevent any assessment of reasonable necessity. Although the third invoice ($1,500.00) for his time in court provides greater detail, much of that time was consumed by counsel debating his qualifications in turn leading to the ruling which ultimately made his testimony largely irrelevant for the outcome.
The Defendants' Position
[15] The Defendants argued that $640.60 for trial transcript was justified by the 7-month break in the middle of the trial (between February and September 2003). The verbatim quotation in para. [38] of the decision indicates the usefulness of transcript provided by the Defendants to the Court. The Defendants noted that a letter inviting objections to its delivery had covered the expert report and that the first assertion of any objection came at the hearing of this assessment. In fact, its delivery was timely and any objections now are irrelevant. The Defendants asserted that, given the references in the court record to Mr. Drake's academic qualifications and to his extensive practical experience in marketing and web page design, it is a mischaracterization to label him a lay expert.
[16] The Court found Mr. Drake's expertise, which was not lay knowledge within the capacity of the principals on either side of this litigation, integral for its decision on this novel fact situation, ie. such as at para. [10] and contrary to the Plaintiff's submissions. Similarly, and contrary to the Plaintiff's submissions concerning para. [45] of the decision, he had very specific qualifications beyond those of lay persons, including the parties hereto, integral to the outcome on predatory pricing. The Court's considerations on predatory pricing in para. [18] also demonstrate the relevance of his expert report to the outcome, ie. in defining terms and providing context for the testimony of the Defendant Burke concerning free on-line tools. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff cannot reasonably assert that he could not have anticipated this sort of expert evidence and therefore he should have been planning throughout for his own expert. The invoice amounts are reasonable and much less than what other experts, such as economists, would have charged.
Assessment
[17] Trial transcript is ordinarily assessable as part of an appeal bill of costs. I am not convinced in the circumstances here that I should vary that practice, regardless of the prudence displayed by counsel in ordering it during the break in trial. I disallow the $640.60 claimed.
[18] I think that the principal on each side of this litigation is an experienced business person. Given as well that the Plaintiff is also an attorney, I find it difficult to accept that the Plaintiff could not have anticipated the likely thrust of potential expert evidence, regardless of sufficiency of notice. If he indeed did not try to organize his own expert until after delivery of the Defendants' expert report, I am not surprised at his predicament, given the evolving nature of the internet as a business tool.
[19] I discount the Plaintiff's submissions concerning the time spent at trial establishing Mr. Drake's qualifications because, although part of his proposed evidence was precluded by the Court's ruling, the remainder was not and he therefore had to be present and ready to give this latter evidence. Therefore, I find that apportionment of his time at trial is not suitable in these circumstances. However, as the factor of mandatory presence at trial is absent during the preparation phase, the Plaintiff should benefit by some weight in that latter area given that the Court did impose restrictions. I will mitigate the application of that weight because I think that hindsight should not unduly minimize the prudence and good faith of the Defendants' counsel in managing the preparation of this expert. Two of Mr. Drake's invoices resemble many that I have seen from more experienced experts over the years, ie. in their lack of detail. I have assessed his costs as a function of my approach in Merck & Co. Inc. et al. v. Apotex Inc., [2002] F.C.J. No. 1116 (A.O.) affirmed by [2002] F.C.J. No. 1357 (F.C.T.D.), and Bayer A.G. et al. v. Apotex Inc. et al., [2002] F.C.J. No. 1693 (A.O.), and allow the first two invoices for preparation at the reduced amounts of $1,300.00 and $1,125.00 respectively and the third invoice as claimed at $1,500.00, all plus GST.
Rule 420(2)(b) doubling
[20] There was a series of settlement correspondence before and after February 23, 2001, in which no real middle ground was apparent. On February 23, 2001, these three letters were exchanged in this sequence:
• Defendants to Plaintiff:
Pursuant to Rule 419 and Rule 420(2) of the Federal Court Rules, the Defendants offer to settle the above-noted action on the following terms:
1. The Defendant, ATP Aero Training Products Inc., pay and deliver the sum of FIVE ($5.00) DOLLARS to the Plaintiff;
2. The Defendant, Reilly James Burke, pay and deliver the sum of FIVE ($5.00) DOLLARS to the Plaintiff.
3. The Plaintiff pay the Defendants' costs of this action.
Kindly admit service of said offer by signing and returning the enclosed copy of this letter to our office.
• Plaintiff to Defendants:
I reject without hesitation your settlement proposal of today's date, that I accept a $10.00 payment and agree to pay the defendants' legal costs to date (are you kidding?!).
Your offer does not address the fact that I have suffered AT LEAST $100,000 in lost sales due to potential purchasers of my product being given away competing product. Your offer does not address the fact that the continuing actions of the defendants deny me the opportunity of selling my own competing online exams at bona fide market prices and thus cause further losses in unfulfilled potential sales. Your offer does not address the fact that such an outrage as to have a competitor give away product in a calculated attack designed to wreck my business is a "textbook perfect" case of predatory pricing and as such IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW is worthy of a significant judicial assessment of punitive damages and costs. Your offer does not address the fact that there is an interest component to the losses I have suffered. Your offer does not even address the fact that I have stated many times that a fundamental component of any settlement of this dispute MUST BE that the defendants permanently cease and desist from the predatory practises complained of.
I enclose herewith my acknowledgement of service of your offer to settle.
• Defendants to Plaintiff:
The Defendants hereby revoke the Offer to Settle as set out in my letter to you dated February 23, 2001 and make the following offer pursuant to Rule 419 and Rule 420(2) of the Federal Court Rules:
1. The Defendant, ATP Aero Training Products Inc., pay and deliver the sum of FIVE ($5.00) DOLLARS to the Plaintiff;
2. The Defendant, Reilly James Burke, pay and deliver the sum of FIVE ($5.00) DOLLARS to the Plaintiff.
Kindly admit service of said offer by signing and returning the enclosed copy of this letter to our office.
The Plaintiff's Position
[21] The Plaintiff argued that the give and take in all of the settlement correspondence is relevant in any determination of whether doubling applies and, in particular, whether the Defendants' offer was not intended to induce settlement but simply to obtain double fees. As the first February 23, 2001 letter essentially required the Plaintiff to capitulate his position, it lacked the requisite element of compromise to trigger costs consequences, ie. see Mark M. Orkin, The Law of Costs, 2d ed.(Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc. 2003) at page 2-130 para. 214. As well, at page 2-131 para 214, The Law of Costs, supra asserts that, although a nominal amount in a settlement offer may trigger the costs consequences of the rule, that effect is precluded if the underlying intent of the offer was solely to gain a costs advantage.
[22] The Plaintiff noted that Burton v. Global Benefit Plan Consultants Inc., 42 C.P.C. (4th) 35 (Nfld. S.C.), considered the costs consequences of nominal offers and, in particular at pages 53 to 56, paras. 48 to 63, concluded that it should be presumed that the costs consequences of settlement rules are not to be triggered by offers lacking an element of compromise and which are intended solely to secure an undue costs advantage. Even if the nominal offer here is found to meet the technical threshold of Rule 420, Burton, supra, at page 54 para. 54 should be applied to reject doubling given the Court's finding that the Defendants sold products at unreasonably low prices and that the Plaintiff suffered injury. That is, the Court's decision found that the Defendants came very close to being in breach of the Competition Act. The Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal respectively in Canadian Olympic Association v. Olymel, Société en Commandite et al., 195 F.T.R. 216 (F.C.T.D.) at page 219, paras. 10 to 13 and Baker Petrolite Corp. v. Canwell Enviro-Industries Ltd., [2002] F.C.J. No. 1710 (F.C.A.), are consistent with Burton, supra and, given that the Plaintiff's overtures demonstrated that compromise was possible, doubling of fees should be denied.
[23] The Plaintiff argued further that his outstanding arguable appeal, for which the Federal Courts Act, s. 52(b) assigns jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal or award the process that the Federal Court should have given or send the matter back with directions for continuation, coupled with the Defendants' cross-appeal, means that, relative to any determination of costs, the issues here between the parties concerning internet business practice are still very uncertain. The Plaintiff noted that Milliken & Co. v. Interface Flooring Systems (Canada) Inc., [2003] F.C.J. No. 1586 (A.O.), at para. [103], held that an assessment officer has the discretion to refuse doubling. That the Court in Kirgan Holding S.A. v. Panamex Leader (The), [2003] F.C.J. No. 124 (F.C.T.D.), reduced the doubling factor to 1.5 indicates that Rule 420 must be tempered or adjusted in the context of the reasonableness of an offer. The Plaintiff asserted agreement with my comment in AstraZeneca AB v. Novopharm Ltd., [2004] F.C.J. No. 1196 (A.O.), at para. 36, that it may not be "that an element of compromise can be an absolute requirement in all circumstances of settlement offers", but argued that the discussion in para. [16], ie. concerning genuine efforts to settle, as applied to the February 23, 2001 offer here, means that doubling should be denied. Finally, the Plaintiff argued further to Levreault v. Canada, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1676 (A.O.), para. [7], that doubling cannot apply to item 26.
The Defendants' Position
[24] The Defendants argued further to Milliken & Co., supra, at para. 103, that their second February 23, 2001 offer meets the threshold of Rule 420(2)(b) in that its terms were unambiguous, realistic in the context of the Court's decision and could be evaluated. The first February 23, 2001 offer and all other settlement correspondence are irrelevant because none would trigger the costs consequences of Rule 420. The Plaintiff's position simply could not have succeeded at trial because the evidence disclosed that free materials on the internet were very common. The Court found on the facts here that the Defendants had not carried out predatory pricing. The Defendants felt that the Plaintiff should accept the reality of loss leaders on the internet and that the Defendants had no intention of subsequently charging for their free materials. The Defendants' cross-appeal does not seek to vary the trial judgment, which was unequivocal, but simply reflects the need to clarify the Court's reasons, which were not as expected.
[25] The Defendants argued that Burton, supra, is not binding here because it is predicated on Newfoundland rules containing specific language for compromise not found in Rule 420. The Defendants argued that the differing circumstances of Canadian Olympic Association, supra, are not applicable to the circumstances here and agreed with AstraZeneca AB, supra, at para. 36, that an element of compromise may not always be possible or suitable in settlement offers. The offer of $5.00 from each Defendant was minimal, but the provision for each party to bear its own costs was a genuine and possibly generous compromise. An assessment of costs is integral to judgment in that it crystallizes the award of costs and therefore doubling should apply to item 26.
Assessment
[26] The Defendants' offer meets the technical threshold of Rule 420(2)(b). Despite the able submissions from the Plaintiff, I am not convinced that my approach in AstraZeneca AB, supra, should not apply here, notwithstanding that I do not accept certain of the Defendants's submissions. That is, I think that settlement correspondence, apart from the specific offer triggering the costs consequences of a settlement rule, could be useful in gauging the meaning or terms of the subject offer relative to judgment.
[27] The analysis in Burton, supra, is detailed and indicates at para. 55:
To summarize:
1. An offer to settle need not contain an element of compromise in order to be considered an offer to settle for the purposes of Rule 20A.
2. For the purpose of rule 20A.08, an offer to settle which does not contain an element of compromise, is nominal or which otherwise requires capitulation, should not benefit from any presumptive rule of entitlement to post-offer costs on "some other greater basis" than party and party costs.
3. For the purpose of rule 20A.08, in the context of an offer to settle which does not contain an element of compromise, is nominal or which otherwise requires capitulation, the basis of post-offer costs entitlement of the party in question (unless ordered otherwise) should be determined on the basis of the interests of justice and fairness after consideration of all of the relevant circumstances. These circumstances will include at least the nature of the claim, the merits of the claim and any defence, and any opportunity for resolution which can be attributed solely to the offer.
At para. 29, the analysis suggests that the absence of an element of compromise in offers to settle pertaining to unliquidated claims, as here, is of less relevance in the assessment of whether additional costs consequences should result.
[28] The Defendants were not prepared to surrender any part of their position, but their removal of costs in the second February 23, 2001 offer might be seen by some as compromise of some consequence, depending on one's opinion of the generosity of the partial indemnity permitted by the Tariff. In any event, as in AstraZeneca AB, supra, I view an offer without compromise as a notice to its receiver to look beyond its own entrenched position and assess the potential outcome from the perspective of one's opponent. I think that the preliminary sparring in the settlement correspondence indicates that the Plaintiff should not have been surprised by the Defendants' position and that there was sufficient time to have evaluated the February 23, 2001 offer.
[29] Further to my conclusions in Incremona-Salerno Marmi Affini Siciliani (I.S.M.A.S.) s.r.c. v. Castor (The), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1275 (A.O.), I find that the event of item 26 falls outside the time limit represented by the "date of judgment", as that term appears in Rule 420(2)(b), and therefore shall not be subject to doubling. The court record refers to correspondence dated March 26, 2001, to the Defendants' solicitor covering a draft Amended Statement of Claim. Said pleading was served and filed in April 2001. As well, the court record indicates that discovery of documents by both sides occurred substantially before February 23, 2001, and did not always go smoothly. There appears to have been only minimal activity after February 23, 2001, within the meaning of item 7 and I therefore conclude that doubling should not apply to said item. In these circumstances, I conclude that doubling should apply only for items 8 to 15 inclusive. The Defendants' bill of costs, presented at $81,897.85, is assessed and allowed at $61,285.49.
(Sgd.) "Charles E. Stinson"
Assessment Officer
Vancouver, BC
October 28, 2004
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1491-00
STYLE OF CAUSE: MICHAEL J. CULHANE v. ATP AERO TRAINING
PRODUCTS INC. et al.
PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, BC
DATE OF HEARING: September 16, 2004
REASONS FOR ASSESSMENT OF COSTS: CHARLES E. STINSON
DATED: October 28, 2004
APPEARANCES:
Michael J. Culhane representing himself
Gene H. Fraser for Defendants
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Burke Tomchenko & Fraser for Defendants
Port Moody, BC