Date: 20030620
Docket: T-1323-01
Citation: 2003 FCT 769
OTTAWA, ONTARIO, this 20th day of June, 2003
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice James Russell
BETWEEN:
JAMES MERCIER
and CALGARY SKYDIVE CENTRE INC.
Plaintiffs
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Defendant
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an application for various forms of relief following a decision by the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") dated May 17, 2001 to uphold an ascertained forfeiture and resulting monetary demand resulting from a determination that the Plaintiffs had contravened the Customs Act R.S.C. 1985 c-1 (2nd Supp.) (the "Act"). A Notice of Ascertained Forfeiture dated June 12, 1998, pursuant to subsection 124(1) of the Act was prepared by Constable Michael McIntaggart of the Calgary Customs and Excise Section of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (the "Customs Officer") and served upon the Plaintiffs.
[2] The relief requested is a follows:
1. An order pursuant to Rule 213 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, for summary judgment on all or part of the Plaintiffs' claim;
2. Further, and in the alternative, an order pursuant to Rule 227(c)of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, striking the Defendant's pleadings;
3. Further, and in the alternative, an order pursuant to Rule 232 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, excluding from evidence the Defendant's supplementary affidavit of documents sworn the 16th day of September 2002;
4. Further, and in the alternative, an order pursuant to Rule 220(b) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, excluding from evidence the Defendant's supplementary affidavit of documents sworn the 16th day of September 2002;
5. Further, and in the alternative, an interim order pursuant to Rules 373 and 374 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, staying the execution of the collection proceedings commenced by the Defendant until after the determination of this matter.
[3] In his decision dated May 17, 2001the Minister:
a) decided that the Plaintiffs had contravened the Act and the Reporting of Imported Goods Regulations as set out in the Notice of Ascertained Forfeiture;
b) decided to reduce the assessed penalty because of delays in rendering the decision; and
c) demanded payment of the reduced amount of $34,458.29.
[4] Section 135 of the Act provides an appeal to this Court from a decision of the Minister:
| 135. (1) A person who requests a decision of the Minister under section 131 may, within ninety days after being notified of the decision, appeal the decision by way of an action in the Federal Court in which that person is the plaintiff and the Minister is the defendant. (2) The Federal Court Act and the Federal Court Rules applicable to ordinary actions apply in respect of actions instituted under subsection (1) except as varied by special rules made in respect of such actions. |
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135. (1) Toute personne qui a demandé que soit rendue une décision en vertu de l'article 131 peut, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la communication de cette décision, en appeler par voie d'action devant la Cour fédérale, à titre de demandeur, le ministre étant le défendeur.
(2) La Loi sur la Cour fédérale et les Règles de la Cour fédérale applicables aux actions ordinaires s'appliquent aux actions intentées en vertu du paragraphe (1), sous réserve des adaptations occasionnées par les règles particulières à ces actions. |
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[5] MacKay J. had occasion to consider the nature of an appeal under Section 135 of the Act in Mattu v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) (1991), 45 F.T.R. 190, [1991] F.C.J. No. 539 (Q.L.) and concluded as follows at paragraph 27:
Section135 of the Customs Act does not set out in any detail the requirements or the nature of the appeal that is provided from the decision of the Minister, and those matters were not argued in this appeal. My interpretation of the section is that it provides for a trial de novo in the sense that the Court is not limited to consideration of evidence that was before the Minister. At the same time, as in the case of appeals from other administrative decisions or decisions of quasi judicial bodies established by statute this Court will not readily vary the decision appealed from unless it is persuaded that the Minister or his agents failed to observe a principle of natural justice or failed to act within his or her statutory discretion, or that a the decision is based on an error in law, or is based on a finding of fact that is perverse or capricious or without regard to the evidence before the Minister.
[6] The range of relief requested by the Plaintiffs is wide and varied and involves several areas of jurisprudence, particularly with regard to summary judgments, motions to strike and interlocutory injunctions. The Plaintiffs do not seek to appeal the decision of the Minister under subsection 135(1) of the Act.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[7] The Plaintiffs seek an order pursuant to Rule 213 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 for summary judgment on all or part of their claim.
[8] There was no disagreement between the parties concerning the basic principles of summary judgment, although the Plaintiffs point out that, because of the Notice of Ascertained Forfeiture procedure under the Act, which results in an imposed debt owed to Her Majesty and collection proceedings, they are, in effect, in a position of trying to have a judgment set aside rather than applying to have a judgment entered.
[9] Under Section 216 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, and the related jurisprudence it is generally accepted that an applicant for summary judgment must show that there is no serious issue for trial. This means there must be relevant evidence available on the record that does not involve a serious question of fact or law that turns on the drawing of an inference. It is well established that difficult questions of fact or law should not be decided on a summary judgment motion. Also, determinations regarding credibility should not be made on a motion for summary judgment. The onus is on the party moving for summary judgment to prove all necessary facts and that there is no genuine issue for trial. Having said this, it is equally well established that the mere existence of a conflict in the evidence does not preclude summary judgment and that the Court must take a hard look at the evidence and make findings wherever possible. As the Court said in Granville Shipping Co. v. Pegasus Lines Ltd., [1996] 2 F.C. 853, 111 F.T.R. 189 (T.D.), each case must be interpreted in its own context but the test is whether the case and the issue is so doubtful that it deserves no further consideration.
[10] The grounds upon which the Plaintiffs seek summary judgment in the present case can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. Subsection 124(1) of the Act (the provision which gives rise to the ascertained forfeiture procedure) was not complied with in this case in that no attempt was first made to find the goods and seizure was not impractical. Hence, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the powers granted by subsection 124(1) were not satisfied and its use in this instance should be declared void and the ascertained forfeiture unenforceable;
2. The Defendant's delay in providing the Notice of Ascertained Forfeiture jeopardized the Plaintiffs' ability to defend themselves and this is sufficient reason to rule that the ascertained forfeiture procedure in this case is void and unenforceable;
3. The use of the subsection 124(1) procedure requires the Defendant to have reasonable grounds to believe that the Plaintiffs contravened the Act. No such reasonable grounds, and no real evidence for reasonable grounds, existed in this case so that the whole process should be declared void and unenforceable;
4. Appropriate service of the Notice of Ascertained Forfeiture did not take place in this case. Hence, the procedure should be declared void and unenforceable;
5. The relevant limitation period had expired for most of the items that were the subject of the contravention of the Act by the Plaintiffs, so that those items could not give rise to proceedings under subsection 124(1) of the Act and summary judgment should issue to this effect;
6. All goods shipped in accordance with subsection 12(3)(a.1) of the Act (i.e. goods imported by courier or as mail) were not violations of the Act by the Plaintiffs but, rather, were violations by persons who exported those goods, so that any allegations against the Plaintiffs with respect to such goods should be dismissed;
7. Any offences alleged to have been committed by the corporate Plaintiff after 1993 cannot be attributed to the individual Plaintiff, Mr. Mercier, because he had ceased to be a director, officer, or shareholder of the company. Hence, any such allegations should be dismissed against the individual Plaintiff.
[11] Each of these issues was contested at the hearing with detailed evidence by both parties. It was clear to me that the Plaintiffs could not show there was no genuine issue for trial on any of the issues raised.
[12] The Plaintiffs' frustration in this case comes from having to disprove contravention of the Act so long after the events in question. This frustration is quite understandable, but its existence does not relieve the Plaintiffs of the onus of proving to the Court that here is no genuine issue for trial. In fact, the Plaintiffs have deliberately refrained from providing the Court with the kind of evidence it needs to make a decision on this issue.
[13] Two illustrative examples will suffice to show that, although the Plaintiffs would like to be awarded summary judgment, they are not willing to go the distance required to obtain it.
[14] The Plaintiffs argue, in effect, that section 113 of the Act statute bars ascertained forfeiture on most of the items that are alleged by the Defendant to have been smuggled into Canada. Whether this is the case depends on how and when Notice of Ascertained Forfeiture was given by the Customs Officer who handled the matter. The Defendant alleges that all violations of the Act and its regulations set out in the Notice occurred within 6 years of June 12, 1998, the day on which Notice was served. The Plaintiffs allege that service did not take place in accordance with the Act and Mr. Mercier, the individual Plaintiff, says that the Notice was merely left by the Customs Officer with someone at the business next door to his in Calgary, and that it was July 6, 1998 when he actually received it.
[15] In the affidavit of Constable Michael McIntaggart, the Customs Officer assigned the responsibility of investigating the Plaintiffs in this matter, he confirms as follows:
6. On June 12, 1998, a copy of the Notice was left with Brenda Marshall of Lasting Impressions at #202, 3112-11th Street, Calgary, Alberta. Brenda Marshall occupied the office next to Calgary Skydive Centre and she advised that she accepted mail and deposits for skydiving for the Calgary Skydive Centre when no one was in their office. Brenda Marshall further stated that the Plaintiff, James Mercier, comes and goes from the office and she did not know when he would next be at the office.
7. Later in the day on June 12th, 1998, James Mercier telephoned me and confirmed that he had received a copy of the Notice from Brenda Marshall. I explained the Notice to Mercier and he did not deny any of the allegations. Further, James Mercier asked that the Beiseker skydive jump site not be searched as that would cause problems and may put the new owner out of business. During this phone call, I explained the appeal process to James Mercier.
8. Attached as Exhibit "C" are copies of my notes confirming that I dropped off a copy of the Notice with Brenda Marshall on June 12, 1998, and confirming my telephone conversation with James Mercier later that day.
[16] When Mr. Mercier was cross-examined on his affidavit by Mr. Boyd, counsel for the Defendant, the exchange on this matter went, in part, as follows:
Q: Now, it's true that you admit receiving a copy of a notice of ascertained forfeiture from the Crown?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: And that's the document attached as Exhibit A to your affidavit?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: And it's your evidence that you received it July 6, 1998?
A: Yes, it is.
Q: How do you know that you received it that day?
A: The day I received that affidavit, I contacted Kevin Zemp and asked that I can bring it down to him today and made arrangements to bring it in, and he responded to it that day.
Q: And you're certain it was that day? No other -
A: Yes, I am.
Q: - no other day?
A: No other day.
Q: Do you recall being examined for discovery on August 22, 2002?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Do you recall swearing to tell truth during such examination?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: And do you recall being asked questions and giving answers at that discovery?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: And from page 70 of the transcript from that discovery, do you recall being asked the question:
Will you agree with me that on June 12, 1998, you were served with a notice of ascertained forfeiture, which is contained in defendant's Document Number 2?
And your answer was:
Is that all of this stuff here?
Q: You don't need to pull it all out.
A: Yeah, okay. No, I would not agree with that.
Q: Do you know when you were served?
A: It was given to the office next door. It says Suite 203. It was delivered to another company called Lasting Impressions.
Q: When did you first get it?
A: It was sometime after that. I don't recall when.
Q: But you did receive a copy?
A: At a much later date.
Q: How much later?
A: I do not recall.
Q: You'd agree that during that examination for discovery you were asked those questions and gave those answers?
A: Yes, I do. I didn't have -
Q: That's all we -
A: - the letter from Mr. Zemp. I didn't have the letter from Zemp to qualify the date, and I felt it was more appropriate to give accurate information, and I was only able to acquire that accurate information when I could confirm the date that Mr. Zemp had written the letter. Then I was able to determine the date I had received it, because I - I'm aware that I brought it in the day I received that letter.
Q: You agree with me that you have no notes from 1998 that would confirm the exact date that you received that document?
A: I have records from the information you provide with respect to Mr. Zemp's correspondence, and I know the correspondence were produced the day that I received that.
Q: But other than that correspondence, you have no notes. Correct?
A: I have the notes from Mr. Zemp and his letter to Revenue Canada, and I am 100 percent sure, 'cause that was the day that I received the documentation. That is - I'm 100 percent sure that is the day that I was considered served -
Q: The letter -
A: - the day you -
Q: The letter from Mr. Zemp that's Exhibit B to your affidavit?
A: Yes.
Q: Other than Exhibit B, you have no notes. Correct?
A: Correct.
Q: And you did not keep a diary of that time. Correct?
A: No.
Q: That's correct, you did not keep a diary?
A: No, I did not keep a diary.
Q: Is it not true that you in fact received a copy of Exhibit A on June 12, 1998?
A: No, it's not correct.
Q: And is it also not true that you discussed the notice of ascertained forfeiture, which is Exhibit A, with Constable McIntaggart of the RCMP on June 12, 1998?
A: I have never at any time talked with Constable McIntyre, or , McIntaggart.
[17] At the examination for discovery of Mr. Mercier that took place in August 2002, it appears he could not confirm the date when he received the notice and in a letter dated July 6, 1998, to Constable McIntaggart from Bennett Jones Verchère, legal counsel for the Plaintiffs at that time, reference is made to "the Notice of Ascertained Forfeiture, served on James Mercier and the Calgary Skydive Inc. on the 12th day of June, 1998."
[18] In view of the evolving account given by Mr. Mercier as to when he was served, it is difficult to accept his evidence as being clearly preferable to that of Constable McIntaggart who "confirmed by notes made at the time" that the Notice was served on June 12, 1998 and that he spoke with Mr. Mercier on the same day. The Plaintiffs have provided me with no reason or evidence that might persuade me to resolve the matter on the materials before me in their favour. They merely assume that I should accept their account on service over the sworn testimony of an RCMP officer who made notes.
[19] Similarly, in relation to the crucial issue of Mr. Mercier's involvement with the corporate Plaintiff at the material time, Mr. Mercier says in his affidavit that "I believe that the (sic) Paul Sather was the only director and the sole owner of Calgary Skydive Inc. in 1994. I believe that in 1994, Paul Sather was managing all of the equipment repairs and maintenance."
[20] Yet the Defendant is able to adduce two corporate searches, including one from 2003, showing Mr. Mercier as both a director and shareholder of the corporate Plaintiff.
[21] When he was cross-examined on his affidavit Mr. Mercier indicated as follows:
Q MR. BOYD: Now, one of the plaintiffs in this action is Calgary Skydive Centre Inc. It's true that you were not a shareholder of that company in 1994, correct?
A That is correct.
Q And you were also not a director of that company in 1994, correct?
A That's correct.
Q Those statements are true for the entire year of 1994?
A That's correct.
Q And that's because you sold the company in 1993, correct?
A That's correct.
Q So from 1994 on, you were neither a director or a shareholder of that company?
A From nineteen - I'm sorry?
Q 1994 on.
A Actually, I had more - divested my interests late part of '92, and in '93 Paul Sather was running it.
Q So from the time you sold it, there on - and you sold it sometime in 1993 - you ceased to be a director or a shareholder.
A That's right.
Q Do you know exactly when you sold it?
A Paul took over sometime late '92.
Q And you were also not, from 1992, or from the date of the sale on, you were also not an officer of that company.
A No.
Q That's no, you were not an officer, correct?
A That's what I said. No.
Q Yes. Just clarifying.
A Oh, okay. I think - I may have been on some of the documentation and that, 'cause Paul hadn't paid me out yet in full, so I may have shown on Central and Corporate Registry while he was completing the purchase.
[22] So, once again, there appear to be considerable discrepancies between Mr. Mercier's account of his involvement (and even that is unclear because "Paul hadn't paid me out yet in full") and the search documentation adduced by the Defendant. These discrepancies could have been addressed by Mr. Mercier who had it within his power to explain and prove how he ceased to have an interest as either a director or shareholder of the corporate Plaintiff. But he chose not to do so, and he chose not to provide documentation to explain the situation and show how he had ceased to be involved with the company when, as he himself says, "I may have shown on Central and Corporate Registry ... ." Of course, he is quite at liberty not to provide the details of how and when he departed Calgary Skydive, but if he so chooses he can hardly expect this Court to accept that he has provided convincing evidence on a point that is crucial to his action against the Defendant. Once again, he merely expects the Court to accept his somewhat vague version of events ("I may have been on some of the documentation and that, 'cause Paul hadn't paid me out yet in full, so I may have shown on Central and Corporate Registry while he was completing the purchase") over the hard evidence of a corporate search dated February 20, 2003 that shows him as the sole director and sole voting shareholder of Calgary Skydive Centre Inc.
[23] On each of the grounds raised by the Plaintiffs in their claim for summary judgment, I find similar problems that prevent me, after taking a hard look at the merits, from holding there is no genuine issue for trial. From the Plaintiffs' perspective at least there are significant difficulties that will need to be overcome before they can expect any kind of judgment in their favour.
[24] In fact, the Defendant's position is that the evidence clearly establishes, not only that there is no genuine issue for trial in the Plaintiffs' favour, but that the Court should grant summary judgment in favour of the Defendant. While Rule 216 permits such a ruling, I decline to do so in this action where serious questions of fact and law "that involve the drawing of inferences" need to be determined, serious questions of the credibility of witnesses need to be resolved, and where significant detail is still required to assess fully the points of contention between the parties.
[25] Consequently, the matters raised in the Plaintiffs' summary judgment claim should proceed to trial in the usual way.
REQUEST TO STRIKE
[26] The Defendant filed an affidavit of documents on September 20, 2001. The individual Plaintiff was examined for discovery on August 22, 2002. Subsequently, the Defendant swore a supplementary affidavit of documents on September 16, 2002.
[27] Referring to Rules 224(2) and (3), 227, 232 and 220, the Plaintiffs say that either the Defendant's whole claim should be struck for failure to disclose documents in the first instance or that the supplementary affidavit of documents should be excluded from the trial.
[28] The Defendant admits that it did serve a supplementary affidavit of documents listing documents discovered after its first affidavit but, in so doing, it says it was merely complying with Rule 226(1) of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 which deals with continuing disclosure.
[29] The Plaintiffs offer various reasons why the production of a supplementary affidavit of documents after discovery had taken place should lead to a decision by this Court to strike all or part of the Defendant's pleadings.
[30] First of all, in accordance with Rule 224(2) and (3), full disclosure has to be made and the deponent of an affidavit has to make reasonable inquiries of certain persons who might reasonably be expected to have knowledge relating to any matter in question in the action. The supplementary affidavit of documents provides no reason why the additional documents were not disclosed in the first place, and, under Rule 227, if an affidavit of documents is inaccurate or deficient, the Court may inspect any document and may order all or part of the pleadings of the party on behalf of whom the affidavit was made to be struck out.
[31] It is interesting, however, that although this Court is asked to exercise the powers granted under Rule 227, no document or other evidence that might help the Court to assess the significance of the documents in question was presented and, as it emerged at the hearing, the Plaintiffs themselves have not examined the documents contained in the supplementary affidavit.
[32] Therefore, there is no evidence before me that documents undisclosed in the first affidavit, but appearing in the supplementary affidavit, prejudice the Plaintiffs in any way or are even of material importance for the Plaintiffs' action. The Plaintiffs merely ask this Court to assume, from the fact that the supplementary affidavit was filed after the discovery on August 22, 2002, that this was done because "the Affidavit of Documents failed to disclose a case against the Plaintiffs" or because "the volume of documents contained in the Supplemental Affidavit of Documents delays the Plaintiffs' case." The Court is asked to assume that this is the case and to strike pleadings, even though the Plaintiffs have not examined the documents in question and hence can present no real evidence on any of the grounds alleged for striking.
[33] I am not willing to strike pleadings at the mere request of the Plaintiffs. For similar reasons, I decline to exercise any powers under Rules 232 or 220 to exclude documents in the supplemental affidavit from evidence or to make a preliminary determination on admissibility.
INTERIM INJUNCTION
[34] The final principal area of jurisprudence brought into play by the Plaintiffs' application in this case is that dealing with interim and interlocutory relief. In short, the Plaintiffs (or at least the individual Plaintiff Mr. Mercier) request, "an interim injunction staying the execution of the Defendant's judgment pending the outcome of the trial." In other words, the Plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to Rule 373 to have a stay imposed on the collection proceedings presently being undertaken by the Defendant as part of the ascertained forfeiture process.
[35] The Defendant points out that, to date, it has neither seized any assets of the Plaintiffs nor garnished any of the Plaintiffs' income. The Defendant also points out that the act itself provides a stay procedure in relation to actions of this nature. Subsection 143(3)(b) of the Act provides as follows:
| Any amount of money demanded under paragraph 133(1)(c), from and after the time notice is served under subsection 131(2), constitutes a debt due to Her Majesty from the person who requested the decision and that person is in default unless, within ninety days after the time of service, he
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(b) where he appeals the decision of the Minister under section 135, gives security satisfactory to the Minister. |
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Les montants réclamés en vertu de l'alinéa 133(1)c) constituent , dès la signification de l'avis prévu au paragraphe 131 (2), des créances de Sa Majesté dont est tenu le demandeur de la décision, lequel est en défaut si, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant l'envoi, il n'a:
...
b) ni, en cas d'appel de la décision du ministre en vertu de l'article 135, donné la garantie jugée satisfaisante par celui-ci. |
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[36] In other words, 90 days following service of a ministerial decision on an ascertained forfeiture, the amount demanded becomes a debt to Her Majesty unless the appellant, in this case the Plaintiffs, appeals to this Court in accordance with subsection 135(1) of the Act, and gives security satisfactory to the Minister. As no security has been posted in the present case, this statutory stay does not assist the Plaintiffs.
[37] Hence, the Plaintiffs are asking for an injunction pursuant to Rule 373 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 even though they have offered no undertaking to compensate the Defendant for any damages suffered as a result of the imposition of an injunction.
[38] Quite apart from the omission of such an undertaking (not necessarily fatal to such an application), the Plaintiffs offer little in the way of evidence or argument for irreparable harm. In paragraphs 21 and 22 of his affidavit, Mr. Mercier swears as follows:
21. I have and continue to suffer irreparable damages by the continued attempted collection proceedings by the Defendant. The examples of my ongoing damages include the facts that I am unable to obtain any credit including a mortgage financing, I am unable own any assets for fear of seizure, I am unable to open a bank account, I am unable to obtain any personal goods including products such as a cell phone, I am unable to lease any chattels, I am unable to start any business or seek any investment capital, or enter into a business partnership, I am viewed with suspicion and frequently detained when departing Canada resulting in missed travel connections and public humiliation.
22. This assessment has put my life on hold and interferes with my ability to make a living. On the balance of convenience, the Defendant is not suffering any damages in the event that the Defendants collection proceedings are stayed until the conclusion of a trial.
[39] Notwithstanding these assertions that his life has been seriously disrupted, Mr. Mercier makes no effort to support his bold assertions with objective evidence of the harm he claims to have suffered, and whether or not it is compensable in damages, or, indeed, whether it can be attributable to the Defendant's action (the Defendant has merely issued a demand letter and has not seized assets or garnished income), or to other difficulties in Mr. Mercier's life. Evidence adduced at the hearing shows that, at the Alberta Personal Property Registry, a writ of enforcement and pre-judgment attachment order are registered against Mr. Mercier by parties other than the Defendant.
[40] The evidentiary standard governing proof of irreparable harm is that it must be clear and not speculative. It is just not clear to the Court why a demand letter from the Defendant should have caused, or will cause, the irreparable harm claim by the individual Plaintiff in paragraph 21 of his affidavit.
[41] Once again, the Plaintiffs request relief but appear to be unwilling to present the Court with a full picture and sufficient objective evidence to establish the grounds for the relief sought. Consequently, I find the Plaintiffs have not established sufficient grounds to allow me to grant injunctive relief against the collection proceedings of the Defendant.
ORDER
THIS COURT HEREBY ORDERS THAT:
1. The Plaintiffs' application is dismissed in its entirety;
2. The Defendant's request for summary judgment is dismissed;
3. The Defendant is granted the cost of this motion in the cause and payable in the event.
"James Russell"
J.F.C.C.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: T-1323-01
STYLE OF CAUSE: James Mercier and Calgary Skydive Centre Inc.
v. HMQ and Represented by the Minister of National Revenue
DATE OF HEARING: May 6, 2003
PLACE OF HEARING: Edmonton, Aberta
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: Justice James Russell
DATED: June 20, 2003
APPEARANCES BY:
Mr. Robert Burgener
For the Plaintiffs
Mr. Kerry Boyd
For the Defendant
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Mr. Robert Burgener
Edmonton, Alberta
For the Plaintiffs
Mr. Kerry Boyd
Edmonton, Alberta
For the Defendant
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Date: 20030620
Docket: T-1323-01
BETWEEN:
JAMES MERCIER
and CALGARY SKYDIVE CENTRE INC.
Plaintiffs
- and -
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Defendant
REASONS FOR ORDER