Date: 20041210
Docket: T-21-03
Ottawa, Ontario, December 10, 2004
Present: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE LAYDEN-STEVENSON
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Applicant
and
EMILE MARGUERITA MARCUS MENNES
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] Mr. Mennes, an inmate at Warkworth institution, is an articulate individual whose knowledge of the contents of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as am. (The Act) and the Federal Courts Rules SOR/98-106, as am. (the Rules) would be the envy of many lawyers. The applicant, Her Majesty the Queen, seeks an order that no further proceedings may be instituted in this Court by him, except with leave of the Court, and that any existing proceedings brought by him should not proceed except by leave of the Court. The Attorney General has consented to the bringing of the application. I have determined that the applicant's request should be granted.
THE APPLICATION
[2] This application is dated December 31, 2002 and it was filed on January 7, 2003. It has a history of its own. It is supported by the affidavits of Angela McCarthy sworn August 31, 1999, Janice Rodgers sworn August 24, 2002, and Linda Ann Hall sworn September 9, 2002. The notice of application and supporting affidavits were served on Mr. Mennes on January 7, 2003 and he filed a notice of appearance on January 10, 2003.
[3] On February 5, 2003, Mr. Mennes wrote to the Court requesting a special sitting for the hearing of a motion requesting a stay of the proceeding. He did not file a notice of motion. On March 5th, he spoke with Ms. Martel in the office of the judicial administrator and agreed to file his motion record, without a return date, no later than March 31, 2003.
[4] The applicant's record was due on March 21, 2003. On March 14th, the applicant sought directions regarding the requirements of rule 309(2) and on March 20th, Prothonotary Lafrenière directed that "the applicant is hereby dispensed from reproducing the applicant's supporting affidavits in her application record in light of their volume". That direction was conveyed to the applicant but there is no indication that it was transmitted to Mr. Mennes.
[5] Meanwhile, various correspondence between the applicant and the respondent and from both parties to the Court ensued. On March 24, 2003, Associate Chief Justice Lutfy, as he then was, directed that the hearing of the motion for a stay be scheduled for June 25, 2003 and that the motion record be filed by March 31st. Mr. Justice Russell subsequently extended the time for filing and Prothonotary Lafrenière dispensed with the requirement for the applicant to file her application record pending disposition of the motion for a stay. The motion record was filed April 22, 2003.
[6] The "stay" hearing began on June 25th and its continuation was scheduled for February 24, 2004. On the latter date, Mr. Mennes requested that three ex parte motions be heard on grounds of urgency prior to the continuation of the stay motion. He tendered a notice of "conditional abandonment" with respect to the stay motion pending the hearing of his ex parte motions and presented five volumes of an ex parte motion record on which he was prepared to make submissions. Mr. Justice O'Keefe determined that the matter, in the circumstances, could not be heard and he instructed Mr. Mennes to file his material in Toronto in the normal manner.
[7] On April 28th, Mr. Justice Shore directed the parties to, jointly or separately, serve and file not later than May 17, 2004, a draft order setting out a revised schedule for the timely completion of the remaining steps to be taken in relation to the matter. The applicant responded on May 7th with a draft order and the filing of the application record along with a copy of correspondence to Mr. Mennes dated May 6, 2004, indicating, among other things, that Her Majesty's application record was enclosed. Mr. Mennes did not respond to Mr. Justice Shore's direction.
[8] On May 25th, Prothonotary Tabib ordered that Mr. Mennes' respondent's record be filed by June 16, 2004 and that the applicant file a requisition for hearing within the time prescribed by her order. Mr. Mennes did not file a respondent's record. On June 28th, Her Majesty filed, with proof of service, a requisition for hearing with respect to the application.
[9] By order dated July 29, 2004, Chief Justice Lutfy fixed October 5 and 6, 2004, at Toronto, for the hearing of the application. On August 19th, the applicant wrote to Mr. Mennes (a copy of the correspondence was filed with the Court) requesting that Mr. Mennes advise by September 10th if he wished the applicant to move for an order for his attendance at the hearing. Mr. Mennes did not respond.
[10] Not having heard from Mr. Mennes, the applicant sought directions from the Court. On my direction, registry contacted Warkworth institution. After registry's communications with the institution and the receipt of correspondence from Mr. Mennes, it was evident that Mr. Mennes did not wish to appear in person at Toronto, but did wish to appear by way of teleconference from Warkworth. I issued an order accordingly.
[11] At the outset of the hearing on October 5th, Mr. Mennes requested that the hearing be adjourned. After entertaining lengthy submissions from Mr Mennes, I denied his request and provided my reasons for so doing. I proceeded with the hearing and the applicant argued the merits of the application. When I provided Mr. Mennes an opportunity to respond to Her Majesty's submissions, he renewed his "objection" and requested that the proceeding be adjourned to a fixed date at Peterborough.
[12] During the arguments of both parties regarding the propriety of that request, it became apparent that Mr. Mennes did not have in his possession the application record or any of the supporting affidavits. This revelation precipitated immediate telephone contact between Her Majesty's counsel and the institution. After receiving confirmation that Mr. Mennes did not have the documents, arrangements were proposed to get the materials to Mr. Mennes late in the afternoon. The hearing was adjourned at 4:40 p.m.
[13] When the Court resumed on the morning of October 7th, Mr. Mennes again renewed his request for an adjournment. In seeking clarification regarding the documentation, I learned that, for want of a better word, the "search" for the documents began at 9:00 p.m. on October 6th and that Mr. Mennes still did not have all of the documents in his possession. To make a long story short, I varied my order refusing an adjournment, with reasons. I ordered that the matter be adjourned to November 30 and December 1, 2004 at Peterborough upon specified conditions. A copy of my order dated October 6, 2004 is attached to these reasons as Schedule "A".
[14] While I have no responsive affidavit, Mr. Mennes filed his written submissions on November 15th, as ordered. The hearing resumed on November 30th. Mr. Mennes made detailed responsive submissions that were, as usual, followed by the applicant's reply and the proceeding concluded on December 1st.
MR. MENNES
[15] Mr. Mennes was born on February 19, 1950. Between 1981 and 1996, he was convicted of a number of sexual offences in relation to children. On November 13, 1996, he was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender. He is serving his sentence as an inmate at Warkworth penitentiary.
OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICANT'S POSITION
[16] Her Majesty claims that Mr. Mennes is a vexatious litigant. Since 1987, he has launched over 74 legal proceedings, 44 of them in the Federal Court. Her Majesty alleges that the files are meritless, repetitive and abuse the Court's process. She submits that an order under subsection 40(1) of the Act is the only way to protect the Court, the public, and the Crown "from Mr. Mennes' persistent wastage".
[17] The applicant offers three affidavits outlining Mr. Mennes' activities before the courts. The affidavit of Angela McCarthy concerns his files in the Federal and British Columbia courts from 1987 to the mid-1990's. The affidavit of Linda Hall describes four proceedings before the Federal Court in 1992, filed in Ottawa. The affidavit of Janice Rodgers sets out the activities of Mr. Mennes in the Federal Court and the Ontario courts from 1998 to August 2002 in the Toronto area.
[18] The affidavit evidence discloses 64 separate proceedings dating from February 1987 to August 2002. Most of these files are concentrated in two periods, the first from 1987 to 1992, and the second from 1998 to the present. Mr. Mennes commenced only three proceedings between 1993 and 1997. Of the 64 files, 34 belong to the Federal Court, 26 are files from the provincial courts of British Columbia, two are from the provincial courts of Ontario and two are leave applications to the Supreme Court of Canada.
[19] Of the 34 files (detailed in the affidavits) in the Federal Court, 15 were applications, 11 were actions and eight were appeals. Nine were struck out at a preliminary stage, six were dismissed by the Court after some form of hearing, three were dismissed by the Court for delay, five were discontinued by Mr. Mennes, ten reflect a lack of prosecution at some stage in the proceeding without final disposition. One appeal was found in favour of Mr. Mennes. Additionally, since August 2002, when the Rodgers affidavit was sworn, Mr. Mennes has initiated another ten proceedings in the Federal Court. These include five new actions and five new applications.
THE RESPONSE OF MR. MENNES
[20] As previously noted, Mr. Mennes did not submit an affidavit. He did, however, pedantically argue against the granting of the applicant's request. He approached the matter from two fronts. The first, for convenience and want of a better description, I will refer to as the "technical" front. The second, again for convenience, I will refer to as the "substantive" front. The synopsis that follows constitutes a distilled version of the arguments.
[21] There are several components to the technical front. First, Mr. Mennes takes exception to the application record. He correctly notes that the record does not contain any of the affidavits relied upon by Her Majesty as required by rule 309(2). He turns to rule 55 which permits the Court, on motion, to dispense with compliance with any of the Rules, but points to rule 47(2) which expressly mandates that where the Rules provide that the powers of the Court are to be exercised on motion, they may be exercised only on the bringing of a motion. Thus, in Mr. Mennes' view, the applicant is improperly before the Court because there is no evidence in the record. If there exists an instruction from the Court in this respect, it too ought to have been included in the record (rule 309(2)) therefore the record is doubly deficient.
[22] Next, he refers to the applicant's citation of the Federal Court Act. The applicant cites the Act as "R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7" without including "as amended". Mr. Mennes contends that section 40 was repealed by Statutes of Canada, 1990, c. 8, s. 11 and the Court cannot proceed on a defective application that specifically relies on a section that was, in fact, repealed. Moreover, the consent of the Attorney General was given on that premise. The result, according to Mr. Mennes, is that the applicant relies on provisions unknown to law and the doctrine of contra proferentum applies.
[23] The third component of the "technical front" pertains to the jurat in the McCarthy affidavit. In this respect, Mr. Mennes turns to his copy and notes that the specific date in August, 1999 is not completed. (The jurat in the original affidavit filed with the Court indicates that it was sworn on August 31, 1999 and at least some of the copies are consistent with the original). Mr. Mennes submits that this constitutes an "alteration to documents". Someone, he says, has added something to the document and this is totally improper. He additionally points to paragraphs 2, 3, 142, 152, 162, 187, 195, 209, 214, 216, 223 and 224 of the McCarthy affidavit and submits that they contravene rule 81(1) which requires that affidavits be confined to facts within the personal knowledge of the deponent. The applicant ought to have produced the affidavits of deponents with personal knowledge.
[24] The last component of this front relates to the exhibits to the Hall and Rodgers affidavits. Referring to the "blank pages" on which the endorsement for the exhibit appears, Mr. Mennes maintains that these are not exhibits; they are merely blank pages and thus totally improper. Additionally, the Hall affidavit contains information and belief and the Rodgers affidavit is improper because it is sworn by a lawyer from the Department of Justice. Mr. Mennes says that there should be no distinction between a law firm and the Department of Justice for purposes of these proceedings. Since it would be improper for one lawyer to swear an affidavit and another lawyer from the same firm to argue, the situation is no different for the Department.
[25] The substantive front is specifically stated to be without prejudice to the technical submissions. Mr. Mennes argues that the applicant's case constitutes a charade to its core and is a perversion of logic. The applicant, he says, chooses "juicy little bits from cases, strings them together and contrives a characterization or stereotype". Because of layered deception, the Court is presented with a slanted view as portrayed by the applicant. Pared to the core, there is nothing in Her Majesty's submissions that reveals anything other than ordinary litigation with its attendant procedural errors in judgment.
[26] Mr. Mennes distinguishes the jurisprudence relied upon by Her Majesty on the basis that it did not deal with inmates and in none of the cases did the complaints in relation to the "vexatious" litigants amount to contempt as is the situation regarding the wrongs alleged by Mr. Mennes.
[27] He submits that there are four distinct reasons why the application should not succeed. First, there exists an available alternative remedy in rule 221. Her Majesty can move to strike, as she has oft been inclined to do. This provides an expeditious, cost-effective remedy. The second reason is the futility of the declaration sought - what will it accomplish other than add another step to litigation requiring the Court to consider the granting of leave? Third, the passage of time between August 1999, when the McCarthy affidavit was sworn and the institution of the application constitutes acquiescence on Her Majesty's part. Fourth, the applicant, Mr. Mennes says, comes to Court with unclean hands. In this respect, he asks that I refer to the contents of his ex parte motions.
[28] Mr. Mennes additionally dissects the exhibits in the affidavits in an effort to justify the existence of each of his proceedings and to illustrate that, viewed in proper context, each was defensible. For example, he submits that his references to scripture occur in the context of Her Majesty's Coronation Oath which is indisputably binding on the government.
[29] He then takes issue with all proceedings delineated in the McCarthy affidavit that refer to proceedings in the courts of British Columbia on the basis that the concern here is the Federal Court. He also takes issue with any proceedings, referred to by Ms. McCarthy, antecedent to 1990 on the basis of the applicant's failure to properly plead the Act. In a similar vein, he submits that proceedings in the Ontario courts delineated in the affidavit of Ms. Rodgers should be disregarded along with all proceedings that are not specific to him. Finally, in relation to proceedings in the Federal Court, on the strength of Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 342 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal dismissed [1979] 2 S.C.R. vii, Mr. Mennes asserts that appeal proceedings should be excluded from any consideration of section 40 of the Act.
[30] In sum, Mr. Mennes considers that the motive underlying Her Majesty's application is to undermine his irrefutable common law right of access to the courts and effectively defeat proceedings without dealing with the merits. He regards the application as a personal attack and characterizes the situation as one where it is the "pot calling the kettle black".
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
[31] Before setting out the various proceedings initiated by Mr. Mennes in the Federal Court,
it is useful to address his arguments now in order to maintain cohesiveness and clarity in the analysis that follows later. My determination with respect to many of the "technical front" arguments can be disposed of on the basis of rule 56 which provides that non-compliance with the Rules does not render a proceeding, a step in a proceeding or an order void, but instead constitutes an irregularity, which may be addressed under rules 58 to 60. I regard the submissions of Mr. Mennes to be challenges to the applicant's non-compliance with the Rules and if it is necessary to do so, I deem those challenges to be motions made pursuant to rule 58.
[32] Regarding the applicant's record, I have already noted that there is no indication that Mr. Mennes was notified of Prothonotary Lafrenière's direction of March 20, 2003. However, he was aware of the contents of the applicant's record on May 6, 2004, when it was served on him. The applicant's correspondence of May 6th referred to the court's instructions regarding the affidavits. Mr. Mennes took no issue with the record until November 15th when he filed his written submissions in compliance with my order. It was incumbent upon Mr. Mennes to voice his objection regarding the record as soon as practicable after he had knowledge of it. Mr. Mennes was not prejudiced because he had been served with the supporting affidavits in January, 2003. I therefore dismiss this argument or motion.
[33] Regarding the applicant's failure to include "as amended" in her citation of the Act, I do not view this complaint as going to non-compliance with the Rules, even when regard is had to rule 301(e). It is assumed when referring to any statute that the reference is to the statute, as
amended, unless the contrary is specifically stated. There is no question as to the law upon which the applicant relies and Mr. Mennes' comprehensive response to the application leaves no doubt that he was not prejudiced by Her Majesty's failure to include "as amended" in the citation. The doctrine of contra proferentum, generally applicable to contract law, whereby, in interpreting documents, ambiguities are to be construed unfavourably against the drafter, has no application here.
[34] That said, Mr. Mennes will nonetheless reap some benefit from his submission. Section 40 was not repealed in 1990; it was enacted. It did not previously exist in any form. Its enactment replaced two previous sections that had no connection to the newly enacted section. I am of the view that notwithstanding the absence of a specific statutory provision relating to vexatious litigants, the Court nonetheless possesses jurisdiction to control its process. However, in the circumstances of this case, the applicant relies exclusively on section 40. Therefore, for purposes of this particular matter, proceedings initiated by Mr. Mennes, in any Court, prior to the coming into force of section 40 will not be considered. Chapter F-8 of the Statutes of Canada, assented to on March 29, 1990, came into force on February 1, 1992: S.I./92-6 C. Gaz. 1992. II. 280.
[35] The McCarthy affidavit will not be disregarded on the basis of the missing date in Mr. Mennes' copy. The original affidavit has the date "31" August, 1999. The applicant's counsel readily conceded the existence of the discrepancy in Mr. Mennes' copy and was at a loss to explain it other than to surmise that a copy of the unsworn affidavit was inadvertently and accidentally provided to him. Counsel apologized for the error and offered to replace the affidavit with a proper copy. I reject Mr. Mennes' allegations of "alteration of documents" as well as his references to contraventions of the Criminal Code of Canada that I have intentionally omitted from my consolidation of his submissions.
[36] Regarding contravention of rule 81(1) - requiring personal knowledge of the deponent - the purpose of the provision is to eliminate hearsay. In Éthier v. Canada (R.C.M.P. Commissioner), [1993] 2 F.C. 659 (C.A.), the Court held that documents obtained from the respondent by way of an access to information request met the requirements for admissibility. Here, the impugned paragraphs relate to the affiant obtaining information from Correctional Services Canada (CSC) regarding Mr. Mennes' sentence and the location of his incarceration and to information regarding proceedings in the British Columbia courts obtained from Agentis Information Services Inc. (an agency that provides assistance in service, filing and searching for court documents). While the preferable and proper route would have been to have the named individuals from CSC and Agentis swear the affidavits, the impugned information consists of uncontroverted facts and is largely a matter of public record. Rule 81(2) provides the option of attaching less weight to affidavits that fail to produce the best evidence. I am not inclined to strike the contested paragraphs although, as I have indicated, proceedings that pre-date the coming into force of section 40 will not be considered in any event.
[37] In relation to the "exhibits" in the Hall and Rodgers affidavits, rule 80(3) is dispositive. The "blank pages" with their endorsements are "certificates" as permitted by the rule.
[38] With respect to the argument that Ms. Rodgers, being a solicitor within the Department of Justice, was disqualified from swearing an affidavit, the prohibition in rule 82 extends to the same solicitor deposing to an affidavit and presenting argument based on that affidavit. The jurisprudence relating to another member of a solicitor's firm arguing a motion is not definitive, undoubtedly because the issue will turn on the circumstances of each particular matter.
[39] Where the purpose of the affidavit is merely to put documents before the Court and the "evidence" is not controversial, a solicitor within the same firm may be permitted to swear an affidavit, but not argue the matter. In this instance, Ms. Rodgers was the solicitor who had carriage of most of the files described in her affidavit. In relation to those files for which she did not have carriage, she reviewed the files. Her affidavit simply recites the history of Mr. Mennes' proceedings in the Federal Court during a specific time period and attaches the supporting documentation as exhibits. The fact that Mr. Mennes does not agree with the use that Her Majesty's counsel makes of the documents bears no relationship to the affidavit's contents. This is not a situation where it is improper for a solicitor within the Department of Justice to swear an affidavit.
[40] In coming to these determinations, I do not wish to be taken as condoning non-compliance with the Rules. Mr. Mennes properly notes the comments of Madam Justice Dawson in Canada v. Olympia Interiors Ltd. (2001), 209 F.T.R. 182 (T.D.) aff'd. (2004), 323 N.R. 191 (F.C.A.) to the effect that failure to comply with the Rules is never a trivial matter. I endorse that comment and adopt it as my own. There are, however, degrees of non-compliance. The applicant's mis-steps are not flagrant or wilful. Rather, they exhibit inattention to detail and Her Majesty, of all litigants, should exercise more care and caution. That said, rules 3 and 56 were not enacted in vain and I regard this matter as one that should be determined on its merits.
[41] Regarding the argument arising from Foy, supra, that: (a) proceedings in the Rodgers affidavit that are not specific to Mr. Mennes should not be included and (b) that appeal proceedings should be excluded, I do not accept Mr. Mennes' position. In Foy, the Court, interpreting the Ontario provision - similar but not identical to section 40 - stated that the section would not apply to "proceedings which were a response to, or a participation in, proceedings instituted by another party". Mr. Mennes interprets this ruling as one which would exclude any proceedings in which he was involved where there were also other plaintiffs (or applicants) or to proceedings where he initiated a proceeding in his name on his own behalf and on behalf of "all other inmates across Canada in the care and control of the Correctional Service of Canada under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act". Foy does not, in my view, stand for the proposition advanced by Mr. Mennes. In circumstances where Mr. Mennes is a plaintiff or an applicant, albeit with others, the proceeding is not excluded from consideration because it is not a proceeding instituted by another party - it is a proceeding instituted by Mr. Mennes and other parties.
[42] In relation to proceedings instituted by another inmate where Mr. Mennes proposed to represent that inmate in an action or application by virtue of a power of attorney by the inmate, it could be said that the Foy reasoning applies. However, the Rules prohibit such conduct and the jurisprudence of the Federal Court that will be discussed later in these reasons interprets section 40 more broadly than the Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted its rule in Foy.
[43] Similarly, with respect to the exclusion of appeals, the Federal Court jurisprudence reveals a wider interpretation of the phrase "instituted vexatious proceedings" than that advanced in Foy. Rule 2 defines "action" as a proceeding referred to in rule 169, "application" as a proceeding referred to in rule 300, and "appeal" as a proceeding referred to in rule 355. Moreover, the comments of Justice Blair, writing for a unanimous court in Mascan Corp. v. French (1988) 49 D.L.R. (4th) 434 (Ont. C.A.) are unequivocal. The Ontario Act was amended in response to Foy, supra, and now a decision in the Ontario courts regarding a vexatious litigant involves a "realistic appraisal of all proceedings whether original, interlocutory or by way of appeal..." Thus, I find that appeals are not to be excluded from consideration in a section 40 application.
[44] As to rule 221 being an available alternative remedy, an alternative remedy must be adequate. Rule 221, in and of itself, does not alleviate the necessity for a defendant or respondent to initiate further steps in a proceeding. If rule 221 provided the remedy advanced by Mr. Mennes, section 40 would be redundant. Parliament is presumed not to speak in vain. I agree with the respondent that, in circumstances where there is a multiplicity of proceedings, rule 221 is a piecemeal approach and section 40 addresses the bigger picture. The same reasoning applies to the submission regarding the futility of such a declaration due to adding yet another step to litigation. Leave will be granted for proceedings that are based on reasonable grounds and are not an abuse of process.
[45] There is no limitation period with respect to the bringing of an application under section 40. The provision is intended for situations where there is an ongoing problem with litigation. It is designed to protect the public interest, the administration of justice, and the administration of the courts as well as the interests of a party subject to vexatious litigation. Nothing turns on the fact that no application was instituted until 2003, while an affidavit was sworn in August 1999 detailing Mr. Mennes' activity in the Court during, for present purposes, the 1990's. The applicant's failure to act before January 2003 does not constitute acquiesence.
[46] With respect to the "unclean hands" argument, Mr. Mennes refers to his ex parte motions and asks that I review them. I have done so because I told Mr. Mennes that I would. I will briefly comment on those motions later in these reasons. However, as my order of October 6, 2004 provides, this application stands on its own and arguments or submissions on collateral issues or matters will not be addressed. The submission that Her Majesty comes to the Court with unclean hands has not been made out on the evidence before me.
FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
[47] I turn now to the history of Mr. Mennes' proceedings in the Federal Court since the coming into force of section 40. In the case of the Federal Court proceedings detailed in the McCarthy affidavit, this history excludes those proceedings referred to in paragraphs 4 through 79 and 114 to 116 of the affidavit.
[48] Because some of the proceedings in the history set out below reference the direction of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, dated May 7, 1992, for clarity I mention it now. The direction provides, in part, that "any document that Mr. Mennes submits for filing should not be filed without first submitting it to a prothonotary for examination as to whether it contains scandalous, insulting or abusive matter that should not be permitted to be placed on a Court file". On February 16, 1998, the executive officer to the Chief Justice advised Mr. Mennes, in writing, that the direction remains in effect and applies to any material Mr. Mennes attempts to file with the Court.
[49] Time constraints do not permit an exhaustive review of each of the files. Consequently, I choose to review the first file in some detail and note that it is, for the most part, representative of the various files that are referred to in the history.
Court File No. T-289-91
[50] Although this proceeding was initiated on February 6, 1991, there was considerable activity in relation to it following the coming into force of section 40. The reference to the originating document is for the sole purpose of providing context for steps in the proceeding taken after February 1, 1992. References to interlocutory requests before that date are omitted.
[51] On February 6, 1991, Mr. Mennes filed a statement of claim requesting an order for restitution to him and several of his companies, restoration of his health and youth, reinstatement with various organizations and other relief. The statement of claim was amended three times. On April 6, 1992, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of motion for: an order condemning [John Doe] Q.C. for contempt of court; an order granting leave to have a writ of attachment attaching [John Doe] issued and executed; an order adjourning the remaining portions of his motion pending execution of the writ of attachment; an order of committal committing [John Doe] to imprisonment; and other orders. He additionally filed a formal demand to [John Doe] for an immediate apology and to inform the Court as to what steps he and the Minister of Justice will take or have taken.
[52] On April 21, 1992, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of motion for the relief claimed in his further amended statement of claim. On April 29, 1992, Mr. Justice Rouleau held that the order "issued by the Associate Chief Justice striking Mr. Mennes' statement of claim in court file No. T-1231-91 is also applicable to the present action". Justice Rouleau dismissed the section 324 contempt application with respect to [John Doe] and prohibited Mr. Mennes from instituting any further proceedings in the Federal Court without the express consent of a judge of the Court.
[53] On June 22nd, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of motion for an order allowing him to remove the original exhibits from the file. Prothonotary Hargrave, on June 27, 1994, ordered that Mr. Mennes' citizenship card and citizenship commemorative certificate be returned to him, provided that copies be placed on the file. He denied the remainder of the motion. On January 15, 1997, Mr. Justice Joyal dismissed Mr. Mennes' application for an order for rescission of the order of Mr. Justice Rouleau dated April 29, 1992.
[54] On September 18, 1997, Associate Chief Justice Jerome struck all of Mr. Mennes' pleadings in this action nunc pro tunc. On September 23, 1997, Mr. Mennes forwarded correspondence to the attention of the administrator of the Court advising that he would shortly be filing materials and instructions on his remaining motions. On December 2, 1997, Mr. Justice Joyal dismissed an application for a show cause order.
Court File No. A-566-92
[55] On April 29, 1992, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of appeal with respect to the order of Mr. Justice Rouleau dated April 28, 1992 in court file No. T-289-91. Before the appeal was heard, there were six motions by Mr. Mennes and various correspondence. From the Court there were four directions, four certificates and seven orders. As to disposition, on September 9, 1997, the Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, referred the matter back to the Associate Chief Justice for signature of an order nunc pro tunc in court file No. T-289-91 implementing his reasons of July 24, 1991, and to the Trial Division for disposition of Mr. Mennes' motion under the former rule 1733. The request to stay proceedings was denied.
Court File No. A-306-92
[56] On March 3, 1992, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of appeal in relation to the judgment of Madam Justice Reed in court file No. T-7-92. Mr. Mennes filed two motions and there were five orders emanating from the Court in relation to this matter. On September 9, 1997, the appeal was dismissed.
Court File No. T-1724-92
[57] On August 7, 1997, Mr. Mennes filed an originating notice of motion for judicial review seeking a writ of certiorari and mandamus in relation to a transfer to Warkworth institution and his inmate grievance. Mr. Mennes filed two interlocutory motions; four directions issued from the court; and Mr. Justice Muldoon dismissed the judicial review application on May 7, 1998. On June 9, 1998, Mr. Mennes attempted to file a motion record seeking a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter for recommendation regarding Justice Muldoon's order.
Court File No. T-253-98
[58] On February 13, 1998, Mr. Mennes filed an originating notice of motion applying for a pardon under section 690 of the Criminal Code and for an order of certiorari and a stay of proceedings in court file No T-289-91. Again, there were a number of motions and orders. On July 21, 1998, Prothonotary Hargrave ordered that the motion record not be accepted because the material "runs afoul of a number of the definitions of scandalous, insulting or abuse". He permitted a reworked motion record to be tendered. On November 10, 1998, Prothonotary Hargrave struck the proceeding without leave to amend. Mr. Mennes subsequently continued to attempt to file documents in relation to this file, including, among other things, motions and notices of constitutional questions.
Court File No. T-538-98
[59] On March 16, 1998, Mr. Mennes sought judicial review of the direction of the Chief Justice dated May 7, 1992. The application was dismissed by Mr. Justice Richard, as he then was.
Court File No. A-402-98
[60] On June 26, 1998, Mr. Mennes appealed the order in court file No. T-538-98. He sought an order directing Ms. Rodgers to attend a hearing to defend a charge of contempt for having brought what Mr. Mennes asserted to be an illegal motion. He sought the same remedy in relation to Justice Richard for his order striking out the originating notice of motion. On August 14, 1998, Mr. Mennes brought a motion seeking, in part, an order directing Robert Biljan, administrator of the court, to appear to defend a charge of contempt allegedly as a result of a two-week delay between the date of Justice Richard's order and the date it was sent to Mr. Mennes. That motion was dismissed and the appeal was dismissed on September 21, 1999.
Court File No. T-1844-98
[61] On September 23, 1998, Mr. Mennes served the Attorney General with a statement of claim in which he sought a declaration that rule 70(2) of the Rules contravenes various sections of the Charter. A motion to have the matter specially managed resulted in his motion record being twice rejected as it contained insulting and abusive material. Mr. Mennes discontinued this proceeding on December 20, 2001.
Court File No. T-1845-98
[62] On September 23, 1998, Mr. Mennes served the Attorney General with a statement of claim in which he sought damages arising out of the alleged negligence and Charter violation of CSC in relation to its decision to refuse him permission to purchase a computer from another inmate as well as with respect to the outcome of his related grievances. His motion record regarding his request to have the matter specially managed was not accepted for filing. The proceeding was discontinued on December 20, 2001.
Court File No. T-2019-98
[63] On October 16, 1998, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of application seeking judicial review of a purported decision of the Governor in Council and CSC relating to the CSC inmate grievance procedure. His motion documents in relation to requests to have the matter specially managed were not accepted for filing. The Attorney General brought a motion to dismiss and Mr. Mennes responded with a motion for, among other things, a direction that the application be converted to an action and an injunction preventing CSC from charging him for photocopies. On February 3, 1999, Mr. Justice Blais dismissed the cross motion, granted the Attorney General's motion, and dismissed the application with costs.
Court File No. A-146-99
[64] On February 26, 1999, Mr. Mennes appealed the decision of Justice Blais in T-2019-98. The hearing was scheduled for September 10, 2001 and on August 1, 2001, the Chief Justice issued an order for "attendance of person in custody". Mr. Mennes wrote twice to the Court to request that his appeal be heard on the record and without his personal appearance. Prior to receipt of a response, he served and filed a notice of discontinuance. On August 16, 2001, he wrote to the Attorney General stating his intention to discontinue all of his proceedings in the Federal Court in response to the Chief Justice's order to appear at the hearing of the appeal. He asserted that Chief Justice Richard's order was illegal and amounted to kidnapping. He stated his intention to charge, prosecute and possibly sue Chief Justice Richard for what Mr. Mennes characterized as criminal misconduct. On September 25, 2001, Mr. Mennes moved to set aside the discontinuance. Mr. Justice Noel ordered the discontinuance set aside and on December 20, 2001, Mr. Mennes discontinued the proceeding.
Court File No. T-033-99
[65] On January 8, 1999, Mr. Mennes brought an action in libel against the Department of Justice based on statements in pleadings in other proceedings where the Court had stated that Mr. Mennes is a frivolous and vexatious litigant. The defendant successfully brought a motion to strike. By order dated March 1, 1999, Madam Justice Reed ordered that the statement of claim be struck out.
Court File No. T-207-00
[66] On February 3, 2000, Mr. Mennes filed a statement of claim seeking a declaration that his Charter rights were breached by the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, a committee of the House of Commons, because it did not hear from Mr. Mennes during its review of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. Prothonotary Giles, on May 24, 2000, granted the Attorney General's motion to strike. On May 28, 2000, Mr. Mennes submitted an amended statement of claim that Prothonotary Aronovitch directed could not be filed. Mr. Mennes filed a motion for leave to amend the order of Prothonotary Giles to grant him leave to amend the statement of claim. Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer dismissed the motion by order dated November 6, 2000.
Court File No. A-752-00
[67] Mr. Mennes appealed the order of Justice Tremblay-Lamer in court file No. T-207-00, but discontinued the proceeding on February 18, 2002.
Court File No. T-2351-00
[68] On December 19, 2000, Mr. Mennes filed an application for judicial review naming various individuals as well as the Commissioner of Corrections, CSC, the National Library of Canada and the Minister of Health and Welfare as respondents. The application related to a denial by CSC of a grievance by Mr. Mennes regarding bed linens. An ex parte motion was, by order of Mr. Justice Pelletier, appended to this court file. By order dated December 7, 2001, Mr. Justice Blais dismissed the application for judicial review.
Court File No. A-366-01
[69] On June 12, 2001, Mr. Mennes appealed the order of Mr. Justice Pelletier and requested, among other things, that the court grant the ex parte motion. On July 13, 2001, he sought an extension of time within which to serve his notice of appeal. The extension was granted to September 14, 2001 and on February 18, 2002, Mr. Mennes discontinued the appeal.
Court File No. A-9-02
[70] On January 8, 2002, Mr. Mennes appealed the order of Mr. Justice Blais dated December 7, 2001. No agreement could be reached regarding the contents of the appeal book. On July 15, 2002, a notice of status review was issued. On August 12, 2002, Mr. Mennes requested an extension of time which was granted, along with other relief, on September 9th. On September 10th, he requested reconsideration of the order of September 9th. That motion was dismissed on December 5, 2002. On February 18, 2003, the appeal was dismissed. Mr. Mennes' application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on September 18, 2003.
Court file No. T-598-02
[71] On April 12, 2002, Mr. Mennes filed a statement of claim seeking from Her Majesty a declaratory order declaring him entitled to have the defendant "maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the Gospel...to the utmost" of Her power. By order dated June 24, 2002, Mr. Justice Blais struck out the statement of claim in its entirety holding that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.
Court file No. A-440-02
[72] On July 25, 2002, Mr. Mennes filed a notice of appeal with respect to the June 24th order of Mr. Justice Blais in T-598-02. On November 12, 2002, he applied for an extension of time which was granted on December 3, 2002. On February 24, 2003, Mr. Mennes filed a motion requesting that the Court order that a joint book of authorities be filed and that the respondent's book of authorities be removed from the court file. By correspondence dated February 24, 2003, he requested that his appeal proceed on the basis of the written materials and without his personal attendance. On March 31, 2003, both motions with respect to the books of authorities were dismissed and Mr. Mennes was, in accordance with his request, granted leave to file a separate book of authorities consisting solely of para. 861, Vol. 8, Halsbury's Laws of England (4th). On June 17, 2003, his appeal was dismissed. On November 17, 2003, Mr. Mennes' application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed.
[73] Mr. Mennes additionally, in court file No. T-80-98 and court file No. T-879-96, sought to represent other inmates in actions and applications before the Court, contrary to rules 119 and 121 of the Rules. He claimed to be entitled to do so by virtue of a power of attorney from the inmates. It appears that Mr. Mennes has discontinued this practice.
[74] As previously noted, Mr. Mennes has initiated additional proceedings since the swearing of the affidavits or the initiation of this application. Specifically, there are five actions represented by court file numbers T-2051-02, T-1324-03, T-318-03, T-1436-03 and T-477-04 and five judicial reviews represented by court file numbers T-2167-02, T-1980-02, T-458-03, T-405-03 and T-97-03. I have not tallied the numbers with respect to interlocutory motions in relation to these matters.
[75] THE STATUTORY PROVISION
Section 40 of the Federal Courts Act provides:
| 40. (1) If the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, it may order that no further proceedings be instituted by the person in that court or that a proceeding previously instituted by the person in that court not be continued, except by leave of that court.
(2) An application under subsection (1) may be made only with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, who is entitled to be heard on the application and on any application made under subsection (3).
(3) A person against whom a court has made an order under subsection (1) may apply to the court for rescission of the order or for leave to institute or continue a proceeding.
(4) If an application is made to a court under subsection (3) for leave to institute or continue a proceeding, the court may grant leave if it is satisfied that the proceeding is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding.
(5) A decision of the court under subsection (4) is final and is not subject to appeal. R.S., 1985, c. F-7, s. 40; 1990, c. 8, s. 11; 2002, c. 8, s. 39.
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40. (1) La Cour d'appel fédérale ou la Cour fédérale, selon le cas, peut, si elle est convaincue par suite d'une requête qu'une personne a de façon persistante introduit des instances vexatoires devant elle ou y a agi de façon vexatoire au cours d'une instance, lui interdire d'engager d'autres instances devant elle ou de continuer devant elle une instance déjà engagée, sauf avec son autorisation.
(2) La présentation de la requête visée au paragraphe (1) nécessite le consentement du procureur général du Canada, lequel a le droit d'être entendu à cette occasion de même que lors de toute contestation portant sur l'objet de la requête.
(3) Toute personne visée par une ordonnance rendue aux termes du paragraphe (1) peut, par requête au tribunal saisi de l'affaire, demander soit la levée de l'interdiction qui la frappe, soit l'autorisation d'engager ou de continuer une instance devant le tribunal.
(4) Sur présentation de la requête prévue au paragraphe (3), le tribunal saisi de l'affaire peut, s'il est convaincu que l'instance que l'on cherche à engager ou à continuer ne constitue pas un abus de procédure et est fondée sur des motifs valables, autoriser son introduction ou sa continuation.
(5) La décision du tribunal rendue aux termes du paragraphe (4) est définitive et sans appel. L.R. (1985), ch. F-7, art. 40; 1990, ch. 8, art. 11; 2002, ch. 8, art. 39.
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ANALYSIS
[76] An order under subsection 40(1) is an extraordinary remedy. However, in appropriate cases, the remedy is necessary in order to maintain respect for the judicial process and to protect others from frivolous and pointless litigation: Olympia Interiors, supra. Because the provision in the Act is similar to the wording of the corresponding provision in the Ontario legislation, guidance can be obtained from Ontario judgments: Vojic v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1992] F.C.J. No. 902 (T.D.).
[77] In Re Lang Michener et al. and Fabian et al. (1987), 37 D.L.R. (4th) 685, Justice Henry reviewed the Ontario jurisprudence and extracted the following principles regarding vexatious proceedings:
(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;
(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;
(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;
(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;
(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;
(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;
(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.
[78] The categories for vexatious proceedings are not closed: Vojic, supra. In addition to the circumstances set out in Re Lang Michener, supra, proceedings have been found to be vexatious where:
- the court has no power to grant the requested relief: Foy, supra;
- proceedings are instituted to delay other proceedings: Mascan Corp., supra;
- the litigant has instituted proceedings but failed to pursue a large number of the proceedings with diligence: Yorke v. Canada (1995), 102 F.T.R. 189 (T.D.);
- pleadings are replete with extreme or scandalous allegations that remain
unsubstantiated: ibid.;
- disregard for the Court has been demonstrated: Vojic, supra;
- the litigant has distributed court documents to parties unrelated to the proceedings for purposes extraneous to the litigation: Canada Post Corp. v. Varma (2000), 192 F.T.R. 278 (F.C.T.D.);
- the litigant has relied on abusive tactics in the conduct of the litigation: Nelson v. Canada, 2002 FCT 77 aff'd. (2003), 301 N.R. 359 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal dismissed, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 139.
[79] Whether an action is vexatious is a matter to be determined by objective rather than subjective standards: Foy, supra. In making its determination, the court is entitled to take notice of its own records and of the proceedings contained therein: ibid.; Varma, supra.
[80] The proceedings that I have referred to demonstrate that, on a number of occasions, Mr. Mennes' proceedings have been stuck out on a preliminary motion on the basis that they disclose no reasonable cause of action or because they are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process (T-289-91, T-253-98, T-538-98, T-2019-98, T-033-99, T-207-00, T-598-02).
[81] Since the filing of this application, other proceedings have been struck. After Mr. Mennes was served with this notice of application, he brought a new and independent application for judicial review of the Attorney General's consent to proceed with the section 40(1) application. In striking Mr. Mennes' application, Prothonotary Lafrenière found that it was bereft of any possibility of success. The prothonotary noted that Mr. Mennes' litigation approach represents a strategy "for the specific purpose of systematically frustrating and delaying...the prosecution of the section 40 proceeding".
[82] In T-97-03, Mr. Mennes sought a declaration that various people have committed criminal offences or ought to be prosecuted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. On July 29, 2003, Prothonotary Tabib held that such relief is clearly beyond the court's jurisdiction.
[83] In A-146-99 (noted above), Mr. Mennes requested, among other things, that the Court of Appeal find six Federal Court judges to be in violation of the Book of Deuteronomy. In T-1844-98 (noted above), Mr. Mennes' affidavit contained the following request:
I request that the following judges not be assigned:
Mr. Justice Rouleau;
Mr. Justice Cullen;
Mr. Justice Nadon;
Mr. Justice Joyal;
Mr. Justice Hugesson;
Mr. Justice Richard;
Mr. Justice Gibson;
Madam Justice Trembly-Lamer (sic); and
Madam Justice Reed.
All of whom are judges whose names have been circulated across Canada by Canadian Prison Law Association and the Inmates' Advocacy Group, House of Commons, as having a reputation of being hostile and unfair towards disadvantaged parties proceeding in person and of causing them serious procedural difficulty and expense. Further and better information is being collected on these and other like judges for the purpose of having their names and the problems caused by them placed before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, House of Commons, and to have the House of Commons and Senate address their removal from office.
[84] In A-146-99 (noted above), when threatening to charge, prosecute and possibly sue Chief Justice Richard, Mr. Mennes copied 28 other people and organizations in his correspondence, including the Globe and Mail, various M.P.'s and the United Nations.
[85] In T-2351-00 (noted above), Mr. Mennes claimed that because the poetry of Irving Layton sets the legally binding "standard of expression in Canada", one of his grievances ought not to have been denied on the grounds that it contained obscene language. In T-253-98 (noted above), Prothonotary Hargrave struck out Mr. Mennes' application on the grounds that it was fundamentally deficient. The prothonotary described Mr. Mennes' four affidavits as making "scurrilous and irrelevant accusations", "rehashing of past criminal proceedings", "to a great extent an incomprehensible rant" and "a mishmash of references to case law, to statute law and to the Bible".
[86] Mr. Mennes, when served with a motion contrary to his interests, rather than answering the motion with responding materials, frequently will bring a new motion of his own to strike the first motion or to find his adversary in contempt of court. He also rolls the subject matter of one file into the litigation of another. In the course of this application, he brought, first, a motion for a stay of proceedings and, later three ex parte motions. The motions made claims that were already before the Court in proceedings that Mr. Mennes had previously commenced. The issues
include the use of a computer in a penitentiary (previously raised in T-1324-03) and the seizure of contraband (previously raised in T-1436-03). These matters have been raised again in a recent statement of claim (T-477-03).
[87] He also has made a frequent practice of filing ex parte motions under rule 467 to find public officials, lawyers, employees of CSC, court administration staff and judges in contempt of court. His ex parte motions in relation to this application seek to do precisely that.
[88] Regarding the proceedings that I have reviewed, there are no actions in which Mr. Mennes has been successful. As nearly as I can gather, he has had ultimate success only once in the Court of Appeal (A-566-92) based on a determination that the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring Mr. Mennes a vexatious litigant when no application for such a declaration had been made.
[89] In my view, and with all due respect to Mr. Mennes, to characterize the proceedings that I have reviewed as "nothing more than ordinary litigation with its attendant errors in judgment" is inconceivable. The evidence demonstrates, without doubt, that Mr. Mennes has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner.
[90] In coming to this conclusion, I have considered Mr. Mennes' submissions and I have, as requested, reviewed his recent ex parte motions. Regrettably, I find a striking similarity between these motions and the proceedings described in these reasons.
[91] Mr. Mennes says that he has been scrupulous in his drafting efforts and has "consulted and followed the Bullen and Leake and Jacob's precedents of pleadings". I have no doubt that is the case. No issue arises from the form of his documents. Rather, it is their substance that offends. The ex parte motions, upon which he places great reliance, seek show cause for contempt orders against the administrator of the court, the Deputy Minister of Justice, various CSC personnel, various solicitors in the Department of Justice, and the list goes on. He additionally seeks, among other things, to address the alleged failure of Mr. Justice Pelletier to inform himself of the law when rendering his order in court file No. T-2351-00 as well the "deliberate omission by Sygias et al" to include a reference to "Mennes v. Canada (1988) in their Federal Court Practice". He seeks damages and/or compensation of varying amounts ranging from $10,000 to $80,000 from many of the respondents and "imprisonment for 5 years less a day until they comply with the order to pay".
[92] Mr. Mennes insists that he is the victim of wrongs allegedly perpetrated by CSC personnel that must be addressed. The ex parte motions also refer, among other things, to seizure of his legal files, computer, and law books, to breaches of the provisions of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act with respect to his mail and the conduct of disciplinary actions and the grievance process. Whether Mr. Mennes has been wronged is not for me to determine in this application. He may be correct in whole or in part. The failure of CSC to provide him with the documents for the teleconference portion of this proceeding was less than stellar. However, in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, regard must be had to the proceedings as framed and even meritorious allegations will not justify abusive tactics: Nelson, supra; Re Lang Michener et al. and Fabian et al., supra.
[93] I have also considered, as requested by Mr. Mennes, the comments of Mr. Justice Muldoon in Mennes v. Canada (1988), 23 F.T.R. 181 (T.D.), where he stated that "the court will always hearken to a plea for relief from behind the bars of a prison" for no one is "to be denied access to the Court". Justice Muldoon, I note, also stated that there are limits. Moreover, the granting of the requested declaration does not deny Mr. Mennes access to the courts; it requires that any proceeding brought by him is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds to found it. Justice Sedgwick, in Mishra, supra, discussed the right of access to the court and stated that the access must be "exercised reasonably and with due regard for the applicable laws and rules of procedure and the integrity of the administration of justice, including the protection accorded to others as being indiscriminately made the subject of vexatious proceedings".
[94] Mr. Mennes has achieved a level of proficiency with respect to the form of court documents. If he wishes to pursue relief with respect to alleged "wrongs", his energy must be directed to achieving a comparable knowledge in relation to substance. Thus far, he has exhibited an incapacity to discriminate between what is reasonable and what is not with respect to both his underlying complaints and his requested relief.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
(1) No further proceedings may be instituted in this Court by Emile Marguerita Marcus Mennes except by leave of the Court and any existing proceedings brought by him should not proceed, except by leave of the Court.
(2) The applicant will have costs that I fix in the all inclusive sum of $750 to be paid by the respondent to the applicant.
Judge
FEDERAL COURT
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: T-21-03
STYLE OF CAUSE: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Applicant
- and -
EMILE MARGUERITA MARCUS MENNES
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: November 5,6 & 30, and December 1, 2004
FURTHER SUBMISSIONS: Dated December 1, 2004
Received December 8, 2004
(by the Respondent)
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.
APPEARANCES BY:
Mr. Matthew Sullivan
For the Applicant
Mr. Emile Mennes
For the Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
For the Applicant
Emile Mennes
For the Respondent