IMM-1460-96
B E T W E E N:
TERESA RODRIGUEZ DE ROJAS
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
GIBSON, J.:
These reasons arise out of an application for judicial review of a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division (the "Tribunal") of the Immigration and Refugee Board wherein the Tribunal determined the applicant not to be a Convention refugee within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act1. The Tribunal's decision is dated the 29th of March, 1996.
The applicant is a citizen of Venezuela. She and her mother were both born in Colombia. The applicant moved to Venezuela at an early age and, following that move and until the events giving rise to her refugee claim, remained a resident of that country.
The Tribunal determined the applicant to have a well-founded fear of persecution if she were required to return to Venezuela. The Tribunal went on to determine that the applicant lost her Colombian citizenship when she acquired Venezuelan citizenship but that she had the right to reacquire Colombian citizenship "... upon compliance with requirements that are mere formalities." On the evidence that was before the Tribunal, I am satisfied that this conclusion was reasonably open to it. The Tribunal determined that the applicant faced no serious possibility of persecution should she be required to go to Colombia. In the result, relying on Bouianova v. Minister of Employment and Immigration2, the Tribunal determined the applicant not to be a Convention refugee.
In Bouianova, Mr. Justice Rothstein wrote:
| In my view, the applicant, by simply making a request and submitting her passport to be stamped, becomes a citizen of Russia. On the evidence before me, there is no discretion by the Russian officials to refuse her Russian citizenship. I do not think the necessity of making an application, which in these circumstances is nothing more than a mere formality, means that a person does not have a country of nationality just because they choose not to make such an application. |
While the facts of Bouianova can be distinguished from those in this matter, the principles are identical. In this matter, by complying with a mere formality, the applicant could have formal Colombian nationality. By simply choosing not to comply with the mere formality, the applicant cannot claim that Colombia is not a country of nationality for her.
In Zdanov v. Minister of Employment and Immigration3, Mr. Justice Rouleau elaborated on the principle in Bouianova when he stated:
| The applicant in the present case has not applied for citizenship nor has he made any inquiries as to whether or not citizenship would be denied him; he has no desire to do so and consequently he describes himself as a "stateless person". In my opinion, he cannot expect to base his claim to be a Convention refugee on the fact that he has not applied for, or been granted, Russian citizenship; to hold otherwise would allow him to undermine the rationale underlying international refugee law as expressed in Canada (Attorney General ) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; 153 N.R. 321, at p. 709 (S.C.R.): |
| "International refugee law was formulated to serve as a back-up to the protection one expects from the state of which one is a national. It was meant to come into play only in situations when that protection is unavailable, and then only in certain situations. The international community intended that persecuted individuals be required to approach their home state for protection before the responsibility of other states becomes engaged. For this reason James Hathaway refers to the refugee scheme as 'surrogate or substitute protection', activated only upon failure of national protection ..." (emphasis added) |
Once again, the same principles apply here. While the applicant in this matter does not describe herself as a "stateless person", she does describe herself as a person with no nationality other than Venezuelan. She can obtain Colombian nationality through compliance with a mere formality. She is required to do so before seeking to avail herself of refugee protection.
On the basis of the foregoing brief analysis, I conclude that the Tribunal made no reviewable error in determining the applicant not to be a Convention refugee. In the result, this application for judicial review will be dismissed.
Neither counsel recommended certification of a question. No question will be certified.
"Frederick E. Gibson"
Judge
Toronto, Ontario
January 31, 1997
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
COURT NO: IMM-1460-96
STYLE OF CAUSE: TERESA RODRIGUEZ DE ROJAS
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
DATE OF HEARING: JANUARY 30, 1997
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: GIBSON, J.
DATED: JANUARY 31, 1997
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Chris Opoka-Okumu
For the Applicant
Ms. Cheryl Mitchell
For the Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Chris Opoka-Okumu
Barrister & Solicitor
530 Wilson Avenue
Suite 206
North York, Ontario
M3H 5Y9
For the Applicant
George Thomson
Deputy Attorney General
of Canada
For the Respondent
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Court No.: IMM-1460-96
Between:
TERESA RODRIGUEZ DE ROJAS
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
__________________
1 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2
2 (1993), 67 F.T.R. 74 (F.C.T.D.)
3 (1994), 81 F.T.R. 246