Date: 20030314
Docket: T-54-03
Montréal, Quebec, March 14, 2003
Before: Richard Morneau, prothonotary
In re the CANADA LABOUR CODE,
R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, as amended
BETWEEN:
CANADIAN UNION OF
POSTAL WORKERS
Applicant
and
CANADA POST CORPORATION
Respondent
ORDER
The motion for a stay filed by the Canada Post Corporation is dismissed with costs.
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"Richard Morneau"
Prothonotary |
Certified true translation
Suzanne M. Gauthier, C. Tr., LL.L.
Date: 20030314
Docket: T-54-03
Neutral citation: 2003 FCT 313
In re the CANADA LABOUR CODE,
R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, as amended
BETWEEN:
CANADIAN UNION OF
POSTAL WORKERS
Applicant
and
CANADA POST CORPORATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY
[1] The case at bar concerns a motion by the Canada Post Corporation ("the Corporation") pursuant to Rule 398 of the Federal Court Rules (1998), and by analogy pursuant to ss. 18.2 and 50 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as amended, to stay the execution of an arbitral decision made on November 29, 2002, ("the arbitral decision") and filed for registration in the case at bar pursuant to s. 66 of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, as amended.
[2] By its registration the arbitral decision acquired the same force and effect as a judgment of this Court, and hence the motion at bar to stay.
Essential facts
[3] It appeared that the Corporation received complaints from co-workers of one Jacques Morissette indicating that he was responsible for an unpleasant work climate in the Corporation.
[4] As a result of these complaints, the Corporation conducted an investigation involving several of Mr. Morissette's co-workers or members of supervisory staff.
[5] The Corporation also sent Mr. Morissette a notice on April 3, 2002, summoning him to a meeting arranged for April 5, 2002, telling him that the meeting at that time would be the result of complaints received concerning him.
[6] The nature of this meeting or interview on April 5, 2002, in view of the requirements of the collective agreement binding on the parties, is the focus of the arbitral decision and its subsequent judicial revision, points to which we will return below (see paragraphs [19] et seq., infra).
[7] Following the interview on April 5, 2002, Mr. Morissette on April 11, 2002, received a letter of dismissal.
[8] On April 18, 2002, the Canadian Union of Postal Workers ("the Union") filed a grievance against this dismissal. The grievance asked inter alia that Mr. Morissette be reinstated in his duties.
[9] It will be understood that this grievance was dismissed at the lower levels, since the Union took the grievance to arbitration. The arbitration resulted in the arbitral decision.
[10] The arbitral decision reversed the Corporation's decision to dismiss Mr. Morissette and by its conclusion allowed the grievance filed by Mr. Morissette and the Union.
[11] On January 2, 2003, the Corporation brought an action in the Quebec Superior Court for judicial review of the arbitral decision. This action was heard on February 18, 2003. On February 21, 2003, the Superior Court dismissed the application for review filed by the Corporation (judgment of Barakett J. dated February 21, 2003, case 200-05-017854-030).
[12] Counsel for the parties at bar did not become aware of this Superior Court judgment until March 3, 2003, at the time of the actual hearing of the motion at bar.
Law on stays
[13] It is well settled that the remedies sought in the motion at bar are subject to the analysis which the Supreme Court described as follows in RJR - MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, at 334:
Metropolitan Stores adopted a three-stage test for courts to apply when considering an application for either a stay or an interlocutory injunction. First, a preliminary assessment must be made of the merits of the case to ensure that there is a serious question to be tried. Secondly, it must be determined whether the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the application were refused. Finally, an assessment must be made as to which of the parties would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of the remedy pending a decision on the merits.
Analysis
(a) Serious question to be tried
[14] Under this heading we must consider, first, the fact that the Corporation originally filed the instant motion to stay the arbitral decision until final and definitive judgment was rendered on its application for judicial review of the arbitral decision.
[15] At the time the motion at bar was filed, therefore, the Superior Court had not heard counsel for the parties, still less rendered its decision of February 21, 2003.
[16] However, we know that the Superior Court has quite recently dismissed the Corporation's application for review. Since the Corporation has approached this Court for a stay while it was obtaining a final judgment on its review of the arbitral decision, it appears that if the Corporation does not appeal the Superior Court's judgment of February 21, 2003, it would be in a difficult position to argue that there is still a serious question outstanding in its favour. This result or finding would therefore be a negative conclusion as to the fate of the Corporation's motion to stay, since the very first part of the required test would not be met.
[17] Nevertheless, I must proceed with the present analysis, on the basis that the Superior Court judgment of February 21, 2003, will be appealed. On that assumption, can it be said that the Corporation still has a serious question to be tried here?
[18] Here we have a discrepancy between what the Superior Court ruled on February 21, 2003, and what was established by the Quebec Court of Appeal in its judgment of February 15, 2002, in Société canadienne des postes v. Leblanc (QCA, per Baudouin, Fish and Rousseau-Houle JJ.A., case 500-09-010407-005, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court denied on March 6, 2003, hereinafter "Leblanc").
[19] For the purposes of the Superior Court's judgment of February 21, 2003, it had to determine whether the arbitrator's ruling as to the nature of the meeting on April 5, 2002, was patently unreasonable in view of the requirements of clause 10.04 of the collective agreement.
[20] Clause 10.04 reads as follows:
10.04 Interviews
(a) The Corporation agrees to notify an employee twenty-four (24) hours in advance of any interview of a disciplinary nature or related to his or her attendance record and to indicate:
(i) his or her right to be accompanied by a Union representative as specified in clause 10.06;
(ii) the purpose of the meeting, including whether it involves the employee's personal file;
(iii) that if the employee's personal file is to be considered during the interview, the employee and/or his or her Union representative, the latter with the employee's permission, shall, before the meeting, have access to this file in accordance with clause 10.03.
(b) The employee has the right to refuse to participate or to continue to participate in such interview unless he or she has received the notice hereinabove provided for.
(c) If the employee fails to appear at the interview and does not explain his or her inability to do so, the Corporation shall proceed unilaterally.
(My emphasis.)
[21] It appeared from the arbitral decision that the arbitrator concluded that the meeting or interview of April 5, 2002, was in fact an interview of a disciplinary nature within the meaning of clause 10.04(a), but neither Mr. Morissette nor the Union was given sufficiently clear advance notice that this was the nature of the meeting.
[22] In its judgment the Superior Court refused to intervene in the arbitrator's decision. It considered that the arbitral decision did not meet the applicable requirement for intervention, namely that the decision be unreasonable.
[23] Additionally, the Superior Court summarized the arbitral decision as follows and made its own comments on the decision:
[TRANSLATION]
[18] . . . The arbitrator came to the conclusion that it [the meeting of April 5, 2002] could have been nothing but a meeting to decide whether Morissette should receive a disciplinary penalty and that in the circumstances the parties should have been informed in accordance with clause 10.04 and were not, which thereby vitiated the entire dismissal process.
[19] Instead of considering the meeting in this way, the alternative would have been to find that the employee's rights had been completely disregarded, by considering that there was no meeting (10.04) allowing the employee to put forward his case. This reasoning is far from unreasonable or absurd.
[20] In other words, the Court must conclude that the arbitrator came to the conclusion that the employee was deprived of his right to be heard and to defend himself with the help of a union representative who knew he was there for that purpose. He was deprived of his most fundamental right, and in a way was trapped. Before being dismissed by disciplinary means the employee should have been sent a notice consistent in all respects with clause 10.04 and given an opportunity to be heard, knowing that he would receive a penalty. This was the arbitrator's opinion.
Law
[21] The applicant had to prove not that the arbitrator could have been wrong, but that he was so mistaken as to render a patently unreasonable decision, that it was irrational, illogical and even absurd, as alleged by the Corporation.
Conclusion
[22] The arbitrator found that the meeting of April 5, 2002, despite the testimony, could not have been anything but a disciplinary interview. That decision was not illogical, because it takes into account the fact that it was the only meeting the employer had with the employee before dismissing him, and in fact the information obtained at the interview of April 5 was included in what was used to explain the dismissal in the notice of April 11, 2002.
[23] Accordingly, either this was the meeting referred to in 10.04 and it was not held in accordance with the requirements of the Act, or the employer proceeded unilaterally, which it could not do in the case at bar.
[24] When an interview is requested with an employee for complaints made against him, and the latter may lead to disciplinary action, it must be arranged in accordance with clause 10.04 of the agreement. The interview notice must contain no ambiguity as to the consequences which it may have for the employee and his future.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:
[25] DISMISSES the motion with costs.
(Emphasis in original.)
[24] Does this conclusion by the Superior Court, which supports that arrived at by the arbitrator, exhaust the possibility that judicial review of the arbitral decision might be devoid of a serious question for the purposes of the first part of the test under consideration?
[25] Not necessarily.
[26] First, we should recall that the burden which the Corporation has to meet under the first test, the serious question, is relatively low.
[27] As noted by the Federal Court of Appeal in its judgment in Bisaillon v. Canada (FCA, June 10, 1999, case A-315-99) at paras. [29] to [30]:
[29] According to precedent, for an action to raise a serious question to be tried the question must simply not be frivolous or vexatious. The applicants do not have to provide prima facie proof of the validity of their arguments. In this connection Hugessen J.A. wrote in Coppello:
. . . On the first branch of that test as to whether or not there is a serious question to be tried, there is no doubt whatever that this application raises very serious and difficult questions. This application is, in my view, fraught with difficulties . . . The threshold, however, is a very low one. The bar is not set high for an applicant to clear. I am satisfied that, notwithstanding the difficult questions that the applicant will have to face, the application itself is not frivolous or vexatious and that is enough to satisfy the first branch of the test.
[30] The judgment by this Court in North American Gateway Inc. v. C.R.T.C. lays down the same rule:
The jurisprudence directs that the threshold of "serious issue to be tried" is a low one. The earlier jurisprudence suggested that the applicant had to establish a prima facie case before a stay would be granted. Since the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd. v. Manitoba Food and Commercial Workers Local 832 and Labour Board (Man.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110; 73 N.R. 341; 46 Man. R. (2d) 241, and R.J.R. MacDonald, supra, the courts have held that the threshold is much lower: the applicant need only satisfy the court that the matter on appeal is neither frivolous nor vexatious.
[28] As mentioned above, the Superior Court by refusing to intervene in the arbitral decision only asserted that the decision was not patently unreasonable. The Superior Court did not thereby conclude that the Corporation's position was frivolous or vexatious. As we know, there is a world of difference between these two ideas.
[29] What is more, certain comments by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Leblanc, supra, in the nature of obiter dicta, indicate that a failure by the employer to comply with the requirements of clause 10.04 of the collective agreement should possibly not entail the automatic quashing of the disciplinary action contemplated by the employer.
[30] However, Leblanc may not be as much help as the Corporation would like, since the separate reasons of three judges of the Court of Appeal form a ratio with a dynamic which is different from our own.
[31] It is true that Leblanc involved the dismissal of a Corporation employee and the impact of clause 10.04 of the collective agreement, at issue here, on the dismissal process.
[32] As with the Superior Court in the case at bar, in Leblanc the Quebec Court of Appeal had to determine whether the arbitrator's decision which quashed the dismissal at issue on the basis of preliminary objections by the employer - a decision upheld by the Superior Court - was patently unreasonable. A majority of the Court concluded that it was.
[33] However, the reasons of the Court of Appeal in its analysis of the arbitrator's decision indicated that the ratio of the two majority judges (Rousseau-Houle J.A. dissenting) addressed a situation or a step that was not present in Mr. Morissette's case.
[34] That step was the meaning to be given to a meeting of March 26, 1999, which a Corporation investigator had with the employee in question at a police station, following the latter's arrest for fraud committed by her.
[35] Baudouin J.A. summarized the facts and his position as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
I. FACTS
10. The mis-en-cause Sylvie Leblanc, an employee of the Canada Post Corporation, was arrested on March 26, 1999, when she was trying to take possession of goods ordered by telephone, giving a credit number she had stolen from the mail. She was caught in flagrante delicto.
11. The appellant's investigator, Serge Mathieu, was informed of the matter and the appellant's managers at once decided to suspend Sylvie Leblanc indefinitely, as allowed under the collective agreement. Serge Mathieu accordingly went to the police station, met Sylvie Leblanc there and gave her a written suspension notice, indicating that a disciplinary meeting would be held the following April 1. On that date Sylvie Leblanc appeared, accompanied as was her right under clause 10.04 of the collective agreement by a Union representative, and admitted what she had done. Shortly after, the appellant dismissed her, considering that the relationship of trust had been broken.
12. The case went before the arbitrator, and the latter, Diane Sabourin, first had to consider four preliminary objections made by counsel for the Union, which were the following:
(1) the employer failed to inform the complainant 24 hours in advance of the interview on March 26, 1999, "of a disciplinary nature", contrary to clause 10.04 (a);
(2) the employer did not indicate to the complainant that she had the "right to be accompanied by a Union representative" as specified in subparagraph (a)(i);
(3) at that time the employer also failed to mention "the purpose of the meeting", as provided in this case by subparagraph (ii), and to indicate whether it involved the employee's personal file;
(4) finally, the employer failed to indicate to the complainant that she had "the right to refuse to participate or to continue to participate in such interview", contrary to para. (b) of the said clause 10.04.
13. The arbitrator allowed these four objections, considering that the meeting of March 26, 1999, was a meeting of a disciplinary nature, that Sylvie Leblanc did not have the benefit of Union representation, and that the employer or its representative should have told her that it would be a disciplinary interview. In the arbitrator's view this was a serious, fundamental and fatal substantive defect, which consequently led the arbitrator to quash the suspension notice and dismissal notices and to allow the grievance.
14. The appellant appealed for judicial review to the Superior Court, which on November 9, 2000, dismissed her motion, considering that it did not have to review the facts presented to the arbitrator and that the latter's decision was not patently unreasonable.
. . .
20. In my opinion, with all due respect for the contrary view, the arbitral decision of June 30, 2000, was patently unreasonable and the appellant's motion for judicial review should accordingly be allowed, for the following reasons.
21. First, the arbitrator was clearly wrong in describing the meeting at the police station on March 26, 1999, as a disciplinary interview. The evidence before the arbitrator was that the purpose of the meeting was simply to give Sylvie Leblanc the letter of suspension, to take back her keys and identity card, to inform her that a disciplinary interview would be held on April 1, to ask her whether she had anything to say (she did not reply) and whether others were involved (here again there was no reply), and finally to offer her the employee assistance program.
22. Accordingly, unless any meeting in which an employer's representative issues a letter of suspension is to be described as a "disciplinary interview", the meeting of March 26, 1999, in these circumstances clearly cannot be so described. Here, the error is obvious.
[36] Fish J.A. came to the same conclusion as Baudouin J.A., but added that even if the meeting of March 26, 1999, were to be regarded as a disciplinary interview, the failure to observe clause 10.04 of the collective agreement caused no injury to the employee in question, since this brief meeting had no bearing on her suspension and subsequent dismissal.
[37] Fish J.A. said the following about this aspect of the matter, at paras. 51 to 53 of his reasons:
51. Assuming, for present purposes, that these brief questions constituted a "disciplinary interview" that was not conducted in accordance with section 10.04 of the collective agreement, the incontrovertible fact of the matter is that this "interview" had no bearing whatever on either the suspension or the dismissal of Ms. Leblanc.
52. In short, assuming that Mr. Mathieu's two questions - unanswered, to all intents and purposes - constituted a "disciplinary interview" within the meaning of section 10.04, Ms. Leblanc suffered no prejudice whatever as a result of her employer's failure to observe the procedural requirements of section 10.04 of the collective agreement.
53. On any view of the matter, there was thus no rational basis for the arbitrator's decision to set aside Ms. Leblanc's suspension.
[38] In the case now under consideration, Mr. Morissette did not first have a meeting with a Corporation investigator who gave him a notice of suspension and asked certain questions. Mr. Morissette's case was at the stage of prior notice of a disciplinary interview. In Leblanc, it was recognized that the disciplinary process of dismissal following the suspension was carried out correctly (see as to this the reasons of Fish J.A.).
[39] These distinctions between the case at bar and Leblanc are important.
[40] That is why the following passage, to which the Corporation attached great importance in the matter of a serious question, is in my judgment in the nature of an obiter dictum by Baudouin J.A. of the Court of Appeal. It is a passage which is nevertheless present.
[41] The passage, set out below, is found at para. 23 of the reasons of Baudouin J.A., and reflects the position taken by the Corporation before the arbitrator and the Superior Court in the case at bar. In this passage Baudouin J.A. indicates that absence of notice under clause 10.04 of the collective agreement should not result in quashing of the disciplinary measures imposed by the employer. Paragraph 23 reads as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
23. Reading this provision clearly shows that the absence of notice simply allows the employee to refuse to continue the interview, and does not authorize the arbitrator to set aside the disciplinary measures (suspension or dismissal) taken by the employer.
[42] I consider that this comment by Baudouin J.A., taken together with the relatively low burden which the Corporation has to meet in order to persuade the Court that there is a serious question, means that it must conclude, though by a slight margin, that the Corporation did meet the first part of the test in RJR - MacDonald Inc., supra.
(b) Irreparable harm
[43] Under this heading the Court understood that the Corporation's first argument was that if it eventually was successful on the review of the arbitral decision, the lack of a stay of that decision in the interval would mean that in the meantime the Corporation would have to reinstate Mr. Morissette, and in the argument on the merits, that is on the propriety of the dismissal, the Corporation would no longer be in a position to argue a breach of the confidential relationship in support of the rigour of the penalty imposed, namely dismissal, since it could be said that for a time it was able to work with Mr. Morissette.
[44] I cannot agree with the Corporation in this respect.
[45] First, in order to deal with the merits of the matter, namely the propriety of the dismissal, the Corporation will have to appeal the Superior Court's judgment of February 21, 2003, and will also have to be successful in the Court of Appeal, which will then refer the matter back for re-hearing before another arbitrator. This series of steps makes the present argument somewhat uncertain.
[46] Second, I strongly doubt that the Corporation could be precluded on the merits from making a strong argument that if there had been reinstatement, this was due to circumstances arising after the situation giving rise to the dismissal, and inter alia the fact that the arbitral decision had become executory. Reinstatement would to some extent have been imposed on the Corporation by the state of the law, and it could certainly argue that so far as it was concerned all the reasons for the dismissal were still valid. Any evidence subsequent to the dismissal, whether that evidence was for or against a party's position, would have to be disregarded if the evidence did not relate to the acts preceding the dismissal.
[47] The Corporation also maintained, as another argument involving irreparable harm, that the affidavits it submitted in connection with the motion at bar established in its favour that there was such harm.
[48] Here again, I find it difficult to agree.
[49] First, it should be noted that the evidence the Corporation presented in this respect was partly submitted not in connection with its initial motion record - which in the circumstances should have been the case - but well after the Union's reply record. Although I allowed this belated evidence to be filed at the hearing - the affidavit of Ms. Pagé dated February 26, 2003, (Ms. Pagé's second affidavit) and the affidavit of Mr. Racine, dated February 26, 2003 - this tardiness still further illustrates all the time the Corporation had at its disposal to assemble contemporary evidence from personal knowledge of the deponents, for the argument that reinstating Mr. Morissette in his duties would be to cause irreparable harm to the Corporation or Mr. Morissette's co-workers.
[50] It should be borne in mind that, as in Leblanc, the arbitrator here and the Superior Court have not had to consider the serious actions allegedly committed by Mr. Morissette on the merits, since to date the argument has been limited to the process of announcing the dismissal penalty.
[51] This is a situation which the Corporation should have known would be applicable to it in connection with its motion for a stay. Accordingly, it should have appeared with one or more sufficient affidavits to establish irreparable harm in connection with its motion.
[52] Mr. Racine's affidavit filed by the Corporation is not very detailed. In fact, it only contains four short paragraphs and is the only testimony based on direct and personal knowledge. That affidavit sets out the following:
[TRANSLATION]
1. I have been a supervisor with the Canada Post Corporation for 22 years, including the last three years on the day shift at the package distribution centre in Randin, Quebec;
2. At the time relevant to the dismissal of Jacques Morissette, I was his supervisor on the day shift at the Package Distribution Centre at Randin, Quebec;
3. At that time, I feared for my health and safety when Jacques Morissette was on the premises, and I would have the same fears if he returned to work;
4. I am very reluctant to see Jacques Morissette return to work.
[53] This affidavit cannot be taken as coming from one of Mr. Morissette's co-workers. It is probably more suitable to associate this affidavit with the Corporation's management. That is not fatal as such, except that as supervisor Mr. Racine gives no explanation whatever of why it was impossible for him to contain the situation, even as an experienced supervisor. In the same way, it should also be noted that paragraph 3 of his affidavit is very terse and gives few details.
[54] As to the evidence filed by Ms. Pagé, her initial affidavit dated January 30, 2003, and especially paragraphs 14 and 18 of the affidavit, seeks to emphasize the negative impact which the reinstatement of Mr. Morissette would have on the supervisory personnel and Mr. Morissette's co-workers.
[55] For the supervisory personnel, we have seen that the Corporation subsequently felt it necessary to introduce Mr. Racine's affidavit, discussed above.
[56] As to Mr. Morissette's co-workers, this affidavit does not clearly indicate, any more than Ms. Pagé's second affidavit does, that the fears entertained by co-workers at that time are in fact still felt by co-workers following a contemporary inquiry.
[57] Further, it should be noted that the Corporation did not file a single affidavit from Mr. Morissette's co-workers to show more than hesitation or reluctance. It will be recalled here that there is no aspect of confidentiality or anonymity that would discourage the Corporation from obtaining and submitting such evidence.
[58] Under this heading, in short, I feel that the Corporation was not able to meet its burden of proof and establish that Mr. Morissette's reinstatement would cause it irreparable harm.
[59] As I feel that the Corporation did not meet the irreparable harm test, there is no need to consider the third test, namely the balance of convenience. However, I would add that if I had done so I would have been inclined to find in Mr. Morissette's favour, even if his reinstatement were eventually to be quashed if the Corporation was successful in a hearing on the merits.
[60] It is impossible to say just when the Court of Appeal will be able to make a ruling, if there is an appeal, and at the present time the evidence is that Mr. Morissette is having financial problems. As Dubé J. indicated in International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local 148 v. Air Canada (1991), 44 F.T.R. 206, at 210 (T-2872-90, p. 7):
Courts have recognized that long periods of unemployment create moral, psychological as well as financial hardship upon the unemployed that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages (see Retail Store Employees' Union v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (1980), 2 Man.R. (2d) 100, at 104-150).
[61] It should also be borne in mind that if once he is reinstated Mr. Morissette commits reprehensible acts he will again be subject to dismissal, and the process will undoubtedly not have the deficiencies noted by the arbitrator and the Superior Court.
[62] Consequently, in view of all the foregoing reasons, the Corporation's motion for a stay of the arbitral decision is dismissed with costs.
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"Richard Morneau"
Prothonotary |
Montréal, Quebec
March 14, 2003
Certified true translation
Suzanne M. Gauthier, C. Tr., LL.L.
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FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA TRIAL DIVISION
Date: 20030314
Docket: T-54-03
In re the CANADA LABOUR CODE, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, as amended
Between: CANADIAN UNION OF POSTAL WORKERS Applicant and CANADA POST CORPORATION Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
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FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
FILE: T-54-03
STYLE OF CAUSE: In re the CANADA LABOUR CODE,
R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, as amended
Between:
CANADIAN UNION OF POSTAL WORKERS
Applicant
and
CANADA POST CORPORATION
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: March 3, 2003
REASONS FOR ORDER: RICHARD MORNEAU, PROTHONOTARY
DATED: March 14, 2003
APPEARANCES:
Bernard Philion FOR THE APPLICANT CANADIAN UNION OF POSTAL WORKERS
Luc Jodoin FOR THE RESPONDENT CANADA POST CORPORATION
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Morency, Philion, Leblanc FOR THE APPLICANT CANADIAN
Montréal, Quebec UNION OF POSTAL WORKERS
Jodoin, Santerre FOR THE RESPONDENT CANADA
Montréal, Quebec POST CORPORATION