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                                                                    Date: 20030110

                                                               Docket: IMM-2171-02

                                                    Neutral Citation: 2003 FCT 9

Entre :

                       Mohammad Bassam BAKI ZADA,

                               Nada KOUDSI,

                             Sirin BAKI ZADA,

                                                               Demandeurs;

                                  - et -

                     LE MINISTRE DE LA CITOYENNETÉ

                          ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

                                                                Défendeur.

                          REASONS FOR ORDER

PINARD J.:

   The applicants seek judicial review of a decision of Me Mona Beauchemin, of the Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Appeal Division"), dated April 18, 2002, that the applicants were to be removed from Canada by overturning the order of suspension of removal signed on June 5, 2000.

   The applicants' claim is based on the grounds of successful establishment in Canada and the advanced age of the principal applicant, Mr. Mohammad Bassam Baki Zada.

   On April 18, 2002, the Appeal Division stated the reasons for its decision as follows:


Ayant revu toutes les circonstances de l'espèce, le tribunal conclut que l'appelant principal n'a pas démontré, selon la balance des probabilités, qu'il s'était établi comme entrepreneur au sens du Règlementni que, considérant toutes les circonstances de l'espèce, il ne devrait pas être expulsé du Canada, et ordonne que le sursis d'exécution de la mesure de renvoi pour une période d'un an, sujet à certains termes et conditions, accordé par Me Sivak le 5 juin 2000, soit annulé. Il en est de même pour son épouse et sa fille, qui ne sont pas suffisamment établies au Canada pour justifier l'octroi d'une mesure spéciale. Une telle mesure est cependant justifiée pour le fils qui est véritablement établi au Canada.

   The relevant section of the Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172 (the "Regulations") reads as follows:

23.1 (1) Entrepreneurs and their dependants are prescribed as a class of immigrants in respect of which landing shall be granted subject to the condition that, within a period of not more than two years after the date of an entrepreneur's landing, the entrepreneur

(a) establishes, purchases or makes a substantial investment in a business or commercial venture in Canada so as to make a significant contribution to the economy and whereby employment opportunities in Canada are created or continued for one or more Canadian citizens or permanent residents, other than the entrepreneur and the entrepreneur's dependants;

(b) participates actively and on an on-going basis in the management of the business or commercial venture referred to in paragraph (a);

(c) furnishes, at the times and places specified by an immigration officer, evidence of efforts to comply with the terms and conditions imposed pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b); and

(d) furnishes, at the time and place specified by an immigration officer, evidence of compliance with the terms and conditions imposed pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (b).

23.1 (1) Les entrepreneurs et les personnes à leur charge constituent une catégorie réglementaire d'immigrants à l'égard desquels il est obligatoire d'imposer les conditions suivantes au droit d'établissement :

a) dans un délai d'au plus deux ans après la date à laquelle le droit d'établissement lui est accordé, l'entrepreneur établit ou achète au Canada une entreprise ou un commerce, ou y investit une somme importante, de façon à contribuer d'une manière significative à la vie économique et à permettre à au moins un citoyen canadien ou un résident permanent, à l'exclusion de lui-même et des personnes à sa charge, d'obtenir ou de conserver un emploi;

b) dans un délai d'au plus deux ans après la date à laquelle le droit d'établissement lui est accordé, l'entrepreneur participe activement et régulièrement à la gestion de l'entreprise ou du commerce visé à l'alinéa a);

c) dans un délai d'au plus deux ans après la date à laquelle le droit d'établissement lui est accordé, l'entrepreneur fournit, aux dates, heures et lieux indiqués par l'agent d'immigration, la preuve qu'il s'est efforcé de se conformer aux conditions imposées aux termes des alinéas a) et b);

d) dans un délai d'au plus deux ans après la date à laquelle le droit d'établissement lui est accordé, l'entrepreneur fournit, à la date, à l'heure et au lieu indiqués par l'agent d'immigration, la preuve qu'il s'est conformé aux conditions imposées aux termes des alinéas a) et b).

   The relevant provisions of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 (the "Act") read as follows:


27. (1) An immigration officer or a peace officer shall forward a written report to the Deputy Minister setting out the details of any information in the possession of the immigration officer or peace officer indicating that a permanent resident is a person who

[...]

(b) if that person was granted landing subject to terms and conditions, has knowingly contravened any of those terms or conditions;

70. (1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), where a removal order or conditional removal order is made against a permanent resident or against a person lawfully in possession of a valid returning resident permit issued to that person pursuant to the regulations, that person may appeal to the Appeal Division on either or both of the following grounds, namely,

[...]

(b) on the ground that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from Canada.

27. (1) L'agent d'immigration ou l'agent de la paix doit faire part au sous-ministre, dans un rapport écrit et circonstancié, de renseignements concernant un résident permanent et indiquant que celui-ci, selon le cas :

[...]

b) a sciemment contrevenu aux conditions dont était assorti son droit d'établissement;

70. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (4) et (5), les résidents permanents et les titulaires de permis de retour en cours de validité et conformes aux règlements peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel d'une mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel en invoquant les moyens suivants :

[...]

b) le fait que, eu égard aux circonstances particulières de l'espèce, ils ne devraient pas être renvoyés du Canada.

   The applicants submit that, although the Appeal Division correctly stated the factors to be considered in an appeal from a decision under paragraph 70(1)(b) of the Act, it is evident from the decision that not all circumstances were taken into consideration. The applicants specifically argue that the Appeal Division ignored the medical certificate of Sirin Baki Zada when it reproached her for not being able to find employment in Canada. The applicants further submit that the Appeal Division did not take into consideration the importance of family unity when it stated that the principal applicant's son, Salaheddi Baki Zada, should not be removed, yet ordered the removal of the applicants.

   The Supreme Court of Canada has indicated the approach to be taken to a determination under paragraph 70(1)(b), in Chieu v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] S.C.J. No. 1 (QL):

[40]      . . . In Ribic, supra, at p. 6, the I.A.B. summarized the relevant factors to be considered under its discretionary jurisdiction pursuant to what is now s. 70(1)(b) of the Act:


In each case the Board looks to the same general areas to determine if having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from Canada. These circumstances include the seriousness of the offence or offences leading to the deportation and the possibility of rehabilitation or in the alternative, the circumstances surrounding the failure to meet the conditions of admission which led to the deportation order. The Board looks to the length of time spent in Canada and the degree to which the appellant is established; family in Canada and the dislocation to that family that deportation of the appellant would cause; the support available for the appellant not only within the family but also within the community and the degree of hardship that would be caused to the appellant by his return to his country of nationality. While the general areas of review are similar in each case the facts are rarely, if ever, identical.

This list is illustrative, and not exhaustive. The weight to be accorded to any particular factor will vary according to the particular circumstances of a case. . . .

   The power to issue a departure order pursuant to paragraph 70(1)(b) is discretionary, and a court can only intervene where the power is exercised in bad faith or in an arbitrary or illegal manner, or where it has been influenced by irrelevant considerations (M.C.I. v. Saintelus (September 11, 1998), IMM-1542-97). Furthermore, an administrative tribunal is presumed to have considered all the evidence before it (Taher v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (September 7, 2000), IMM-5255-99 and Hassan v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (October 22, 1992), A-831-90), and need only make specific reference to those pieces of evidence which directly contradict its conclusions (Cepeda-Gutierrez et al. v. Canada (M.C.I.) (1998), 157 F.T.R. 35). Therefore, we can assume that the Appeal Division took into account the medical certificate of Sirin Baki Zada, which is of a general nature and does not explicitly address an inability to work.

   There is no requirement for the Appeal Division to take into account family unity, but rather the dislocation to the applicant's family in Canada that deportation of the applicant would cause. The Appeal Division has addressed the applicant's son's situation and found him to be an autonomous adult, well-settled in Canada. It was not unreasonable for the Appeal Division not to explicitly address the issue of dislocation of the son in these circumstances. Instead, it correctly considered the dislocation to the son's fiancée which the latter's removal would engender.


The applicants submit that the Appeal Division erred in discounting the contract for the purchase of the second convenience store. They further argue that the Appeal Division erred in according more weight to the testimony of the vendor, who stated that he had a buy-back option, than to the clear terms of the contract, which describe an outright sale.

In my view, the Appeal Division was justified in admitting and assessing as it did the testimonial evidence of the oral agreement between the applicant and the vendor concerning the buy-back option on the convenience store. This evidence was admissible pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 69.4(3)(c) of the Act, which reads:


69.4 (3) The Appeal Division has, as regards the attendance, swearing and examination of witnesses, the production and inspection of documents, the enforcement of its orders and other matters necessary or proper for the due exercise of its jurisdiction, all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a superior court of record and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may

[. . .]

(c) during a hearing, receive such additional evidence as it may consider credible or trustworthy and necessary for dealing with the subject-matter before it.


69.4 (3) La section d'appel a, pour la comparution, la prestation de serment et l'interrogatoire des témoins, ainsi que pour la production et l'examen des pièces, l'exécution de ses ordonnances et toute autre question relevant de sa compétence, les attributions d'une cour supérieure d'archives. Elle peut notamment:

[. . .]

c) recevoir, en cours d'audition, les éléments de preuve supplémentaires qu'elle estime utiles, crédibles et dignes de foi.


There is no requirement for a document to take precedence over testimonial evidence. In the case at bar, the Appeal Division examined the question of the contract for purchase of the convenience store in great detail. It cannot be said that it did not take this factor into account. Given all the evidence before the Appeal Division, I am satisfied, therefore, that the latter could reasonably conclude as it did.

For all the above reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

                                                                         

       JUDGE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

January 10, 2003


                              FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

                                  TRIAL DIVISION

                    NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:                                IMM-2171-02

STYLE OF CAUSE:                       Mohammad Bassam BAKI ZADA, Nada KOUDSI, Sirin BAKI ZADA c. LE MINISTRE DE LA CITOYENNETÉ ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

PLACE OF HEARING:              Montréal, Quebec

DATE OF HEARING:              November 21, 2002

REASONS FOR ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PINARD

DATED:                          January 10, 2003                     

APPEARANCES:

Me Viken G. Artinian                        FOR THE APPLICANTS

Me Annie Van Der Meerschen           FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Viken Artinian                        FOR THE APPLICANT

Montréal, Quebec

Morris Rosenberg                      FOR THE RESPONDENT

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

Ottawa, Ontario

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