Date: 20030408
Docket: IMM-2112-02
Neutral citation: 2003 FCT 408
Toronto, Ontario, Tuesday, the 8th day of April, 2003
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
SIVASOTHY SIVAMOORTHY
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an appeal for leave and judicial review of the decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division (the "Board"), dated April 19, 2002, deciding that Sivasothy Sivamoorthy (the "Applicant") was not a Convention refugee. The Applicant asks that the decision of the Board be set aside pursuant to s. 18.1 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.F-7, and the claim be referred back to the Board for redetermination.
Background
[2] The Applicant is a 27-year-old female Tamil who purports to be a citizen of Sri Lanka from the north. She claims refugee status based on her race and membership in a particular social group (Tamils from northern Sri Lanka facing persecution from the Sri Lankan authorities (the "SLA") and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the "LTTE")), as well as her imputed political opinion.
[3] The Applicant alleges that she was forced by the LTTE to do various types of work in LTTE camps including cleaning, sewing, and washing. She claims that with army advances into LTTE areas she and her family had to move several times. In August of 1996, the family moved to Thunnukai where they paid money to the LTTE in order to avoid forced recruitment and the ire of the LTTE. The Applicant contends that she was held at an LTTE camp for three days in late 1997 and released upon payment of 25,000 rupees by her mother.
[4] After her marriage in 1998, the Applicant and her husband were forced to work for the LTTE. After witnessing the death of a civilian through SLA attacks, the Applicant's husband decided they should leave the country. They managed to get out of the north with the help of a guide. They travelled to a sentry point in Maddu and were allowed to proceed to the Vepankulam camp for processing to travel to Colombo. She describes the camp as a place where women are taken by soldiers for interrogation and some never return. She was afraid of being raped or accused of being a LTTE collaborator. The Applicant and her husband were able to secure a pass to travel to Colombo with the help of an agent. They attempted to leave Sri Lanka with false passports on March 14th, 2000. The Applicant was successful but the Applicant's husband was detained. She proceeded to Malaysia. Through the help of her family she arranged for a bribe to be paid to secure the release of her husband. She came to Canada on April 13th, 2000 and made a refugee claim, having spent 17 days in Italy, 2 days in France and 8 days in England without making a claim.
[5] After making her initial application for refugee protection, the Board's administration decided that the hearing should be expedited. The expedited interview was held August 3, 2000. At the interview the Refugee Claims Officer ("RCO") had suspicions that the Applicant's National Identity Card ("NIC") was forged. The RCO sent copies of the NIC and the Applicant's birth certificate to the Canadian High Commission in Colombo, Sri Lanka, so that the Canadian authorities could check with the Sri Lankan government on whether the documents were genuine. She also recommended that the case not be expedited on that basis. The case was eventually scheduled for a full hearing on February 13, 2001.
[6] On January 16, 2001 the Canadian High Commission confirmed that the documents were certified as genuine by the Sri Lankan authorities. At the hearing on February 13, 2001, the RCO insisted that the NIC could still be forged. The Board decided to question the Applicant about how she had been issued the NIC. Based on this questioning the Board then decided that since the applicant could not accurately remember how the NIC was
issued, the original NIC should be sent to Sri Lanka for verification.
[7] On July 8, 2001 the Canadian High Commission confirmed that the original NIC had been verified and that it was genuine. Having obtained verification that the original NIC was genuine, the Board resumed the hearing on August 14, 2001.
Board's Decision
[8] The Board found that the central issues that were determinative of the Applicant's claim were the identity of the claimant as a Tamil recently from the north and general credibility concerns.
[9] The Board found that the Applicant failed to demonstrate with credible evidence that she was a Tamil woman who was present in northern Sri Lanka at times material to her claim. The Board considered the supporting documents presented by the Applicant, including the NIC, a birth certificate, school documents, and a letter from her husband.
[10] The Board found that her testimony as to how she obtained her NIC was contradicted by the documentary evidence. It found that NICs were not obtained in the manner described by the Applicant. It further found that her testimony with respect to how she obtained her NIC was contradictory. The Board stated:
We find, on a balance of probabilities, that her lack of knowledge relating to how NICs are issued and also her lack of knowledge pertaining to the symbol "V" on the NIC, stems from the fact that even if she was born in Sri Lanka, she was no longer in the country when the time came for requiring a NIC. We cannot be really sure who the claimant is, as it would appear that she has thus far operated with at least three names, her currently submitted documents notwithstanding. She arrived in Canada with a set of documents including a passport and ID card claiming to be Mullaimalan Rajaratnam and she later gave her name to the Canadian Immigration authorities as Sivasothy Sivamoorthy. She is obviously not someone who concerns herself with the truth.
When the panel assessed this portion of the claimant's testimony and her lack of knowledge regarding the acquisition of her NIC, the reason she gave for acquiring it and the whole question of what document was presented at the A level exams, we find, on a balance of probabilities, that her NIC was improperly obtained, its "genuineness" notwithstanding, and that she has not been in the North for a number of years. Previously referenced documentary evidence indicates that it is possible to obtain NICS by fraudulent means.
...
In any event, the claimant has not provided any objectively verifiable document which places her in the North beyond the beginning of 1993....
[11] The Board did not give any weight to the Applicant's personal letters, describing them as "self-serving" because the Board had no way of testing their veracity, and because of the claimant's lack of credibility.
[12] The Board went on to discuss other reasons why they found the Applicant to be lacking in credibility. They found that her testimony as to her Sri Lankan passport was contradictory. The Board also considered the evidence of various assumed identities as further testimony of the Applicant's lack of veracity.
[13] The Board also did not believe that her husband would have been released through a bribe after being detained for trying to leave the country using a false passport. The documentary evidence revealed that the charges for this crime were severe and the Board did not "believe that her husband, if stopped would have been so lightly treated." They also found it strange that her husband would not have mentioned his detention in his letter to his wife.
Issues
[14] The issues are:
1. Whether the Board violated natural justice by ruling, after giving the impression that the applicant's NIC was accepted, that it was really fraudulent?
2. Whether the Board acted perversely and capriciously, and beyond its expertise, by rejecting the Sri Lankan government's verification of the Applicant's identity?
3. Whether the Board erred by ignoring or rejecting all other evidence of the Applicant's identity?
4. Whether the Board's supplementary findings were wrong in fact or law, and whether they would, in any event, be sufficient as an independent foundation for the Board's finding?
5. Whether the Board members erred in law by making conflicting decisions on the issue of Sri Lankan National Identity Cards?
Applicant's Submissions
[15] The Applicant submits that the standard of review for findings of fact and law are different. Findings of fact must be shown to be made in a "perverse or capricious manner," or made "without regard to the material." With respect to errors of law, the Board need only be shown to have erred (Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982). The Applicant submits that issues of natural justice are points of law, with respect to which the Board is owed no deference. The standard for judicial review on these points is one of correctness.
Issue 1:
[16] The Applicant submits that the Federal Court of Appeal in Velauthar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] F.C.J. No. 425 (F.C.A.)(QL), held that a Board cannot give the impression that an issue is resolved, and then go back on this in its decision. This decision has been applied consistently in the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division. The Applicant relies on a series of cases at the Trial Division that indicates that it was a violation of natural justice for the Board to give the Applicant the impression that the issue of the Applicant's identity was resolved after the Sri Lankan government affirmed the genuineness of the NIC, and then made an adverse finding as to the Applicant's identity. Counsel for the Applicant relied on this impression and so did not question the Applicant further on this point or introduce additional evidence to establish the Applicant's identity as a Tamil female from the North.
Issue 2:
[17] The Applicant submits that the Board erred in finding that the NIC was not genuine when the Sri Lankan authorities had confirmed its authenticity. The Board has no greater authority than the government of Sri Lanka to determine if a Sri Lankan document is genuine, or a Sri Lankan national is who she states she is (Popal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000]_F.C.J. No. 352 (T.D.)(QL); Oduro v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 1421 (T.D.)(QL)).
Issue 3:
[18] It is the Applicant's submission that the Board erred by ignoring the fact that the Applicant's Birth Certificate was verified as genuine. This was proof that the Applicant was who she said she was, contrary to the Board's finding. The Applicant further submits that the Board's reason for rejecting the Applicant's letters was wrong in law and perverse. The Board found that the letter was self-serving. The Federal Court of Appeal in Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] F.C.J. No. 408 (C.A.)(QL) held that it is an expression of bias for a tribunal to presume that evidence from a refugee must be self-serving and false. The Board had no basis for rejecting the letters.
Issue 4:
[19] The Applicant submits that the Board's finding that the Applicant could not have been issued a NIC with a "V" on it is perverse and beyond the Board's expertise. The finding disregards the fact that the Sri Lankan government recognized the NIC as genuine, having seen all the details in it, including her age at the time of issuance. This also disregards sworn affidavit evidence which states that students are routinely issued NICs with the letter "V" on them, if they are citizens of Sri Lanka.
[20] It is the Applicant's submission that it was perverse for the Board to find that, because the Applicant used false travel documents to flee to Canada, her real identity was not established. Most refugees arriving in Canada have to flee using false documents. It is submitted that it is inherently unfair and perverse to presume, without basis, that this automatically means their identity must remain a mystery.
[21] The Applicant submits that none of the Board's credibility findings make any difference to the fundamental basis for the decision in this case. The Board cannot possibly accept a refugee claim if it does not believe the claimant is a citizen of the country she claims to be from. In Peng v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 119 (C.A.)(QL) the Federal Court of Appeal held that if the Board doubts that a person is who she says she is, and even doubts her citizenship, there is no way to tell whether it would have arrived at the same conclusion had it not been for this erroneous finding, so other findings cannot salvage the validity of the decision. The Applicant submits that the Board's findings are so egregious that its decision should be set aside.
Issue 5:
[22] The Applicant submits that Board Members Then and Wilson, who decided this case have made several decisions which state conflicting positions with respect to Sri Lankan National Identity Cards.
[23] Either NICs are necessary and reliable or they are of no use. Either the verification of the Sri Lanka government is reliable or it is of no use. These conflicting findings raise a reasonable apprehension of bias that the Board members were determined to reject the claimant's identity, regardless of the evidence on record.
[24] In the alternative, the Applicant submits that making conflicting decisions is a reviewable error, even if it is not characterized as raising apprehension of bias, simply because it is capricious for the same Board Members to hold conflicting positions on the same issue (Katalayi v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1997] F.C.J. No.1494 (TD)(QL)).
Respondent's Submissions:
[25] The Respondent submits that one of the central issues to the Applicant's claim was her identity as a Tamil female who was present in northern Sri Lanka during the material time. The claim partly failed because she could not demonstrate her identity with credible testimony. The Respondent submits that the other central issue to the claim was credibility. There were contradictions, inconsistencies and implausibilities in her oral testimony, her PIF and the Port of Entry Notes. The Board found that she was totally devoid of credibility.
[26] The standard of review for credibility findings is patent unreasonableness (Aguebor v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1993] F.C.J. No. 732 (C.A.)(QL)). In this case the Applicant's submissions only address the issue relating to the NIC and her identity. These submissions hardly deal with the adverse credibility findings that form the bulk of the Board's reasoning.
[27] It is the Respondent's submission that the Board did not violate natural justice in this case. The record shows that it was the Applicant, through her counsel, who chose to believe that the identity issue was settled. The Board rejected the Applicant's request for an expedited hearing after the NIC was proved to be genuine. It was clear that by refusing this request, the Board signalled to the Applicant that the issues surrounding her identity were not resolved.
[28] The Respondent submits that the transcript reveals that the Board was ready to hear further evidence by way of counsel's redirect. Counsel's decision not to re-examine the Applicant is not an error of the Board.
[29] Unlike the cases cited by the Applicant, in the case at bar the Board had signalled that the central issue was not resolved. Despite the refusal of his request for an expedited hearing and the instructions at the resumption of the hearing, counsel chose to believe that the verification of the NIC remedied the conflicts between the Applicant's testimony and the documentary evidence.
[30] The Respondent also submits that it was not beyond the expertise of the Board to reject the Sri Lankan government's verification of the Applicant's identity card. The Board's concern was valid as there was objective documentary evidence before it that suggested a "genuine" NIC could be improperly obtained.
[31] The Respondent submits that the granting of an adjournment for the purpose of the verification of the NIC was not perverse. Although the document was found to be genuine, the Board could not ignore the fact that the documentary evidence contradicted the Applicant's testimony with respect to how she obtained the NIC. The Board did not ignore the Applicant's birth certificate and her school documents. The Board also did not err in assigning no probative value to the letters. It is trite law that the assessment of the weight of evidence is a proper matter for the decision of the Board and is not subject to review by this Court.
[32] The Respondent submits that the Board did not err with respect to its finding that the Applicant's lack of knowledge of the significance of the letter "V" on her NIC suggested she was not in the country when the NIC was issued. The Board used its own expertise in this area. The genuineness of the NIC did not cure the Applicant's lack of knowledge. The affidavit evidence filed by counsel does not refute the fact the "V" signifies voting rights.
Analysis
Standard of Review
[33] The Court must first determine what the appropriate standard of review is for this case.
[34] In Aguebor, supra, the Federal Court of Appeal discussed the standard of review for Refugee Division decisions at paragraph 4:
There is no longer any doubt that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: Who is in a better position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings are not open to judicial review.
[35] The Court should not seek to reweigh evidence before the Board simply because it would have reached a different conclusion. As long as there is evidence to support the Board's finding of credibility and no overriding error has occurred, the decision should not be disturbed.
[36] With respect to the issue of natural justice and procedural fairness, the standard of review is correctness. If the Court finds that there was a violation of natural justice or procedural fairness the Court must intervene (NAV Canada v. Canadian Air Traffic Control Assn., [1999] F.C.J. No. 1799 (C.A.)(QL); Lai v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] F.C.J. No. 1088 (T.D.)(QL); Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No.798 (T.D.)(QL); Sharma v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), [2001] F.C.J. No. 867 (T.D.)(QL)).
Issue 1: Was there a violation of procedural fairness in this case?
[37] The Applicant submits that the Board violated principles of natural justice by misleading the Applicant into believing that the issue of her identity had been resolved with the confirmation of the genuineness of her NIC by the Sri Lankan government. She submits the Board's course of conduct in this case with respect to the central issue of her identity misled the Applicant and denied her the opportunity to meet her case.
[38] The following is a summary of the actions of the Board:
· After a hearing to decide whether the Applicant's case could be decided by expedited hearing, a concern was raised by the RCO about the genuineness of the Applicant's identity documents. The RCO sent copies of the Applicant's NIC and Birth Certificate to the Canadian Embassy in Sri Lanka in order to have the Sri Lankan authorities attest to their genuineness.
· The NIC and Birth Certificate were deemed genuine by the Sri Lankan authorities.
· A full refugee determination hearing was scheduled for the Applicant.
· At the outset of the hearing the Board identified that the central issue to the claim was the Applicant's identity, stating that it still had concerns as to the genuineness of the NIC.
· The Applicant testified at the hearing with respect to how she obtained her NIC and her knowledge as to the meaning of the letter "V" on the NIC.
· Before Applicant's counsel began questioning the Applicant on this issue, the Presiding Member indicated that his concerns about the genuineness of the NIC were not resolved by the testimony and that he wanted to adjourn the hearing so that the original NIC could be sent to Sri Lanka for verification of its authenticity.
· The Sri Lanka authorities confirmed that the original NIC was genuine.
· The hearing was resumed on August 14, 2002 and a pre-hearing conference was conducted. At this pre-hearing conference counsel for the Applicant indicated on several occasions that it was his understanding that, since the NIC had been confirmed genuine, identity was no longer an issue.
· Specifically, when asked whether the Applicant's brother would be testifying Counsel stated: "I don't think it's necessary for him to give evidence, since we've verified the NIC. So, I don't intend to call him as a witness."
· Later the following exchange occurred at page 971 of the Tribunal Record:
Presiding Member: Okay. When we were here last time, we got to the point where counsel was about to do a re-direct in the area of identity documents. Now, briefly stating what we will do is if counsel still wants to continue that line, he can do so. Then we will deal with the issue of failure to claim elsewhere. Unless anyone has any other ideas?
Counsel: I don't think it's necessary for me to question on the ID, because the questioning had been related to how she got her national identity card, because she had not been clear on exactly what method had to be followed to get the NIC, she had forgotten that she had to see the Grammacivica (ph). Then Mr. Wilson reminded her in a question, "Didn't you have to see the Grammacivica?" And she said, "Yes. I forgot."
So, that led to the further investigation of the NIC, but now we have the confirmation that the NIC is genuine. So, I don't think there's any need to ask more questions about how she got it.
Presiding Member: Ms. Marchant?
RCO: I don't have any further questions in that area, sir. The only thing I wish to note for counsel is that I have not yet received the original document. When I do, I will let you know and then return it to you.
Presiding Member: Okay, Mr. Then?
Mr. Then: I am satisfied with the procedure today.
Presiding Member: All right, then, let's go on to deal with the other substantive issue, failure to claim elsewhere...
· In final submissions, Applicant's counsel reiterated his understanding that "we've conclusively established that the claimant is a young, Tamil woman from Northern Sri Lanka". The Presiding Member found it necessary to interrupt counsel's submission later with the following statement at p.980 of the Tribunal Record:
Presiding Member: I was waiting till you had done that section of your submission to ask you to address a certain question for me, and that is: Although the NIC indicates that the document is genuine, one thing has not been established thus far and that is that the claimant is recently from the north based on her documents....
· The RCO made the following statement in her final submissions:
RCO: When I screened this file a year ago, the main issues, to my mind, were, as well, identity, and the subjective component of the claimant's failure to claim elsewhere.
This case had originally been scheduled for an expedited interview, unfortunately without being screened first. However, I took the opportunity on that date to examine the original national identity card, and because of concerns with missing security features, I sent it off to Colombo to be verified, or rather I sent a copy off to be verified, and the response came back that the card was genuine. However, based on concerns with the claimant's testimony in February of this year with respect to how she obtained that card, the panel gave directions to send the actual card, itself, to be verified and, as you know, it's now been deemed genuine.
So, because of that, my concerns with the claimant's identity as a Sri Lankan national are no longer there.
...
...given that the most important document in Sri Lanka, namely the national identity card, has been deemed genuine, the identity of this individual is no longer a concern.
[39] The above sequences lead me to conclude that the Board did mislead the Applicant to believe that the central issue of identity had been resolved and that the confirmation by the Sri Lankan authorities that the original NIC was genuine had resolved any outstanding doubts as to her identity. Any reasonable person would have also believed this to be the case. Counsel for the Applicant clearly indicated at the beginning of the hearing that, based on the proceedings thus far, he understood that the issue of identity was resolved. The Board members did not disabuse him of that understanding. In final submissions, the Presiding member did interrupt counsel on the issue of identity, and a statement was made indicating that the Applicant's Sri Lankan origins had been resolved, and there remained only a question of whether she was recently from the North. It is clear from the transcript that even the RCO was satisfied that the confirmation of the NIC had resolved the issue of identity.
[40] The Board members had ample opportunity to indicate at the outset of the hearing, or at any point in the hearing, that they were still not satisfied, despite the verification of the NIC, that the Applicant was really from Sri Lanka. The Board's reasons indicate that this remained a central concern and it was clearly unfair to sit back idly and allow counsel for the Applicant to proceed without questioning the Applicant as to her identity and her documents or to call her brother as a witness to attest to her identity, knowing that counsel was under the false impression that the issue of identity had been resolved. The Board at no point indicated that regardless of what the government of Sri Lanka said, the Applicant was still not believed.
[41] In Velauthar, supra, Mahoney J.A. stated at page 2:
There has been a gross denial of natural justice here. The panel had stipulated that the Appellants feared persecution and that the only issue was whether that persecution was encompassed in the Convention definition. It proceeded, on grounds of credibility, to negate its stipulation. The Appellants were denied the opportunity to know and answer the case against them by a deliberate decision of the presiding member in which his colleague acquiesced.
[42] Although the present case does not fall squarely under Velauthar, supra, where the decision makers specifically indicated that certain issues were resolved, the case of Perera v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1172 (T.D.)(QL) states that misleading the Applicant that an issue is resolved and then reaching an adverse finding on that issue invokes the Court of Appeal decision of Velauthar, supra, and amounts to a denial of natural justice.
[43] In Perera, supra, Whetston J. applied Velauthar, supra, stating at paragraph 6:
The situation in the case at bar is somewhat different in that the Board did not explicitly specify which issues should be addressed in the representations by counsel. However, in my view, the effect of the Board's comments was the same as that in Velauthar, supra. The adverse finding of credibility on the issue of the formation of the DUNF was used to discredit the Applicant's testimony that he was actively involved in that party. His participation in the DUNF was a central aspect of the Applicant's claim. It was not open to the Board to give the claimant a false impression during the hearing that his oral testimony regarding his knowledge of the formation of the party had been accepted and then later impeach his credibility on the basis of that testimony.
[44] Perera, supra, and Velauthar, supra, are directly applicable to this case. The Applicant was denied natural justice by the Board misleading the Applicant into believing that the issue of identity was resolved and then refusing the claim based primarily on that issue.
[45] The Supreme Court has stated that in cases where natural justice has been denied a new hearing is required to remedy the violation. In Cardinal v. Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 Le Dain J., speaking for a unanimous court, stated at page 660:
I find it necessary to affirm that the denial of a right to a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid, whether or not it may appear to a reviewing court that the hearing would likely have resulted in a different decision. The right to a fair hearing must be regarded as an independent, unqualified right which finds its essential justification in the sense of procedural justice which any person affected by an administrative decision is entitled to have. It is not for a court to deny that right and sense of justice on the basis of speculation as to what the result might have been had there been a hearing.
[46] Even if there could remain a basis in the reasons to support the denial of the Applicant's claim, the denial of natural justice in this case requires a new hearing irrespective of whether the ultimate decision would have remained the same.
[47] Furthermore, the Applicant cites Federal Court of Appeal cases that indicate that where an error is so egregious that the Court cannot be certain that the result would have been the same had the error not occurred, other findings cannot salvage the validity of the decision (Peng, supra; Lin v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. No. 128 (C.A.)(QL)). The decision in the present case states that the Board "could not be sure who the claimant was" and that there was "no credible and trustworthy evidence that she is a Tamil who was present in the North at times material to her claim." Clearly the Board did not believe she was who she said she was, and this belief was central to their decision. Therefore, the Board's error in misleading the Applicant's counsel into believing that the issue of identity was resolved, when viewed in the context of the centrality of that finding to its decision, can be characterized as egregious, so that even if the other findings of the Board with respect to recent presence in the North and general credibility are valid, the decision should be returned.
[48] I am also of the view that the Board made other reviewable errors in its decision, but I do no feel it necessary to deal with them at this time. The fundamental basis for the decisions is flawed and the denial of natural justice alone requires a new hearing.
ORDER
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS THAT:
1. The application for judicial review is allowed, the April 19, 2002 decision is set aside and the matter is remitted for reconsideration by a differently constituted panel.
2. No question will be certified.
"James Russell"
J.F.C.C.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record
DOCKET: IMM-2112-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: SIVASOTHY SIVAMOORTHY
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
DATE OF HEARING: TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2003
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: RUSSELL J.
DATED: TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2003
APPEARANCES BY: Mr. Raoul Boulakia
For the Applicant
Mr. Tamrat Gebeyehu
For the Respondent
SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Raoul Boulakia
Barrister and Solicitor
45 Saint Nicholas Street
Toronto, Ontario
M4Y 1W6
For the Applicant
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
For the Respondent
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Date: 20030408
Docket: IMM-2112-02
BETWEEN:
SIVASOTHY SIVAMOORTHY
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER