Date: 20030123
Docket: T-4-02
Neutral Citation: 2003 FCT 51
Ottawa, Ontario, January 23, 2003
Present: The Honourable Mr. Justice Blais
BETWEEN:
CARMEL FORTIN
Applicant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an application under section 18.1 of the Federal Court Act for judicial review of the decision of board member Léo-Paul Guindon (the grievance adjudicator) dated October 5, 2001, pursuant to the Public Service Staff Relations Act.
FACTS
[2] The applicant was an employee of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), working as an immigration officer (PM-02) in Edmunston, New Brunswick, during a period commencing in March 1978 and ending in September 1996.
[3] In February or March 1996, a decision was made pursuant to the Budget Implementation Act, 1995 to reduce the work force by eliminating some of the less productive office positions.
[4] In the Edmunston office, this meant cutting two of the four immigration officer positions.
[5] The work force reduction could not be done through voluntary departures, so CIC resorted to an evaluation process through reverse order of merit.
[6] Those employees affected were able to prepare their evaluation records for comments and propose changes in them before the records were finalized.
[7] The records were then sent to Moncton where an evaluation committee ranked the employees on an eligibility list.
[8] This evaluation committee was composed of three individuals: Tim Shaw, Pauline Alain and Raymond Bélanger. Mr. Shaw had been the applicant's supervisor from 1982 to 1994. Ms. Alain hardly knew the applicant since she had supervised him for only two years (1994-96), and she wanted to take advantage of the more detailed knowledge of Mr. Shaw. Mr. Bélanger, for his part, was acquainted with the applicant.
[9] At page 2 of his memorandum, the applicant alleges that he was strongly opposed to Mr. Shaw's participation in his evaluation, suggesting that he could not be impartial.
[10] On July 9 and 17, 1996, a CIC manager informed the applicant that as a result of a work force reduction he had to reduce the number of positions from four to two. Since the applicant had ranked fourth on the eligibility list, he would therefore be declared surplus to requirements.
[11] On July 25, 1996, the applicant filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission (the Commission) pursuant to section 7.1 of the Public Service Employment Act (the PSEA) alleging that his evaluation was flawed owing to the fact that Mr. Shaw had participated in it. He expressed the opinion that this reduction, as it affected him, was a disguised disciplinary dismissal and not a budgetary measure.
[12] On July 31, 1996, the director general for the Quebec/Atlantic region notified the applicant that his position could be declared surplus and informed him of the options available to him where applicable (applicant's record, exhibit C). These options were as follows:
- the Early Retirement Incentive program (ERI);
- the Early Departure Incentive (EDI);
- the Lump Sum(s) payable under the Work Force Adjustment Directive (WFAD) (where such options applied);
- the Prior Rights to an appointment within the public service.
[13] CIC attempted to facilitate the alternation of positions with another employee, Judy Bagley-Woodsocq, but she changed her mind and declined.
[14] Another position with a term of nine months would have been available in Saint John, but it was no longer available at the time the applicant wanted to take it. The employer had informed him that because the available position was not indeterminate, it had no obligation to offer it to the applicant (adjudicator's decision, page 6, paragraph 20 and applicant's record, page 4).
[15] At page 4 of his memorandum, the applicant expresses the contrary opinion that since the employee had held the Saint John position for only nine months before being transferred to an indeterminate position in Moncton, this was a clear illustration that the Saint John position was used only in order to camouflage the existence of the Moncton position. The applicant contends that the Moncton position should have been offered to him (applicant's record, exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3).
[16] On September 11, 1996, after inquiring about the possibility of delaying his choice among the options referred to in the letter of July 31, 1996, the human resources manager informed the applicant that this choice had to be exercised by the following September 27, after which his position would be declared surplus. After that date, each day worked would decrease the amount of pay in lieu of unfulfilled surplus priority period by an amount equivalent to one day of pay. Accordingly, the more he delayed the effective date of his resignation, the lesser would be the amount of earnings without having to work.
[17] On the following September 20, without taking advantage of the consultation services offered by his employer or his union, the applicant sent an email to a pay specialist informing him that he was choosing the lump sum payment option entitled "Early Retirement Incentive program".
[18] On September 26, 1996, this request was granted and the documents were signed on the following September 28 (respectively, exhibit G-3, tabs 7 and 8).
[19] The applicant thus received pay in lieu of unfulfilled surplus priority period of $20,000 plus a separation bonus of $14,000. The retirement amount to which he was entitled following the acceptance of his request for early retirement was $15,000 annually.
[20] On January 2, 1997, the Commission dismissed the applicant's complaint that his evaluation was flawed, declaring it to be without foundation (exhibit E-2).
[21] On May 25, 1999, the request for reopening of inquiry dated April 14, 1999, made by the applicant to the Commission's Recourse and Review Branch, was rejected (exhibit E-3).
[22] The applicant then initiated a grievance proceeding.
[23] On December 20, 2000, Joseph W. Potter, a "deputy chairperson" with the Public Service Staff Relations Board, dismissed the employer's submissions that the adjudicator had no jurisdiction to hear the case on the ground that the time limits had expired and that the extension of time granted had been granted in error.
[24] A decision was ultimately issued on October 5, 2001, dismissing the grievance for lack of jurisdiction.
DECISION OF THE GRIEVANCE ADJUDICATOR
[25] The grievance adjudicator had to determine whether the employer's decision to declare the applicant surplus had indeed been made pursuant to the provisions of the PSEA, or whether it was in fact a disguised disciplinary measure under the principle laid down by this Court in Canada (Treasury Board) v. Rinaldi (1997), 127 F.T.R. 60, [1997] F.C.J. No. 225.
[26] The reasons for the grievance adjudicator's decision are clear, and I think quoting a few passages from them will help to enlighten us:
[translation]
[48] The process adhered to by the employer in designating the surplus positions and the decision to evaluate the employees according to reverse order of merit appear to conform with the Budget Implementation Act, 1995 and the Work Force Adjustment Directive. No evidence was submitted to me by the grievor that would indicate that the decision to declare two of the four positions in the Edmunston office surplus contravened any applicable statutes, regulations or guidelines.
[49] The substance of the grievor's representations lies in the premise that Mr. Shaw's participation in the reverse order of merit evaluation vitiated this procedure, making it tantamount to a disguised disciplinary measure. Although the grievor did demonstrate the existence of a turbulent employment relationship with Mr. Shaw, he adduced no evidence that would invalidate the evaluation. In his testimony, he failed to explain in what respect his evaluation was in error or how his evaluation was influenced by Mr. Shaw's allegedly negative attitude toward him. No evidence was adduced of any conduct by Mr. Shaw during the evaluation procedure that might have influenced the other members of the evaluation committee. Mr. Fortin's good relations with Mr. Bélanger (who was a member of the evaluation committee) did not appear to have enabled him to obtain any indications in this regard. Accordingly, although there was a disciplinary measure in 1994 issued under Mr. Shaw's management, the grievor did not demonstrate how and in what way the reverse order of merit evaluation procedure is a disguised disciplinary measure.
[50] ... To demonstrate bad faith, it is necessary to prove specific behaviour or actions by the employer such as disloyalty, dissimulation, duplicity, insincerity or treachery, and this has not been done in this case. ...
[51] ... Mr. Fortin had in his possession the details on the available options and could have obtained complementary information during the five weeks prior to the time of his discussion with Ms. Boivin on September 11, 1996. During these five weeks, he did not consider it necessary to make inquiries of the human resources counsellors or his union, and he cannot criticize the employer for his feeling of being "under pressure" because he had to make a choice concerning some options that were not particularly well understood owing to his own turpitude....
[52] I am unable to agree that the failure to make any reasonable offer of employment to Mr. Fortin prior to his being declared surplus indicates bad faith on the part of the employer.... The Directive explains that a reasonable job offer is an offer of indeterminate employment within the public service, a characteristic that was not satisfied by the position in Saint John. The employer did not have to offer this position to Mr. Fortin, who had not chosen the third, or priority rights, option, since the order-in-council of December 7, 1995, suspends the guarantee of a reasonable job offer (exhibit E-1, tab 11). ...
[55] The employer has discharged its burden of proof by demonstrating to my satisfaction that Mr. Fortin's resignation resulted from the Budget Implementation Act, 1995 and the work force adjustment procedure.
[56] Mr. Fortin has not discharged his burden of proof for he has failed to demonstrate that the procedure followed by the Department in declaring him surplus was nothing but a ruse to disguise a disciplinary dismissal as an administrative lay-off....
[Emphasis added]
He concludes:
[58] Consequently, Mr. Fortin's grievance is covered by the exclusion in subsection 92(3) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act and cannot fall within my jurisdiction; the grievance is therefore dismissed.
APPLICANT'S SUBMISSIONS
[27] The applicant submits that his termination of employment within the public service was not a bona fide administrative decision under subsection 29(1) of the PSEA but rather a disguised disciplinary lay-off.
[28] Consequently, he argues, the grievance adjudicator erred in law in making a decision in a perverse or capricious manner and without regard for the materials before him.
Purpose of the application
[29] The applicant asks that the Court order:
(a) his reinstatement in his old position or in a position at a comparable level within the public service of Canada, in New Brunswick;
(b) full compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the characterization of his position as surplus; and
(c) the costs and interest incurred for the services of counsel before the Commission.
RESPONDENT'S SUBMISSIONS
[30] The respondent submits that the grievance adjudicator did not commit any error warranting the intervention of this Court for the following reasons:
- the evidence did not demonstrate that the employer had acted in bad faith in applying the work force reduction program;
- the evidence did not demonstrate that the employer had acted in bad faith during the reverse order of merit evaluation procedure;
- the evidence did not demonstrate that the employer had acted in bad faith in finding that the applicant's position was surplus; and
- the applicant's termination of employment was done in compliance with the applicable legislation and policies.
[31] Moreover, the grievance adjudicator did not have jurisdiction to hear the grievance.
ISSUE
[32] Did the grievance adjudicator so err in law or in fact as to warrant the intervention of this Court?
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
Section 26 of the PSEA governs the resignation of an employee:
| 26. An employee may resign from the Public Service by giving to the deputy head notice in writing of the intention to resign and the employee ceases to be an employee on the day as of which the deputy head accepts in writing the resignation.
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26. Le fonctionnaire qui a l'intention de démissionner de la fonction publique en donne avis, par écrit, à l'administrateur général; il perd sa qualité de fonctionnaire le jour où sa démission, après acceptation écrite de celui-ci, prend effet.
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[33] The Work Force Adjustment Directive, in force in 1996, provided that pay may be received in lieu of unfulfilled surplus period:
6.2.1 When a surplus employee offers to resign before the end of the surplus period on the understanding that he or she will receive pay in lieu of unfulfilled surplus period, the deputy head may authorize a lump-sum payment equal to the surplus employee's regular pay for the balance of the surplus period, up to a maximum of six months.
[34] An employee who elects to resign pursuant to clause 6.2.1 waives any priority rights for reappointment, as clause 6.2.4 indicates:
6.2.4 An employee relinquishes any priority rights for reappointment upon acceptance of his or her resignation.
[35] Subsection 35(1) of the Public Service Employment Regulations (PSER) provides for the appointment of a surplus employee:
| 35. (1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 40, a surplus employee is entitled, during the surplus period, to be appointed without competition and, subject to sections 29, 30 and 39 of the Act, in priority to all other persons, to a position in the Public Service for which, in the opinion of the Commission, the surplus employee is qualified.
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35. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et de l'article 40, tout fonctionnaire excédentaire a le droit, pendant la période durant laquelle il est excédentaire, d'être nommé sans concours et, sous réserve des articles 29, 30 et 39 de la Loi, en priorité absolue à un poste de la fonction publique pour lequel la Commission le juge qualifié. |
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[36] Subsection 35(2) of the PSER provides that this right may be lost in certain circumstances:
| (2) A surplus employee who is appointed or deployed for an indeterminate period, who refuses a reasonable job offer or who is laid off ceases to be entitled to be appointed to a position under subsection (1).
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(2) Le fonctionnaire excédentaire perd le droit de nomination conféré par le paragraphe (1) s'il est nommé ou muté pour une période indéterminée, s'il refuse une offre raisonnable d'emploi ou est mis en disponibilité. |
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[37] Subsection 29(1) of the PSEA provides for the laying off of employees:
| 29. (1) Where the services of an employee are no longer required by reason of lack of work, the discontinuance of a function or the transfer of work or a function outside the Public Service, otherwise than where the employment of the employee is terminated in the circumstances referred to in paragraph 11(2)(g.1) of the Financial Administration Act, the deputy head, in accordance with the regulations of the Commission, may lay off the employee.
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29. (1) L'administrateur général peut, en conformité avec les règlements de la Commission, mettre en disponibilité le fonctionnaire dont les services ne sont plus nécessaires faute de travail, par suite de la suppression d'une fonction ou à cause de la cession du travail ou de la fonction à l'extérieur de la fonction publique, sauf si le fonctionnaire a été licencié dans les circonstances prévues à l'alinéa 11(2)g.1) de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques. |
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[38] Subsection 32(1) of the PSER provides that the deputy head shall assess the employees in reverse order of merit in order to determine who may be laid off:
| 32. (1) If the services of one or more employees of a part of an organization are no longer required in accordance with section 29 of the Act, the appropriate deputy head shall assess the merit of the employees employed in similar positions in the same occupational group and level within that part of the organization, and identify the employees who may be declared surplus and laid off in reverse order of merit.
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32. (1) Lorsque les services d'un ou de plusieurs fonctionnaires d'un secteur de l'organisation ne sont plus nécessaires aux termes de l'article 29 de la Loi, l'administrateur général compétent évalue le mérite des fonctionnaires qui occupent des postes semblables des mêmes groupe et niveau professionnels dans ce secteur et désigne les fonctionnaires qui peuvent être déclarés excédentaires et mis en disponibilité par ordre inverse du mérite. |
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[39] Subsection 92(1) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) covers the circumstances in which an employee may refer a grievance to adjudication:
| 92. (1) Where an employee has presented a grievance, up to and including the final level in the grievance process, with respect to (a) the interpretation or application in respect of the employee of a provision of a collective agreement or an arbitral award, (b) in the case of an employee in a department or other portion of the public service of Canada specified in Part I of Schedule I or designated pursuant to subsection (4), (i) disciplinary action resulting in suspension or a financial penalty, or (ii) termination of employment or demotion pursuant to paragraph 11(2)(f) or (g) of the Financial Administration Act, or (c) in the case of an employee not described in paragraph (b), disciplinary action resulting in termination of employment, suspension or a financial penalty, and the grievance has not been dealt with to the satisfaction of the employee, the employee may, subject to subsection (2), refer the grievance to adjudication.
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92. (1) Après l'avoir porté jusqu'au dernier palier de la procédure applicable sans avoir obtenu satisfaction, un fonctionnaire peut renvoyer à l'arbitrage tout grief portant sur_: a) l'interprétation ou l'application, à son endroit, d'une disposition d'une convention collective ou d'une décision arbitrale; b) dans le cas d'un fonctionnaire d'un ministère ou secteur de l'administration publique fédérale spécifié à la partie I de l'annexe I ou désigné par décret pris au titre du paragraphe (4), soit une mesure disciplinaire entraînant la suspension ou une sanction pécuniaire, soit un licenciement ou une rétrogradation visé aux alinéas 11(2)f) ou g) de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques; c) dans les autres cas, une mesure disciplinaire entraînant le licenciement, la suspension ou une sanction pécuniaire. |
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[40] Subsection 92(3) of the PSSRA prohibits the referral of a grievance with respect to any termination of employment under the PSEA:
| 3) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be construed or applied as permitting the referral to adjudication of a grievance with respect to any termination of employment under the Public Service Employment Act.
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(3) Le paragraphe (1) n'a pas pour effet de permettre le renvoi à l'arbitrage d'un grief portant sur le licenciement prévu sous le régime de la Loi sur l'emploi dans la fonction publique. |
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ANALYSIS
Did the grievance adjudicator so err in law or in fact as to warrant the intervention of this Court?
[41] The grievance adjudicator heard the parties' submissions in regard to his jurisdiction to hear the grievance. First, he ruled that he had "[translation] jurisdiction to hear the evidence as a whole so as to assess whether the end of employment is a disguised disciplinary measure" (paragraph 6 of the decision).
[42] At paragraphs 57 and 58, he took "under reserve" the preliminary objection in regard to his jurisdiction and ultimately decided:
[translation]
[57] ... the applicant's termination of employment is not a disguised disciplinary lay-off and constitutes a bona fide administrative decision under subsection 29(1) of the Public Service Employment Act.
[58] Consequently, Mr. Fortin's grievance is covered by the exclusion in subsection 92(3) of the Public Service Staff Relations Act and cannot fall within my jurisdiction; the grievance is therefore dismissed.
[43] As I indicated at the hearing, although the applicant has pointed to certain inconsistencies between the facts of this case and certain statements by the grievance adjudicator in his decision, these inconsistencies are not major and would not in themselves warrant the intervention of the Court.
[44] However, in determining whether he had jurisdiction to hear the case, the grievance adjudicator concluded that he had to examine and analyze the evidence and proceedings as a whole. Following that, he concluded that the employer had acted in good faith.
[45] This analysis was also conducted in the context of the complaint to the Commission, but it was dismissed (see paragraph 20 of this order). I recall in passing that the respondent's counsel contends that this analysis did not need to be conducted by the grievance adjudicator, as he was without jurisdiction.
[46] However, it is the grievance adjudicator himself who decided to analyze this evidence and to conclude that the procedure was not flawed in some way.
[47] Since the adjudicator drew conclusions of fact and of law concerning the conduct of the evaluation, it is completely legitimate for the applicant to raise again the fact that Mr. Shaw's participation in the evaluation process irremediably tainted the procedure.
[48] What about Mr. Shaw's participation, then?
[49] The applicant argues that this participation in the evaluation process might have been harmful to him. During the period of supervision, from 1982 to 1994, he says, several incidents indicate that Mr. Shaw was constantly trying to find fault in him. This difficult relationship went back to March 1981, when the supervisor had not appreciated that the decision to assign the applicant to the Edmundston position was taken without his consultation. Mr. Shaw had wanted to assign some other employee, the applicant says.
[50] Likewise, Mr. Shaw had held the applicant responsible for an administrative investigation conducted against him in 1992. At the time, Mr. Shaw was transferred out of the Edmunston office for a two-year period. At page 2 of his memorandum, the applicant attributes this transfer to the grievances he had filed in relation to Mr. Shaw's conduct.
[51] Furthermore, in the grievance adjudicator's decision, reference is made to certain emails between Mr. Shaw and the applicant in relation to various matters (exhibit G-4). By filing these exhibits, the applicant was attempting to demonstrate some examples of harassment he had suffered at the hands of the supervisor.
[52] Also, on August 26, 1994, a two-day suspension without pay was imposed on the applicant for having pushed Mr. Shaw during an incident that occurred on April 18, 1994, (exhibit G-3, tab 2). An assault information was laid in the Provincial Court of New Brunswick in relation to this event. The applicant was convicted and given a conditional discharge (exhibit G-3, tabs 3 and 4). At page 2 of his memorandum, the applicant describes this event: "[translation] I headed for this file, we collided and my shoulder came in contact with his." He considers this information disproportionate, therefore.
[53] According to the applicant, these incidents illustrate that Mr. Shaw's participation in the workforce reduction evaluation procedure could not result in an impartial classification.
[54] At paragraph 11 of the decision, under the section "the facts", the grievance adjudicator states that although the evaluation committee was composed of three members, precedence was given to Mr. Shaw's opinion:
[translation] Ms. Alain hardly knew Mr. Fortin, whom she had been supervising for only two years (from 1994 to 1996), and she wanted to benefit from the more thorough knowledge of Mr. Shaw. ... Furthermore, the grievor had "decent" relations with Raymond Bélanger (Mr. Bélanger had contacted Mr. Fortin on the Saturday preceding the hearing in this case).
[55] It is hard for me to appreciate how an evaluation in this particular case can be characterized by objectivity, or at least not tainted by subjectivity.
[56] At paragraph 56, the grievance adjudicator states that the applicant "failed to demonstrate that the procedure followed by the Minister [sic] in declaring him surplus was nothing but a ruse to disguise a disciplinary dismissal as an administrative lay-off." Although it is not my opinion that the procedure followed by the Minister was a ruse to conceal an administrative lay-off, it does seem obvious to me that an appearance of bias emanated from this procedure.
[57] The principle of impartiality, enshrined by the rule nemo judex in proprio causa, is founded on general principles of law and is included among the principles of fundamental justice recognized in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The requirement of impartiality tends to ensure to anyone whose rights are likely to be affected that the decision will be made by one or more persons who present some elementary guarantees of neutrality in regard to him. In Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311, the Supreme Court and Federal Court of Appeal held that fairness includes the duty of all administrative agencies to be impartial.
[58] One aspect of this principle of natural justice is the procedural guarantee that everyone is entitled to appear before a court or tribunal that is impartial. The objective test by which we determine whether this guarantee has been upheld is that of reasonable apprehension of bias. This test was also used in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
[59] It is fundamental that a tribunal be impartial; and just as fundamental that it appear to be impartial.
[60] Indeed, as Professors Pépin and Ouellette note [G. Pépin and Y. Ouellette, Principes de contentieux administratifs, 2nd ed. (Montréal: Les Éditions Yvon Blais Inc., 1982), p. 252], albeit in a quasi-judicial context:
[translation] Natural justice requires that an agency exercising quasi-judicial functions act with impartiality, independence and disinterestedness, not only in fact but even in appearance.
[Emphasis added]
[61] In light of the circumstances of the present application, it is obvious that Mr. Shaw's participation ruled out any appearance of impartiality or objectivity in regard to the applicant.
[62] The fact that the applicant raised this submission from the outset of the selection procedure adds to the legitimacy of his submissions.
[63] I am of the opinion that the grievance adjudicator, in applying criteria alien to the rule against bias, erred in law.
[64] It seems clear from the record that there was a history marked by a profound disagreement over a period of more than 10 years between the applicant and Mr. Shaw. It is hard to believe how Mr. Shaw could have given the appearance that he could overlook this history during the evaluation of the applicant.
[65] I have no hesitation, therefore, in concluding that the Court's intervention is fully warranted in these circumstances.
[66] However, I am still perplexed as to the consequences of this order. I have no choice but to send the matter back for rehearing by a new grievance adjudicator. However, the damage caused by the ruling that Mr. Shaw's participation in the evaluation committee was acceptable, a finding that I consider inappropriate, remains.
[67] At the hearing, and although it was out of time, I strongly suggested to the applicant that he file an application for judicial review of the Commission's decision dated January 2, 1997, dismissing his complaint (see paragraph 20 of this order). Without wishing to anticipate the result, I am of the opinion that the applicant has an interest in raising the issue of the legitimacy of Mr. Shaw's participation in the evaluation committee.
[68] In my opinion, the fundamental issue that will have been identified by this order is that, in view of Mr. Shaw's participation in the selection committee, and his history of more than 10 years of serious controversy with the applicant, there was no appearance of impartiality in the work of the committee.
[69] It was not necessary, as counsel for the respondent suggested, to show that some particular fault had been committed by the evaluation committee in order to make its decision unacceptable, just as it is not necessary to prove egregious error in a case where the decision-maker has a conflict of interest with one of the parties. The mere demonstration of the conflict of interest is sufficient to vitiate the decision.
[70] When Ms. Alain decided to call on Mr. Shaw and she observed the applicant's strong opposition, given the circumstances and the history of the relations between the two individuals, she would have been well advised to get herself another advisor.
[71] Unfortunately, I do not think a rehearing by another grievance adjudicator will manage to overcome the previous procedural defect and the damage caused since then to the applicant.
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS that the grievance adjudicator's decision be vacated for all legal purposes, and that the matter be sent back for reconsideration by a new grievance adjudicator taking into account the comments and conclusions of this decision.
"Pierre Blais"
Judge
Certified true translation
Suzanne M. Gauthier, C. Tr., LL.L.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET NO: T-4-02
STYLE: CARMEL FORTIN and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF CANADA
PLACE OF HEARING: FREDERICTON
DATE OF HEARING: JANUARY 8, 2003
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER OF MR. JUSTICE BLAIS
DATED: JANUARY 23, 2003
APPEARANCES:
CARMEL FORTIN FOR THE APPLICANT ACTING ON HIS OWN BEHALF
RENÉE ROY FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
MORRIS ROSENBERG FOR THE RESPONDENT
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA