Ottawa, Ontario, June 19, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Snider
BETWEEN:
TEDDY JOSE RIVALDO ESCORCIA,
ROSA HORTENCIA OSORIO CASTELLANOS,
GABRIEL ALEJANDRO RIVALDO,
HEINER ANDRES RIVALDO ESCORCIA
AND TEDDY ALEXANDER RIVALDO OSORIO
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] Mr. Teddy Jose Rivaldo Escorcia (the Principal Applicant), his wife, Rosa Hortencia Osorio Castellanos, and their children, Heiner Andres Rivaldo Escorcia, Teddy Alexander Rivaldo Osorio, and Gabriel Alejandro Rivaldo seek protection in Canada. Except for Gabriel Alejandro, who is a citizen of the United States, all are citizens of Colombia. The Principal Applicant bases his claim for protection on an alleged fear of persecution at the hands of the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (the FARC) by reason of political opinion and membership of a particular social group, namely, the Administrative Department of Security (the DAS). The other members of the family base their claim on their membership in a particular social group, namely, the family.
[2] In a decision dated August 9, 2006, a panel of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) concluded that the Principal Applicant is excluded from protection under Article 1F of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention) because he was complicit in crimes against humanity. The Board also found that the other family members were not Convention refugees. The Applicants seek judicial review of this decision.
Key Findings of the Board
[3] The Board held that the DAS does not have a limited, brutal purpose, and as such, held that complicity must be established by examining the six factors to determine whether there were serious reasons to consider that the Principal Applicant was personally and knowingly participating in the DAS’s crimes.
[4] The Board found that there was compelling, credible and corroborated information that support the allegation that the DAS has committed excludable crimes and that the Principal Applicant should be held to be complicit in these crimes. The Board held that the facts establish that the Principal Applicant was a knowing and active participant of an organization that was responsible for the widespread or systemic murder, torture, and enforced disappearance of individuals and groups considered to be operating contrary to the interest of Colombia. Considering the Principal Applicant’s position in the DAS as Chief of the Intelligence Section, the Board held that it did not find it credible that the Principal Applicant never heard or had some knowledge of what was taking place unless he wilfully chose to ignore it.
[5] The Board, in noting that the wife and children were relying on the Principal Applicant’s story as a basis for their claims, held that the alleged aggressors are not interested in the Applicants. Thus, the Board found that the FARC members were looking for the Principal Applicant and not his family.
Issues
[6] The Applicant raises the following issues:
1. Did the Board err in its finding that the Principal Applicant is excluded from refugee protection under Article 1(F)(a) of the Convention?
2. Was the Board, once it made its exclusion finding, obligated to conduct an inclusion determination for the Principal Applicant?
3. Do the Board’s reasons provide a sufficient analysis for the Principal Applicant’s family pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA)?
Analysis
General Principles on Exclusion
[7] Before turning to the specific issues raised in this application, it would be helpful to review the generally accepted principles involved in exclusion determinations.
[8] The purpose of Article 1F of the Convention is to ensure that perpetrators of serious crimes are not entitled to international protection in the country in which they are seeking asylum (see, for example, Lai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 125, 253 D.L.R. (4th) 606, [2005] F.C.J. No. 584 at para. 22 (F.C.A.) (QL)). Of particular relevance to this application, crimes against humanity are a specifically-referenced type of crime. Article 1F(a) provides that:
|
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; … |
|
F. Les dispositions de cette Convention ne seront pas applicables aux personnes dont on aura des raisons sérieuses de penser : a) Qu’elles ont commis un crime contre la paix, un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité, au sens des instruments internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions relatives à ces crimes; … |
[9] This principle of international protection law is embedded in s. 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) which provides as follows:
|
A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.
|
|
La personne visée aux sections E ou F de l'article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de personne à protéger.
|
[10] Thus, the effect of a Board finding that this Article is applicable to the Principal Applicant is that he cannot be found to be a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection pursuant to s. 96 or s. 97 of IRPA. In other words, such persons do not have access to what has been described as the “refugee protection stream” (Xie v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 250, 243 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1142 (F.C.A.) (QL) at para. 33, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 418). As stated by Justice Pelletier in Xie:
Those who are subject to the exclusion in section 98 are excluded from the refugee protection stream but are eligible to apply for protection at the PRRA stage [IRPA, s. 112(1)]. The basis on which the claim for protection may be advanced is the same, but the Minister can have regard to whether the granting of protection would affect the safety of the public or the security of Canada. If protection is granted, the result is a stay of the deportation order in effect against the claimant. The claimant does not have the same access to permanent resident status as does a successful claimant for refugee protection.
[11] An 'exclusion' hearing under Article 1F is not in the nature of a criminal trial where guilt or innocence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained by Justice Malone, writing for the Federal Court of Appeal in Lai, above at para. 25:
Overall, the Board must assess and weigh the evidence that it has accepted as credible or trustworthy in the circumstances and determine whether or not the threshold test of "serious reasons for considering" has been met with regard to the serious non-political crimes alleged (see Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298 at 309, 311 (C.A.)). The standard of evidence to be applied to this threshold test is higher than a mere suspicion but lower than proof on the civil balance of probabilities standard (see Zrig at paragraph 174; and Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 at 312-14 (C.A.)).
[12] It is also important to note that the Board need not find that the Principal Applicant personally committed the crimes. The definition of a crime against humanity includes complicity therein (Zazai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 303, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 281, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1567 (F.C.A.) (QL)).
[13] What is also clear from the jurisprudence is that the closer the Applicant is involved in the decision making process of the organization and the less he or she does to thwart the commission of the criminal acts enumerated in subsection 1(F)(a) of the Convention, the more likely the Board will find that there are serious reasons to believe the individual was complicit in the commission of the crimes (Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298, 107 D.L.R. (4th) 424, [1993] F.C.J. No. 912 at para. 53 (F.C.A.) (QL); Collins v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 732 at para. 25, 276 F.T.R. 60; Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433, 163 N.R. 197, [1993] F.C.J. No. 1145 at para. 10 (F.C.A.) (QL)).
[14] However, the Board, in being aware of a person’s position within an organization that committed a crime under Article 1(F)(a) of the Convention, must also balance that factor with circumstances which show that the individual protested against the crime, tried to stop its commission or attempted to withdraw from the organization (Sivakumar, above at para. 10; see also Penate v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1994] 2 F.C. 79, 71 F.T.R. 171, [1993] F.C.J. No. 1292 at para. 6 (F.C.T.D.) (QL)).
[15] Justice Pinard in Justino v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1138, 152 A.C.W.S. (3d) 117 went further and stated at para. 10:
A person’s rank within an organization, among other things, speaks to the likelihood of that person’s knowledge and involvement in the organization’s bad acts. However, one need not be in a leading position in order to be found complicit.
[16] Thus, the person’s position in the organization may demonstrate to the Board of that person’s personal and knowing participation, and ultimately the person’s complicity in the organization’s commission of crimes.
[17] As in this case, where the organization does not have a limited, brutal purpose, the nature of the acts of the organization and the role of the individual within it must be examined by the Board. Justice Hughes in Bedoya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1092 at para. 12, 141 A.C.W.S. (3d) 612, has simplified the Board’s analysis in determining whether there are serious reasons to believe an Applicant was complicit in crimes in Article 1(F)(a) of the Convention by listing six factors the Board should consider:
1. The nature of the organization;
2. The method of recruitment;
3. The position/rank in the organization;
4. The length of time in the organization;
5. The opportunity to leave; and
6. The knowledge of the organization’s atrocities.
(See also Ardila v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1518, 143 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1072, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1876 (F.C.) (QL).)
Issue #1: Alleged Errors in Exclusion Finding
[18] The Principal Applicant submits that the tribunal exaggerates and mischaracterizes the nature of the DAS and specifically the alleged institutional complicity of the DAS in crimes. The Principal Applicant states that the Board did not base its conclusion, that the DAS was involved in crimes against humanity, on credible and trustworthy evidence. Rather the Board ignores the legitimate, essential and beneficial state security functions of the DAS in Colombia. The Principal Applicant argues that documents that refer to “security forces” cannot be inferred that these security forces include ipso facto the DAS, and that this is a perverse and capricious error. As well, the Principal Applicant submits that there is no evidence the Principal Applicant would have first hand knowledge of DAS involvement in the commission of crimes and erred in making such an inference. In making its finding with regard to the length of service supporting a finding of complicity, the Principal Applicant claims that this was an error.
[19] In the Applicants’ further memorandum, the Applicant argues that the Board should have found whether the Principal Applicant was an accomplice in the crimes within the ambit of subsection 1(F)(a) of the Convention and that there were no findings made with respect to any specific crimes.
[20] On the question of exclusion via Article 1F of the Convention (or section 98 of IRPA), the Board’s decision will, in general, be reviewed against the standard of reasonableness (Médina v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 62, [2006] F.C.J. No. 86 (F.C.T.D.) (QL); Qazi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1204, 142 A.C.W.S. (3d) 319, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1461 at paras. 8-9 (F.C.) (QL)), although particular findings of fact will, of course, be subjected to a higher standard. On this standard, the Court can only intervene where the decision cannot stand up to a somewhat probing examination.
[21] The Board, in its decision, went through, in detail, the six factors that Justice Hughes laid out in Bedoya, above. In particular, the Applicant takes issue with the Board’s finding with regards to the nature of the organization, length of time in the organization and the knowledge of the organization’s atrocities.
[22] On the first question of the nature of the DAS, contrary to the Principal Applicant’s submissions, the Board did acknowledge the DAS’s legitimate functions:
The DAS was set up in 1962 to organize intelligence regarding the state’s counter-insurgency effort. It is divided into four main branches: intelligence, protection, investigations, and foreign affairs.
The DAS is included in Colombia’s public security forces and references to the “security forces” in human rights documentation [sic] will be interpreted to include the DAS. While the DAS is [sic] an independent organization reporting to the President, it acknowledged that part of the DAS’s mandate was to gather intelligence against any organization that worked contrary to the Colombian constitution and that the DAS provided intelligence reports to the President and his advisors who would pass it on to the military and/or police. The principal claimant stated that this unit shared technical information with the police and carried out missions against subversive groups as a joint team….
(Certified Tribunal Record, pg. 14)
[23] Further, the Board reasonably came to the conclusion that “the DAS has been directly involved in murder, torture, and disappearances in Colombia on a widespread or systematic basis and that it has collaborated with paramilitaries, acting as an accomplice in the same crimes committed by others.” Indeed, there is ample documentary evidence to support this finding and the notion that the DAS resorted to human rights abuses as a “regular part” of its operation or a “way of life” of the DAS (Justino, above at para. 16; Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 173, [1992] F.C.J. No. 109 at para. 37 (F.C.A.) (QL)).
[24] For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reports that public institutions that have committed human rights violations include the DAS (Applicant’s Record, pg. 81). As well, the Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America reports that according to the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, those responsible for disappearances during 1993 include the DAS (Applicant’s Record, pg. 141). A United Nations Economic and Social Council report stated that the Special Rapporteur received reports concerning assassinations and threats related to the disappearance and subsequent killing, in 1990, of more than 40 persons in Trujillo and that investigations revealed that the DAS was involved (Applicant’s Record, pg. 185). The United States Department of States report on Colombia Human Rights Practices 1995 reported that three detectives of the DAS were charged for their presumed participation in incidents of torture. The United States Department of State (DOS) Report for 1996 states that the DAS was being investigated for cases of torture. The Board detailed these and other alleged human rights violations committed by the DAS in its reasons (Certified Tribunal Record, pgs. 15-21).
[25] In addition to its direct involvement in human rights abuses, the DAS, as an intelligence organization, worked hand in hand with both the official Colombian authorities and the paramilitaries. Membership in the organization that actually commits the international crimes is not an essential requirement where, as in this case, the link between the person and the organizations can be established (Bazargan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1209 (F.C.A.) (QL), A-400-95). Here, the evidence shows that the DAS was very much implicated in crimes of both the military and paramilitary forces. Even more specifically, the evidence contains numerous references to the role of DAS in the Sucre area, where the Principal Applicant was stationed for a significant period of time. Accordingly, on these facts, even had there been no evidence (which there was), the Board could reasonably conclude that the DAS was an organization which, through its provision of intelligence services to and collaboration with the perpetrators of human rights abuses, was engaged in a continuous and regular pattern of human rights abuses.
[26] As well, contrary to the Principal Applicant’s submissions, there was nothing unreasonable about the Board’s finding that the Principal Applicant would have first-hand knowledge of DAS involvement in the commission of alleged crimes.
[27] The Principal Applicant was member of the DAS for approximately 13 years, voluntarily joining on October 17, 1983 (Certified Tribunal Record, pgs. 52 and 804). Starting as a Detective Agent and Investigator, he was promoted to Chief of Intelligence for Sucre in 1991 and in 1994 he was Chief of Investigation in Riohacha, which is the same position of Chief of Intelligence (Certified Tribunal Record, pgs. 52 and 830). The Principal Applicant testified that as an investigator/detective, he was responsible for collecting and gathering intelligence and information using various techniques including collaboration with civilians such as farmers. As Chief of Intelligence, he was in charge of a number of detectives and managed intelligence gathering and information (Certified Tribunal Record, pg. 52).
[28] As well, during his testimony, the Principal Applicant stated that he attended security meetings with high-ranking members of the DAS, the police, the army and government officials where he heard about abuses taking place. He testified that he reported to his superiors about what he heard (Certified Tribunal Record, pgs. 845-46). The Principal Applicant also testified that he became aware of abuses of the army from his detectives who worked out in the field (Certified Tribunal Record, pgs. 863-64) which corresponds with documentary evidence (Certified Tribunal Record, pgs. 512-789). He also became aware of abuses by the DAS through the newspaper, the radio, internal faxes and internal investigations (Certified Tribunal Record, pgs. 877, 900). This corresponds with reports of DAS abuses in documentary evidence presented to the Board.
[29] The Principal Applicant testified that he rarely felt that orders given by DAS were incorrect or improper (Certified Tribunal Record, pg. 890) and also stated that he would not have left the DAS if he did not receive the death threats from FARC (Certified Tribunal Record, pg. 911). From this, the Board can reasonably infer that he shared a common purpose with the DAS and had personal knowledge of the DAS’s human rights violations (Penate, above at para. 14).
[30] The Principal Applicant held a supervisory position with the DAS as Chief of Intelligence. This speaks to the likelihood of his knowledge and involvement in the organization’s bad acts (Justino, above at para. 10). The Principal Applicant provided no evidence that he took steps to prevent criminal acts from occurring. Further, he did not disengage from the organization at the earliest opportunity for reasons of disassociating himself from the DAS and its alleged criminal acts. It can reasonably be inferred from this that he shared a common purpose with the organization (Justino, above at para. 10).
[31] This case is not unlike El-Kachi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 403, [2002] F.C.J. No. 554 at paras. 24-26 (F.C.T.D.) (QL), where the Court found that evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the organization had committed crimes and that based on the evidence the Board’s conclusion was not patently unreasonable. As well, the Court found that the applicant joined the impugned organization and worked for it for 16 years and was promoted to a rank where he was in charge of 45 men. The Court held that it was reasonable for the Board to conclude from this that the applicant became involved in the organization because he agreed with its objectives and wished to help achieve them, which he in fact did. Finally, the Court found that the applicant was aware that crimes had been committed by the organization and that the applicant admitted in the hearing that he knew of specific crimes.
[32] In sum on this issue, the Board’s decision on the issue of exclusion is not unreasonable.
Issue #2: Inclusion for Principal Applicant
[33] The Applicant submits that, notwithstanding its finding that the Principal Applicant was excluded under Article 1(F)(a) of the Convention and section 98 of IRPA, it was incumbent upon the Board to address the merits of the Principal Applicant’s claim to Convention refugee status. As well, the Applicant argues that by addressing the issue of exclusion before inclusion was an error.
[34] In my view, this question has been answered by the recent jurisprudence. Once the Principal Applicant was found to be excluded, he was no longer entitled to be part of the “refugee protection stream” (Xie, above). Accordingly, any further analysis by the Board, insofar as the Principal Applicant was concerned, was unnecessary.
[35] In certain situations, the Board may be required to assess the claim of the excluded claimant in order to assess the claims of the other non-excluded family members. The question of whether this is one of those cases is addressed in the following issue.
Issue #3: Alleged Failure to Assess Principal Applicant’s family
[36] Having found that the Board is not obligated to conduct a s. 96 analysis for the Principal Applicant, when found to be excluded under s. 98 of IRPA, I now turn to the question of whether the Board should, nevertheless, engage in a s. 96 and s. 97 analysis for the purposes of evaluating the claims of the remaining family members.
[37] The Applicants submits that the Board failed to consider the nexus between the facts underlying the claims of the remaining family members and their alleged membership in a particular social group within the meaning of the definition of Convention refugee. In particular, the Applicants feel that the Board did not take into account any of the documentary evidence before it concerning the alleged agent of persecution, the FARC.
[38] The Federal Court of Appeal in Moreno, above at para. 67, stated that a Board may err in law by failing to determine whether, for the purposes of evaluating dependent refugee claims, the principal applicant would have been declared a Convention refugee. As stated in Moreno, above at para. 63, “The likelihood of the female appellant suffering persecution is not extinguished simply because the exclusion clause renders the male appellant ineligible for consideration”.
[39] Saying, however, that a claim is not extinguished does not relieve non-excluded family members from putting forward evidence that supports their claim. The jurisprudence of this Court has found that persecution against one family member does not automatically entitle all other family members to be considered refugees (see Pour-Shariati v. Canada (The Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1997), 215 N.R. 174 (F.C.A.), 39 Imm. L.R. (2d) 103; Marinova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.T. 178, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1198). In Granada v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1766, 136 A.C.W.S. (3d) 123, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2164 (F.C.) (QL), a similar case of a family claiming their refugee status dependent upon a family member’s fear of persecution against the FARC, the Court stated at para. 16:
The family can only be considered to be a social group in cases where there is evidence that the persecution is taking place against the family members as a social group: Al-Busaidy v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 139 N.R. 208 (F.C.A.); Casetellanos v. Canada (Solicitor General), [1995] 2 F.C. 190 (F.C.T.D.); Addullahi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 122 F.T.R. 150; Lakatos v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 408, [2001] F.C.J. No. 657 (F.C.T.D.) (QL). However, membership in the social group formed by the family is not without limits, it requires some proof that the family in question is itself, as a group, the subject of reprisals and vengeance or, in other words, that the applicants are targeted and marked simply because they are members of the family even though they themselves have never been involved in politics and never will be so involved. (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Bakhshi, [1994] F.C.J. No. 977 (FCA) (QL)).
[Emphasis added]
[40] A review of the decision demonstrates that the Board turned its mind to the evaluation of the claims of the family members. The Board stated:
While the principal claimant is precluded by his past from being considered for protective status in Canada, his story is presented as the basis for the claims of Rosa and the children. Therefore, the story needs to be examined to see if there is a valid basis therein.
[41] The Board continued by reviewing the evidence before it and concluded as follows:
The panel finds that the alleged aggressors are not interested in Rosa, according to the principal claimant’s testimony and written documentation, they are interested in him due to his work with the DAS. On April 22, 1999, they came to the pharmacy store where they held her up at gunpoint and asked her for the whereabouts of the principal claimant and stole medicine and her wedding ring. It appears that the FARC were looking for the principal claimant and when they realized that he was not at the pharmacy store, they left.
(Certified Tribunal Record, pg. 36)
[42] Had the family members put forward any credible evidence to establish that, because of their association with the Principal Applicant, they have a well-founded fear of persecution upon their return, I would readily agree with the Applicants that the Board would have an obligation to examine and analyze that evidence. However, where no evidence was put forward, there is nothing upon which to base their fear. That was the situation before the Board.
[43] The Applicants, in oral argument before me, reference a few passages in the documentary evidence that appears to indicate that family members may be targeted. However, none of this was relied on by the Applicants or their counsel before the Board or in written final submissions. The Board cannot be required to consider an issue or alleged risk that was not even raised by the Applicants (Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 164, 266 N.R. 380, [2000] F.C.J. No. 2118 at paras. 10-11 (F.C.A.) (QL)).
[44] The Board, in my view, carried out the necessary analysis of the claims of the family members based on the evidence before it. I can see no error.
[45] Finally, the Applicants submit that the Board did not consider s. 97 at all and that it would have been open to the Board, on evidence before it, to find that the Applicants are persons in need of protection under s. 97 of IRPA. The problem with this argument is that the family members simply placed no evidence before the Board upon which to make a s. 97 determination. In these circumstances, it was not a reviewable error for the Board to fail to undertake a separate s. 97 analysis (Soleimanian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1660, 135 A.C.W.S. (3d) 474, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2013 at paras. 22-24 (F.C.) (QL); Kilic v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 84, 245 F.T.R. 52, [2004] F.C.J. No. 84 at paras. 26-27 (F.C.) (QL)).
[46] Even if the Board ought to have carried out a more explicit s. 97 analysis, this deficiency in the Board’s reasons is “not material to the result” and thus not compelling enough to send the decision back for redetermination (Nyathi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1119, 125 A.C.W.S. (3d) 873). There does not appear to be any evidence that would suggest that the Applicants are persons at risk. Rather, it was reasonable for the Board to find, based on the evidence before it, that the Applicants are not targeted by FARC.
Conclusion
[47] Having found that the Board did not err with respect to its determination on the exclusion of the Principal Applicant or on the claims of the family members, I will dismiss this application for judicial review. Neither party proposed a question for certification and none will be certified.
ORDER
This Court orders that:
- The application for judicial review is dismissed; and
- No question of general importance is certified.
“Judith A. Snider”
___________________________
Judge
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-4804-06
STYLE OF CAUSE: TEDDY JOSE RIVALDO ESCORCIA ET AL v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
APPEARANCES:
|
Mr. Michael Brodzky
|
|
|
Ms. Amina Riaz |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
|
Mr. Michael Brodzky Toronto, Ontario
|
|
|
John H. Sims, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada |
|
|
|
|