Date: 20011009
Docket: A-362-00
Montréal, Quebec, October 9, 2001
Coram: RICHARD C.J.
DESJARDINS J.A.
DÉCARY J.A.
BETWEEN:
LOUISE GAGNON
Applicant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
JUDGMENT
The application for judicial review is dismissed with costs.
"J. Richard"
Chief Justice
Certified true translation
Suzanne M. Gauthier, LL.L., Trad. a.
Date: 20011009
Docket: A-362-00
Neutral Citation: 2001 FCA 292
CORAM: RICHARD C.J.
DESJARDINS J.A.
DÉCARY J.A.
BETWEEN:
LOUISE GAGNON
Applicant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
Hearing held in Montréal, Quebec, October 9, 2001.
Judgment rendered in Montréal, Quebec, October 9, 2001.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: DÉCARY J.A.
Date: 20011009
Docket: A-362-00
Neutral Citation: 2001 FCA 292
CORAM: RICHARD C.J.
DESJARDINS J.A.
DÉCARY J.A.
BETWEEN:
LOUISE GAGNON
Applicant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Rendered at the hearing in Montréal, Quebec,
October 9, 2001.)
DÉCARY J.A.
[1] The Tax Court of Canada judge followed the approach that was described as follows by Mr. Justice Marceau in Légaré v. Minister of National Revenue, (1999), 246 N.R. 176 (F.C.A.), at p. 179:
The Act requires the Minister to make a determination based on his own conviction drawn from a review of the file. The wording used introduces a form of subjective element, and while this has been called a discretionary power of the Minister, this characterization should not obscure the fact that the exercise of this power must clearly be completely and exclusively based on an objective appreciation of known or inferred facts. And the Minister's determination is subject to review. In fact, the Act confers the power of review on the Tax Court of Canada on the basis of what is discovered in an inquiry carried out in the presence of all interested parties. The Court is not mandated to make the same kind of determination as the Minister and thus cannot purely and simply substitute its assessment for that of the Minister: that falls under the Minister's so-called discretionary power. However, the Court must verify whether the facts inferred or relied on by the Minister are real and were correctly assessed having regard to the context in which they occurred, and after doing so, it must decide whether the conclusion with which the Minister was "satisfied" still seems reasonable.
[2] Accordingly, the conclusion reached by the judge, namely, that the payer would not have entered into a somewhat similar contract with the applicant had it not been for a non-arm's length relationship (paragraph 3(2)(c) of the Unemployment Insurance Act), is unassailable, in our view. The application for judicial review will be dismissed with costs.
[3] A copy of these reasons will be placed in the record in Christiane Potvin-Gagnon v. Attorney General of Canada, A-363-00 and the application for judicial review in that case will likewise be dismissed, but without costs.
"Robert Décary"
J.A.
Certified true translation
Suzanne M. Gauthier, LL.L., Trad. a.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
APPEAL DIVISION
Date: 20011009
Docket: A-362-00
Between:
LOUISE GAGNON
Applicant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
APPEAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
FILE NO: A-362-00
CORAM: RICHARD C.J.
DESJARDINS J.A.
DÉCARY J.A.
STYLE: LOUISE GAGNON
Applicant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: October 9, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY DÉCARY J.A.
DATED: October 9, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Gilbert Nadon FOR THE APPLICANT
Bruno Levasseur FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Ouellet, Nadon & Associés FOR THE APPLICANT
Montréal, Quebec
Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Montréal, Quebec