Date: 20030605
Docket: A-468-00
Citation: 2003 FCA 254
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
BETWEEN:
GILLES CARON
Applicant
and
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REPRESENTATIVE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
UMPIRE ROULEAU
LOJEN INDUSTRIAL CLEANING
Respondents
Hearing held at Edmonton, Alberta, on May 27, 2003.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on June 5, 2003.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
Date: 20030605
Docket: A-468-00
Citation: 2003 FCA 254
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
NADON J.A.
PELLETIER J.A.
BETWEEN:
GILLES CARON
Applicant
and
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REPRESENTATIVE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
UMPIRE ROULEAU
LOJEN INDUSTRIAL CLEANING
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
[1] The applicant is disputing a decision of the Umpire who affirmed a decision of the Board of Referees determining that the applicant had voluntarily left his employment without just cause within the meaning of section 28 of the Employment Insurance Act. The applicant should have named the Attorney General of Canada as the sole defendant, but this defect in form is immaterial.
[2] The Umpire found as follows:
The claimant attempted to show that he was justified in leaving his employment due to his health problems. He submitted several medical certificates, stating that he was suffering from some lung problems in November and December 1994. After carefully analyzing the medical evidence provided, I cannot conclude that the claimant left his employment with just cause. Of course, he had to be put on antibiotics, but this cannot constitute justification for leaving one's employment. The employer reportedly contacted the claimant about a dozen times while he was off to ask him to return to work, but he replied that he was either too busy or that he was not feeling well. It seems obvious to me that he was not interested in resuming his employment with Lojen Industrial Cleaning Ltd.
[3] Essentially, the applicant takes issue with the Umpire on three points.
[4] First, the applicant argues that the Umpire refused to deal with the constitutional question raised by the applicant because the notice required by section 57 of the Federal Court Act had not been given. Since such a notice had in fact been given, this argument has merit, but that does not invalidate the decision of the Umpire. In fact, the applicant was not actually challenging the validity of a legislative provision. He argued that when the Commission and the Board of Referees were assessing the evidence, they should have considered the fact that the work he was doing-high pressure industrial cleaning in a petroleum company-was dangerous work and accordingly his right to security set out in section 7 of the Charter had been breached.
[5] There is no merit to this argument. Paragraph 28(4)(d) of the Act provides, in fact, that a claimant whose working conditions constitute a danger to health or safety may voluntarily leave an employment if that is the only reasonable solution in his or her case. In this case, the claimant did not establish this. Clearly, his work was dangerous, but he did not prove that he left because the working conditions themselves were dangerous.
[6] Second, the plaintiff states that the Board of Referees admitted into evidence statements that were nothing more than hearsay. As this Court held in A.G. Canada v. Mills (1984), 60 N.R. 4 (F.C.), boards of referees are not bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable in criminal or civil courts and they may receive and accept hearsay evidence.
[7] Third, if we understood correctly, the applicant contends that this Court had already decided on January 27, 1998, in (1998), 12 Admin. L.R. (3d) 196, [1998] F.C.R. No. 97, that the medical reports provided by the applicant were adequate and resulted in a disposition in his favour. That is not what the Court decided. The Court merely returned the matter for rehearing by another umpire because of a breach of the rules of natural justice. The Court even said that it was "very possible that the applicant's somewhat disordered and unorganized submissions could not have been viewed favourably in any event, regardless of the context and the language in which they were presented."
[8] The application for judicial review should therefore be dismissed with costs.
"Robert Décary"
J.A.
"Marc Nadon"
J.A.
"J.D. Denis Pelletier"
J.A.
Certified true translation
Mary Jo Egan, LLB
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
APPEAL DIVISION
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-468-00
STYLE OF CAUSE: Gilles Caron v. Employment Insurance Representative, Attorney General of Canada, Umpire Rouleau, Lojen Industrial Cleaning
PLACE OF HEARING: Edmonton, Alberta
DATE OF HEARING: May 27, 2003
OF THE COURT: Décary, Nadon and Pelletier JJ.A.
DATED : June 5, 2003
APPEARANCES:
Gilles Caron ON HIS OWN BEHALF
Pauline Leroux FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario FOR THE RESPONDENT
Date: 20030605
Docket: A-468-00
Ottawa, Ontario, June 5, 2003
CORAM: DÉCARY J.A.
NADON J.A.
PELLETIER J.A.
BETWEEN:
GILLES CARON
Applicant
and
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REPRESENTATIVE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
UMPIRE ROULEAU
LOJEN INDUSTRIAL CLEANING
Respondents
JUDGMENT
The application for judicial review is dismissed with costs.
"Robert Décary"
J.A.
Certified true translation
Mary Jo Egan, LLB