Date: 20240503
Docket: A-10-22
Citation: 2024 FCA 86
CORAM:
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BOIVIN J.A.
ROUSSEL J.A.
GOYETTE J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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SIERRA CLUB CANADA FOUNDATION, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND CANADA and ECOLOGY ACTION CENTRE |
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Appellants |
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MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
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Respondents |
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LE CONSEIL DES INNU DE EKUANITSHIT and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR |
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Interveners |
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Heard at Halifax, Nova Scotia, on March 21, 2023.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 3, 2024.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: |
GOYETTE J.A. |
CONCURRED IN BY: |
BOIVIN J.A.
ROUSSEL J.A
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Date: 20230503
Docket: A-10-22
Citation: 2024 FCA 86
CORAM:
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BOIVIN J.A.
ROUSSEL J.A.
GOYETTE J.A.
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BETWEEN: |
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SIERRA CLUB CANADA FOUNDATION, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND CANADA and ECOLOGY ACTION CENTRE |
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Appellants |
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and |
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MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
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Respondents |
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LE CONSEIL DES INNU DE EKUANITSHIT
and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR |
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Interveners |
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GOYETTE J.A.
I. Overview
[1] The appellants appeal from a judgment of the Federal Court, which dismissed two applications for judicial review: 2021 FC 1367 [FC Decision]. The first application challenged the validity of a report resulting from a regional assessment of offshore oil and gas exploratory drilling, conducted under the Impact Assessment Act, S.C. 2019, c. 28 (Act). The second application sought to quash a regulation made under the Act that exempts certain exploratory drilling activities from a number of impact assessment requirements.
[2] After our Court heard this appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision on the constitutionality of the Act: Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23 [IAA Reference]. The Supreme Court opined that the federal impact assessment scheme, consisting of the Act and its accompanying Physical Activities Regulations, S.O.R./2019-285 (Activities Regs), is unconstitutional in part.
[3] For the following reasons, which take into account the IAA Reference, I would dismiss the appeal.
II. Background
A. Legislative Background
[4] The IAA Reference provides a thorough analysis of the federal impact assessment scheme found in the Act and the Activities Regs. The following summary highlights the provisions relevant to this appeal. Unless otherwise stated, all legislative references are to the Act. For ease of reference, the relevant legislative provisions are reproduced in the annex of these reasons.
[5] The Act and the Activities Regs form part of a regulatory scheme for assessing and safeguarding against the adverse effects of physical activities on the environment, or on health, social or economic conditions and their ensuing consequences. Other stated purposes of this scheme include (1) fostering sustainability; (2) ensuring respect for the rights of Indigenous peoples; (3) establishing a fair, predictable, and efficient impact assessment process that creates opportunities for sustainable economic development; (4) ensuring that decisions are based on science, Indigenous knowledge, and other sources of evidence; and (5) assessing cumulative effects within a region: see Preamble, section 6.
(1) Designated Projects
[6] One way of safeguarding against the adverse effects of physical activities is the identification of “designated projects”
either in the Activities Regs or in ministerial orders: see section 2, subsection 9(1), and paragraph 109(b). If a proponent wishes to carry out a designated project, but the project may cause one of the effects listed under subsection 7(1), a project-specific impact assessment may be required: subsections 7(1) and (3). Offshore exploratory drilling is one type of designated project listed in the Activities Regs: section 2 of the Activities Regs and section 34 of the Activities Regs’ Schedule. The impact assessment process for designated projects contains three main phases: the planning phase, the impact assessment phase, and the decision-making phase. I will briefly explain each phase.
(a) Planning Phase
[7] After the proponent of a designated project has provided the required information to the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada (Agency), the Agency decides whether the project requires an impact assessment: sections 10–16. An affirmative decision triggers the impact assessment process: IAA Reference at paras. 38–41.
(b) Impact Assessment Phase
[8] Either the Agency or a review panel carries on the assessment. The assessment considers the proposed project’s potential environmental, health, social, and economic impacts, including the project’s benefits: sections 18, 22, 41, 42. The Agency or review panel uses the gathered information to develop an impact assessment report: sections 28, 51; IAA Reference at paras. 42–45.
(c) Decision-Making Phase
[9] The decision maker can be either the Minister of the Environment (Minister) or the Governor in Council (Governor). The Governor becomes the decision maker when a review panel conducts the assessment or when the Minister refers the decision to the Governor: sections 60–62. The decision maker, after considering the impact assessment report, determines whether “the adverse effects within federal jurisdiction—and the adverse direct or incidental effects—that are indicated in the report are […] in the public interest”
: paragraphs 60(1)(a) and (b). If so, the Minister establishes conditions that he considers appropriate with which the proponent of the designated project must comply: section 64; IAA Reference at para. 46.
(2) Regional Assessment Mechanism
[10] In the case of multiple designated projects that are or will possibly be carried out in the same area, the Act provides for a regional assessment mechanism that may result in these projects being exempted from project-specific impact assessments. This regional assessment mechanism, like the scheme governing designated projects, contains three phases: planning, assessment, and decision-making.
(a) Planning Phase
[11] Sections 92 and 93 allow the Minister, alone or together with the government of a province, to appoint a committee or ask the Agency to conduct a regional assessment. The Minister must establish the committee’s terms of reference and appoint one or more persons as members of the committee: subsection 96(1).
(b) Assessment Phase
[12] Once a committee is appointed, the following rules are relevant to the conduct of the regional assessment:
•The committee must take into account any scientific information and Indigenous knowledge provided with respect to the assessment (subsection 97(2));
•The committee must ensure that the information it uses when conducting the assessment is made available to the public (section 98);
•The committee must ensure that the public is provided with an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the assessment (section 99); and
•Upon completing the assessment, the Committee must provide a report to the Minister. The report must demonstrate how the Indigenous knowledge provided was taken into account and used in the regional assessment (section 102).
(c) Decision-Making Phase
[13] After considering a regional assessment, the Minister may make a regulation to exempt physical activities in a specified area from undergoing project-specific assessments if those projects meet the conditions prescribed in the regulation: paragraph 112(1)(a.2), subsection 112(2), and section 112.1 of the Act.
[14] The Minister opted for this regional assessment mechanism in the case at bar, which involves offshore exploratory drilling activities in a defined area east of Newfoundland and Labrador (Study Area).
B. Factual Background
[15] The facts in this appeal can be neatly summarized according to the three phases of the regional assessment.
(1) Planning Phase
[16] In March 2019, the Government of Canada, the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) signed an Agreement (Agreement) to conduct a Regional Assessment of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploratory Drilling East of Newfoundland and Labrador (Regional Assessment): Agreement, Appeal Book at 123–137.
[17] The Agreement defined the Regional Assessment as a “study or assessment of the effects of existing or future physical activities carried out in a region”
, and prescribed the factors to be considered in the assessment: Agreement, definition of “Regional Assessment”
and Appendix A, Appeal Book, at 124, 131, 132.
[18] The Agreement established a five-member committee (Committee) to conduct the Regional Assessment: Agreement, definition of “Committee”
and clause 3.1, Appeal Book, at 125. The Committee’s Terms of Reference, listed in the Agreement, outlined the Committee’s mandate, the conduct of the Regional Assessment, and the contents of the report the Committee had to provide the Minister upon completing the assessment: Agreement, clauses 4.14 and 4.15, and Appendices A and D, Appeal Book, at 126, 131–132, 135–137.
[19] As the Agreement stipulated, the Committee was supported by a “Task Team”
, comprised of technical staff, which came from the Agency, the C-NLOPB, and government departments: Agreement, clauses 4.1–4.8, Appeal Book, at 125–126; Affidavit of Stephen B. Chapman, Appeal Book, at 1481, at para. 34. The Committee was also supported and advised by a technical advisory group (TAG). The TAG’s members included the appellants, relevant government departments and agencies, Indigenous groups, and industry and stakeholder organisations, among others: Agreement, clauses 4.9–4.13, Appeal Book, at 126; Affidavit of Stephen B. Chapman, Appeal Book, 1481, at para. 34.
(2) Assessment Phase
[20] Indigenous groups were consulted in accordance with a formal three-phase consultation approach: Regional Assessment Report, section 2.2.4, Appeal Book, at 169–172.
[21] The Committee worked on the Regional Assessment from the spring of 2019 to May 2020, when it finalized the Geographic Information System tool (GIS). The GIS contains technical information in support of the Regional Assessment: FC Decision at para. 13.
[22] During that period, the Committee held numerous meetings, including (1) a series of initial planning and issue-scoping meetings (May 2019); (2) TAG sessions on various themes, such as the development of the GIS (May 2019), Indigenous knowledge (September 2019), and literature reviews related to the potential environmental effects of offshore exploratory drilling (October 2019); and (3) workshops to discuss and seek input on the Committee’s draft recommendations prior to the release of its draft report (December 2019).
[23] The appellants actively participated in the Regional Assessment process. The intervener, le Conseil des Innu de Ekuanitshit (Conseil des Innu) participated in the activities involving Indigenous issues: FC Decision at paras. 4–13.
[24] Except for certain documents, the Committee posted, on the Agency’s online registry, the information it used to develop the Regional Assessment and the comments it received: Affidavit of Stephen B. Chapman, Appeal Book, at 1488, at paras. 67–68.
[25] On January 23, 2020, the Committee released its draft report to the public—including the appellants—with a 30-day period to review and comment. The appellants and the Conseil des Innu provided their comments: FC Decision at para. 13; Affidavit of Gretchen Fitzgerald, Appeal Book, at 875–876, at para. 23; Affidavit of Sigrid Kuehnemund, Appeal Book, at 1082, at para. 32; Affidavit of Keith Edward MacMaster, Appeal Book, at 1355–1357, at para. 37; Response to draft report from the Conseil des Innu dated February 21, 2020, Appeal Book, at 2437.
[26] The Committee presented its final report (Report) to the Minister on February 29, 2020 and released the Report to the public on March 4, 2020: FC Decision at para. 13.
(3) Decision-Making Phase
[27] On the day the Report was published, the Agency released a Discussion Paper on a Ministerial Regulatory Proposal to Designate Offshore Exploratory Drilling East of Newfoundland and Labrador for Exclusion under the Impact Assessment Act (Discussion Paper on Regulatory Proposal): Affidavit of Stephen B. Chapman, Appeal Book, at 1500–1501, at para. 122; Discussion Paper on Regulatory Proposal, Appeal Book, at 1023–1049.
[28] The public had until April 30, 2020 to provide comments on the proposed regulation: Affidavit of Stephen B. Chapman, Appeal Book, at 1501, at para. 125. The appellants and the Conseil des Innu provided such comments: Affidavit of Gretchen Fitzgerald, Appeal Book, at 892–893, at paras. 63–64; Affidavit of Sigrid Kuehnemund, Appeal Book, at 1087–1088 at para. 44; Affidavit of Keith Edward MacMaster, Appeal Book, at 1360–1361, at para. 48; Comments on proposed regulation of the Conseil des Innu, Appeal Book, at 2460.
[29] On June 3, 2020, the Minister made the Regulations Respecting Excluded Physical Activities (Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Exploratory Wells) (Excluded Activities Regs) pursuant to paragraph 112(1)(a.2) and section 112.1 of the Act. The Excluded Activities Regs came into force on June 4, 2020. These regulations exclude certain physical activities from the designated projects listed in section 34 of the schedule to the Activities Regs. Physical activities are only excluded if they satisfy the conditions in Schedule 2 of the Excluded Activities Regs. Excluded physical activities are therefore exempt from project-specific assessment.
[30] On June 4, 2020, the Agency released two documents. First, the Agency released the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (Regulatory Analysis), which analyzes the impacts of the Excluded Activities Regs: Regulatory Analysis, Appeal Book, at 834–865. Second, the Agency released the Minister’s response to the Regional Assessment titled, Ministerial Response to the Regional Assessment Committee Report for Offshore Exploratory Drilling East of Newfoundland and Labrador (Ministerial Response). In this response, the Minister said the Regional Assessment “allowed the Government of Canada to collect information that enables a credible, evidence-based exclusion of offshore exploratory wells (in the Regional Assessment-defined Study Area) from undergoing project-specific federal impact assessment.”
The Minister added that “[t]his may only occur when a proposed project conforms to the conditions set out in the [Excluded Activities Regs].”
The Minister generally accepted all the Committee’s 41 recommendations. The Minister also largely agreed with the Committee’s recommendations to incorporate certain measures into the Excluded Activities Regs as requirements for all future exploratory drilling in the Study Area. Thus, the Minister incorporated these measures into the Excluded Activities Regs, albeit with noted exceptions or additions, which he detailed in the Ministerial Response: Ministerial Response, Appeal Book, at 348–370.
C. Judicial Background
(1) Appeal Prior to the IAA Reference
[31] The appellants filed two applications for judicial review with the Federal Court: one challenging the Report’s validity and another challenging the Excluded Activities Regs’ validity. The Federal Court dismissed both applications. First, the Court held that the Report was not amenable to judicial review. Second, the Federal Court found the Excluded Activities Regs reasonable because (1) they were consistent with the Act’s purpose, (2) they were within the regulation-making power in the Act, and (3) they met the condition precedent of subsection 112(2), since they were made after the Minister considered a Regional Assessment that was not materially deficient.
[32] The appellants appeal the FC Decision. They say the Regional Assessment and the Excluded Activities Regs are the product of a reverse-engineered process because the decision to make these regulations was made before the assessment began. Working backwards, the Committee conducted an unreasonable assessment and denied the appellants procedural fairness. Moreover, the Minister did not address these deficiencies when making the Excluded Activities Regs via his own procedurally deficient process.
[33] This Court heard the appeal on March 21, 2023.
(2) The IAA Reference
[34] In the IAA Reference, the Supreme Court was asked to determine the constitutional validity of the Act and the Activities Regs. The Court held that the entire Act, except sections 81–91, is ultra vires Parliament and therefore invalid; consequently, the Activities Regs are also invalid. The Court conducted a division of powers analysis to reach this conclusion. This analysis has two steps: characterization and classification.
[35] First, at the characterization step, the Court considered the purpose and effects of the Act to identify its pith and substance. The Court concluded that the Act contains two distinct schemes: IAA Reference at para. 109. The first is a “designated projects”
scheme, which assesses and regulates designated projects to mitigate or prevent their potential adverse environmental, health, social, and economic impacts. The second scheme, in sections 81–91, directs how federal authorities assess the significant adverse environmental effects of projects that they carry out or finance on federal lands or outside Canada.
[36] Second, at the classification step, the Court considered which head of power the Act’s pith and substance relates to. The second scheme (sections 81–91) was upheld for three reasons: (1) its constitutionality was unchallenged, (2) it resembles the legislation the Supreme Court upheld in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 [Oldman River], and (3) it is severable from the rest of the Act: IAA Reference at paras. 207–211. However, the Supreme Court determined that the designated projects scheme, which comprises the balance of the Act, is unconstitutional. Two reasons prohibited the designated projects scheme from being classified under a federal head of power: IAA Reference at paras. 131–139. Firstly, truly federal effects do not drive the scheme’s decision-making functions: IAA Reference at paras. 141–178. That is, decision makers could blend their assessment of adverse federal effects with other adverse effects that are not federal. Secondly, decision-making is driven by considerations labeled “effects within federal jurisdiction”
. Despite this label, these considerations far exceed federal jurisdiction: IAA Reference at paras. 179–203. For these reasons, the Supreme Court ruled that the Act—with the exception of sections 81 to 91—and the Activities Regs exceeded Parliament’s jurisdiction.
(3) Position of the parties following the IAA Reference
[37] Following the issuance of the IAA Reference, this Court directed the parties to provide written representations on the consequences, if any, of the IAA Reference to the present appeal.
(a) Appellants’ and Conseil des Innu ’s Position
[38] The appellants and the Conseil des Innu argue that the IAA Reference does not affect the issues in this appeal. In their view, the IAA Reference addressed different provisions of the Act and dealt with situations involving areas where both provincial and federal governments had jurisdiction. By contrast, the present appeal deals with “federal lands”
, which fall within federal jurisdiction. Alternatively, the appellants argue that, if this Court determines that the IAA Reference invalidates the provisions dealing with regional assessments (sections 92–103, 112–112.1), then the Excluded Activities Regs lack a valid enabling provision and must be quashed. They add that, even if quashing these regulations renders the issues moot, the Court should nonetheless exercise its discretion to address the administrative law issues in the appeal.
[39] Separately, the appellants filed a notice of constitutional question pursuant to section 57 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7. In their notice, the appellants questioned the constitutional validity of the Excluded Activities Regs. The Attorney General of Ontario (Ontario) and the Attorney General of Newfoundland Labrador (Newfoundland) intervened and filed written submissions in response to the notice of constitutional question.
(b) Respondents’ and Attorney General of Ontario’s Position
[40] In the respondents’ view, the IAA Reference implicitly supports the conclusion that the Regional Assessment is not amenable to judicial review. Thus, only one issue remains: the validity of the Excluded Activities Regs. However, given the Supreme Court’s determination that the designated projects scheme of the Act is unconstitutional, the Excluded Activities Regs can no longer have the intended effect of excluding activities from the designated projects scheme. As a result, there is no need to rule on the constitutionality of the Excluded Activities Regs and the issue of their validity is moot.
[41] Ontario goes a step further than the respondents. Ontario says this Court must declare invalid the Act’s impugned portions, the Activities Regs, and the Excluded Activities Regs. The Excluded Activities Regs must be declared invalid because they were made under paragraph 112(1)(a.2) and section 112.1, which are part of the scheme that the IAA Reference found unconstitutional. According to Ontario, since the Supreme Court opted not to grant a suspended declaration of invalidity of the Act and the Activities Regs, our Court’s declaration of invalidity must have immediate effect.
(c) Newfoundland and Labrador’s Position
[42] Newfoundland takes the position that the Excluded Activities Regs are intra vires Parliament. First, these regulations apply to the continental shelf, an area over which the federal government holds exclusive jurisdiction: Reference re Newfoundland Continental Shelf, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86 at 97. Second, these regulations are the result of a collaborative effort between the governments of Newfoundland and Labrador and Canada, and their respective agencies. In other words, the Excluded Activities Regs are a product of cooperative federalism, a goal endorsed by the Supreme Court in the IAA Reference. It follows that applying the analysis and reasoning of the IAA Reference to this particular factual matrix leads to a finding of constitutionality of the Excluded Activities Regs. In the alternative, Newfoundland argues that this appeal calls for a suspended declaration of invalidity.
III. Issues
[43] The appellants raise four issues:
Is the Regional Assessment amenable to judicial review?
Was the Regional Assessment unreasonable?
Was the Regional Assessment procedurally unfair?
Was the Minister’s decision to make the Excluded Activities Regs unreasonable?
IV. Analysis
A. Regional Assessment’s Amenability to Judicial Review
[44] The Regional Assessment culminated in the Report, which the appellants challenge. The Federal Court concluded that the Report was not amenable to judicial review: FC Decision at para. 32. Before this Court, the parties agree that the question of amenability to judicial review is to be reviewed under the correctness standard. For the following reasons, I am of the view that the Regional Assessment and the Report are not amenable to judicial review.
[45] As described above, the regional assessment mechanism essentially comprises three phases: planning, regional assessment, and decision-making.
[46] The Act does not define the phrase “regional assessment”
. The Agreement does. It defines the Regional Assessment as a “study”
or “assessment”
of the effects of existing or future physical activities carried out in a region. This definition makes clear that the Regional Assessment and its resulting Report are not decisions because they do not affect “legal rights, impose legal obligations, or cause prejudicial effects”
: Sganos v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 84 at para. 6.
[47] Rather, rights are affected or obligations are imposed when the Minister decides whether to make a regulation that excludes potential projects from project-specific assessments. The Act requires the Minister to consider the Regional Assessment before making such regulation, but the decision to act on the Regional Assessment is made by the Minister, not the Committee: subsection 112(2).
[48] The three-phase regional mechanism mirrors the Act’s designated projects scheme, described above. The designated projects scheme involves an assessment phase, during which the Agency or a review panel gathers information to develop a report. The designated projects scheme also involves a decision-making phase during which the Minister or the Governor considers the report and determines whether the project’s effects are in the public interest. If the project’s effects are in the public interest, the Minister imposes conditions for the designated project to be carried on. The Supreme Court held that the designated projects scheme “establishes an information-gathering process in the service of an ultimate decision-making function”
: IAA Reference at para. 81. Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized that the assessment phase is clearly distinct from the decision-making phase, and that the two phases have different constitutional implications: IAA Reference at paras. 155–161.
[49] Applying the Supreme Court’s analysis to the regional assessment mechanism, I find that the Regional Assessment (the assessment phase), while being an “integral component of sound decision-making”
(Oldman River at 71), does not involve decision-making and carries no legal consequences.
[50] Thus, as determined by the Federal Court, this situation is no different from the ones previously reviewed by this Court and calls for the same conclusion: the Regional Assessment and the Report are not amenable to judicial review: FC Decision at paras. 29–30; Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, 2016 FCA 187 at para. 125 [Gitxaala]; Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 153 at para. 202 [Trans Mountain]; Taseko Mines Ltd. v. Canada (Environment), 2019 FCA 319 at para. 43 [Taseko #1]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 2023 FCA 191 at para. 107 [Mikisew].
[51] Before this Court, the appellants present three arguments in support of a contrary conclusion.
(1) The Right to Participate Meaningfully Argument
[52] The appellants allege that the public’s legal right to participate meaningfully in a regional assessment (paragraph 6(1)(h) and section 99) imposes a corresponding legal obligation on the Committee. If the right to participate meaningfully is denied, and the regional assessment is not subject to judicial review, then the wronged person or entity will have no remedy, a result contrary to the Act: Appellants’ Memorandum of Fact and Law at para. 110.
[53] I disagree.
[54] The record shows that the appellants participated in the process and had numerous opportunities to make submissions at in person meetings and in written form. While they may be dissatisfied with the regional assessment, they have not demonstrated that they were denied meaningful participation.
(2) The Purposes of the Act Argument
[55] The appellants argue that requiring affected parties to wait for a decision to challenge the regional assessment’s deficiencies would undermine the purposes of the Act, stated in paragraph 6(1)(b.1)—namely, fairness, efficiency, and the predictability of impact assessments: Appellants’ Memorandum of Fact and Law at para. 115.
[56] Again, I disagree.
[57] Allowing a party to challenge a regional assessment that may not result in any decision would be a waste a judicial resources and therefore inefficient. In addition, I fail to understand how challenging a regional assessment—a study which may not result in further action—would render the process fair or predictable.
(3) The Legislative Changes Argument
[58] Lastly, the appellants make an argument based on legislative changes. As I understand it, their argument is that the report issued under the Act’s predecessor, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 52 (CEAA), was “final and conclusive”
and insulated from judicial review. As such, a report made under the CEAA is different from a report made under the Act; the latter is not insulated from judicial review. The appellants say that the Federal Court’s failure to consider these differences led it to improperly rely on the decisions Gitxaala, Trans Mountain, and Taseko #1, which were rendered under the CEAA: Appellants’ Memorandum of Fact and Law at paras. 115–119.
[59] I must disagree. If a report issued under the CEAA was, as the appellants say, more akin to a “final and conclusive”
decision, but was still found not to be amenable to judicial review, then it cannot be that a report made under the Act that is less akin to a “final and conclusive”
decision could be amenable to judicial review.
(4) Conclusion on Amenability to Judicial Review
[60] The Report is not amenable to judicial review. The same is true for the Regional Assessment, an interim document that simply culminates in the Report. Accordingly, the Federal Court correctly dismissed the appellants’ application for judicial review of the Report.
[61] That said, just because a regional assessment, standing alone, is not amenable to judicial review, does not mean it is always immune from judicial review. If a regional assessment is materially deficient (unreasonable or procedurally unfair), the resulting regulation may be quashed on the basis that the Minister lacked the legal prerequisite set out in subsection 112(2) to make that regulation: FC Decision at paras. 26, 31, citing Trans Mountain at para. 201; Mikisew at paras. 108–109.
[62] This case raises three remaining issues: the Regional Assessment’s reasonableness, the Regional Assessment’s procedural fairness, and the reasonableness of the Minister’s decision to make the Excluded Activities Regs. However, deciding these issues would serve no useful purpose if the IAA Reference entails that the Minister lacked the authorization to make those regulations. Consequently, I must consider whether the IAA Reference renders these remaining issues moot.
B. IAA Reference’s Effect on the Remaining Issues’ Mootness
(1) The Doctrine of Mootness
[63] Under the doctrine of mootness, courts may decline to hear a case when its decision will have no practical effects on the rights of the parties. Courts may nevertheless elect to hear a moot case if the circumstances warrant: Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342 at 353 [Borowski]. Thus, the doctrine of mootness involves two steps.
[64] In the first step, a court decides whether the case is moot. A case is moot when no live controversy affects the rights of the parties: Borowski at 353–356; Peckford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FCA 219 at para. 9 [Peckford].
[65] In the second step of the mootness analysis, the court decides whether to exercise its discretion to hear the case despite mootness. In Borowski, the Supreme Court formulated three factors to guide courts’ exercise of discretion:
The presence of an adversarial context;
The concern for judicial economy; and
The need for the court to be sensitive to its role as the adjudicative branch in our political framework.
(Borowski at 358–363; Peckford at para. 10)
(2) Applying the Doctrine of Mootness to this Appeal
[66] As mentioned, the appellants raise three remaining issues: the Regional Assessment’s reasonableness, the Regional Assessment’s procedural fairness, and the reasonableness of the Minister’s decision to make the Excluded Activities Regs. Having reviewed the parties’ and interveners’ helpful submissions with regard to the IAA Reference, I conclude that these issues are moot because the Supreme Court determined that the Act is ultra vires Parliament, except a few provisions that do not apply in our case.
[67] In principle, the Supreme Court’s answer to a reference is advisory and non-binding; in practice, courts follow these rulings and treat them as judicial decisions: Reference re Code of Civil Procedure (Que.), art. 35, 2021 SCC 27 at paras. 151–152; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at para. 40; Reference Re Certification in the Manitoba Health Sector, 2019 MBCA 18. These authorities suggest that I must follow the Supreme Court’s opinion that the entire Act is unconstitutional except sections 81–91. Although the IAA Reference did not specifically address the Act’s regional assessment regime, this regime remains invalid because one cannot sever it from the designated projects scheme: IAA Reference at para. 210.
[68] Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that a tribunal must refuse to give effect to unconstitutional legislation: Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, 2020 SCC 38 at para. 88.
[69] Since a valid regulation cannot be founded on an invalid statute, it stands to reason that the Excluded Activities Regs, like the Activities Regs, are invalid: Elmer A. Driedger, “Subordinate Legislation”
(1960), 38 Can Bar Rev 1 at 7. In the context of this appeal, the IAA Reference’s that the Act (except sections 81-91) is unconstitutional entails that the Minister lacked the authorization to make the Excluded Activities Regs: Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), 2006 SCC 14 at para. 16; Brown v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FCA 130 at para. 40; Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2020 FCA 100 at para. 88; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 300 at para. 16.
[70] In addition, paragraph 112(1)(a.2) of the Act enables the Minister to make regulations to exclude physical activities that underwent a regional assessment from those designated as “designated projects”
in the Activities Regs. Since the Supreme Court determined that the Activities Regs are unconstitutional, there is nothing from which to exclude physical activities anymore even if the factual matrix involves an area over which the federal government holds exclusive jurisdiction. Consequently, the remaining issues are moot under the first step of the Borowski analysis.
[71] The next step of the mootness analysis is to determine whether this Court should exercise its discretion to address the remaining issues despite their mootness. The appellants and the respondents acknowledge that there remains an adversarial context between them. While this acknowledgment supports a decision to address the three remaining issues, the following two considerations weigh heavily against it.
(a) Judicial Economy
[72] This appeal was not the beginning of the dispute between the appellants, the Committee, and the Minister. This dispute started some five years ago, when the Regional Assessment was being conducted. The factual background, the evidence, and the parties’ submissions show that the parties invested tremendous effort and expense in the Regional Assessment and the Excluded Activities Regs.
[73] I cannot overstate the magnitude of the work that the parties and the interveners have put into this appeal and the preceding judicial review application. The judicial expenditures were incurred, and all that remains is for this Court to rule on the three remaining issues. Against this background, the appellants argue that, should this Court refuse to rule on the three remaining issues, they will be forced to pursue a third hearing in the Federal Court if the Minister relies on the Report to re-enact the Excluded Activities Regs in the future.
[74] The problem is that this Court ruling on the three remaining issues would not necessarily eliminate a third hearing or another legal challenge. The Regional Assessment—which culminated in the Report—was relevant to this appeal because subsection 112(2) of the Act provides that the Minister must consider a regional assessment before making a regulation. It was therefore necessary to ensure that the report was not materially deficient, thus engendering the second and third issues raised by the appellants. It is uncertain whether Parliament will retain, in a modified version of the Act, the obligation to consider a regional assessment before making a regulation. This obligation may be accompanied by the need to consider other elements. In this uncertain context, what good would a ruling on the three remaining issues do? How would ruling on the Regional Assessment’s reasonableness or procedural fairness avoid further litigation if the consideration of a regional assessment is no longer a prerequisite of the Act or if it is only one of various prerequisites?
[75] The question about the usefulness of a ruling on the remaining issues remains relevant even if Parliament were to maintain, in a modified version of the Act, the requirement for the Minister to consider a regional assessment prior to making regulations. This is so because nothing guarantees the Minister would consider the Regional Assessment he considered prior to making the Excluded Activities Regs. Were the Minister to consider the Regional Assessment in making future regulations, perhaps a ruling from this Court that the Regional Assessment is reasonable and procedurally fair would be of no avail to the appellants. For instance, the passage of time or contextual changes might support arguments against the reasonableness or procedural fairness of the Regional Assessment that were not made in this appeal, thereby justifying another judicial challenge. Equally, a ruling that the Regional Assessment is unreasonable and was procedurally unfair may be of no assistance to the appellants if the Minister considers an improved version of the Regional Assessment before making future regulations.
[76] It follows that ruling on the three remaining issues may not prevent future litigation. In addition, such a ruling would have no practical effect on the rights of the parties and serve no purpose. Ruling on the reasonableness of the Minister’s decision to make these regulations would serve no useful purpose. Similarly, ruling on the Regional Assessment’s reasonableness and procedural fairness would be of limited value because such a ruling would be rendered in a specific context unlikely to be replicated in the future: Peckford at para. 31.
(b) Role of this Court
[77] Given the Supreme Court’s determination in the IAA Reference, it is better left to Parliament to decide what should happen next.
V. Conclusion
[78] In light of the above, I would dismiss the appeal. The Federal Court correctly dismissed the appellants’ application for judicial review of the Report, and the remaining three issues are moot.
"Nathalie Goyette"
J.A.
“I agree. |
Richard Boivin J.A.” |
“I agree. |
Sylvie E. Roussel J.A.”
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APPENDIX
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2 The following definitions apply in this Act.
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FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
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Docket: |
A-10-22 |
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STYLE OF CAUSE:
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SIERRA CLUB CANADA FOUNDATION, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND CANADA and ECOLOGY ACTION CENTRE v. MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and LE CONSEIL DES INNU DE EKUANITSHIT and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR |
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PLACE OF HEARING:
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Halifax, Nova Scotia
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DATE OF HEARING:
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March 21, 2023
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:
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GOYETTE J.A.
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CONCURRed IN BY:
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BOIVIN J.A.
ROUSSEL J.A.
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DATED:
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MAY 3, 2024 |
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APPEARANCES:
James Gunvaldsen Klaassen Ian Miron |
For The Appellants |
Sarah Drodge Mary Anne MacDonald |
For The Respondents MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
David Schulze
Sara Andrade
Sarah-Maude Belleville-Chénard
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FOR THE INTEVERNER
LE CONSEIL DES INNU DE EKUANITSHIT
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WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY:
James Gunvaldsen Klaassen Ian Miron |
For The Appellants |
Sarah Drodge Mary Anne MacDonald |
For The Respondents MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
Josh Hunter Yashoda Ranganathan Hera Evans Waleed Malik Emily Graham |
For The intervener the attorney general of ontario |
Colm St. Roch Seviour K.C. & G. John Samms |
For The INTERVENER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR |
David Schulze
Sara Andrade
Sarah-Maude Belleville-Chénard
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FOR THE INTEVERNER
LE CONSEIL DES INNU DE EKUANITSHIT
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Ecojustice Halifax, Nova Scotia |
For The Appellants |
Shalene Curtis-Micallef Deputy Attorney General of Canada |
For The Respondents MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE and attorney general of canada |
Dionne Schulze Montréal, Québec |
FOR THE INTERVENER
LE CONSEIL DES INNU DE EKUANITSHIT
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Doug Downey Attorney General of Ontario |
FOR THE INTERVENER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO |
Stewart Mckelvey St. John’s, Newfoundland |
FOR THE INTERVENER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEWFOUNDLAND and LABRADOR |