|
Docket: 2002-3291(GST)I
|
|
BETWEEN: |
|
3859681 CANADA INC.,
|
|
Appellant, |
|
and |
|
|
|
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
|
|
Respondent. |
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard together with the appeals of 3859681Canada Inc. (2002-3293(GST)I) and Zellers Inc. (2002-3294(GST)I) on May 27, 2003 at Toronto, Ontario
|
Before: The Honourable Justice Diane Campbell |
|
|
|
|
|
Appearances: |
|
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the Appellant: |
Bradley E. Berg and Allan Gelkopf |
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the Respondent: |
John McLaughlin |
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the assessment made under the Excise Tax Act, notice of which is dated August 17, 2001 for the period from February 28, 1999 to April 3, 1999 is allowed and the assessment is referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with the terms of the attached Reasons for Judgment.
This appeal having been heard together with the appeals of 3859681Canada Inc. (2002-3293(GST)I) and Zellers Inc. (2002-3294(GST)I), only one set of costs is allowed.
Signed at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, this 24th day of July 2003.
|
"Diane Campbell" |
Campbell, J.
|
Docket: 2002-3293(GST)I
|
|
BETWEEN: |
|
3859681 CANADA INC.,
|
|
Appellant, |
|
and |
|
|
|
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
|
|
Respondent. |
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard together with the appeals of 3859681Canada Inc. (2002-3291(GST)I) and Zellers Inc. (2002-3294(GST)I) on May 27, 2003 at Toronto, Ontario
|
Before: The Honourable Justice Diane Campbell |
|
|
|
|
|
Appearances: |
|
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the Appellant: |
Bradley E. Berg and Allan Gelkopf |
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the Respondent: |
John McLaughlin |
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the assessment made under the Excise Tax Act, notice of which is dated August 22, 2001 for the period from February 27, 2000 to April 1, 2000 is allowed and the assessment is referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with the terms of the attached Reasons for Judgment.
This appeal having been heard together with the appeals of 3859681Canada Inc. (2002-3291(GST)I) and Zellers Inc. (2002-3294(GST)I), only one set of costs is allowed.
Signed at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, this 24th day of July 2003.
|
"Diane Campbell" |
Campbell, J.
|
Docket: 2002-3294(GST)I
|
|
BETWEEN: |
|
ZELLERS INC.,
|
|
Appellant, |
|
and |
|
|
|
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
|
|
Respondent. |
____________________________________________________________________
Appeal heard together with the appeals of 3859681Canada Inc. (2002-3291(GST)I) and (2002-3293(GST)I) on May 27, 2003 at Toronto, Ontario
|
Before: The Honourable Justice Diane Campbell |
|
|
|
|
|
Appearances: |
|
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the Appellant: |
Bradley E. Berg and Allan Gelkopf |
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the Respondent: |
John McLaughlin |
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
The appeal from the assessment made under the Excise Tax Act, notice of which is dated August 8, 2001 for the period from February 1, 1999 to April 30, 2000 is allowed and the assessment is referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with the terms of the attached Reasons for Judgment.
This appeal having been heard together with the appeals of 3859681Canada Inc. (2002-3291(GST)I) and (2002-3293(GST)I).
Signed at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, this 24th day of July 2003.
|
"Diane Campbell" |
Campbell, J.
|
Citation: 2003TCC501 |
|
Date: 20030724 |
|
Dockets: 2002-3291(GST)I 2002-3293(GST)I 2002-3294(GST)I |
|
BETWEEN: |
|
3859681 CANADA INC., ZELLERS INC., |
|
Appellants, |
|
and |
|
|
|
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, |
|
Respondent. |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Campbell, J.
Background and Issue:
[1] These three appeals were heard together under the Informal Procedure. No witnesses were called and counsel for each party presented submissions only.
[2] The Appellants are corporations incorporated under the Federal Laws of Canada. They carry on business across Canada as department store retailers, operating under the name "Zellers Stores". Periodically Zellers moves employees to other locations within the country. This is a regular part of its business operations as a mass retail merchant. To assist employees in these relocations, Zellers reimburses the employees their direct or actual moving expenses (such as moving truck, travel expenses). In addition Zellers pays an allowance to the relocated employees, consisting of 10% of the employee's previous year's salary, net of bonuses. The following paragraph 8 in each notice of appeal lists the additional costs which this 10% allowance is to cover:
...the cost of registering vehicles or obtaining licenses in a new province; the installation of telephone, internet, cable and satellite services; connection fees for hydro, water, gas and other utilities; purchases of food stuffs, paint, firewood and cleaners that cannot be transported from the old location; transportation and boarding of pets; temporary housekeeping services; the cost of duplicate school uniforms if children are relocated during the same school year; disconnection and installation of stove, refrigerator, washer, dryer, dishwasher; cleaning services and minor repairs of the old and new properties; conversion of electrical or gas equipment to meet requirements in the new location; window dressing and floor coverings; forwarding of valuable property/collectibles; and transportation of recreational vehicles.
[3] Counsel for the Appellants and the Respondent agree that the 10% amounts paid to such employees are allowances and that the amount of these allowances is reasonable. It was also agreed that these moving allowances are taxable to the employee for income tax purposes pursuant to section 6 of the Income Tax Act and as such are included on an employee's T4 form.
[4] Each Appellant, being the employer, filed a rebate claim to recover income tax credits (ITC's) in respect to GST. They filed these claims pursuant to sections 169 and 174 of the Excise Tax Act (the "Act") on the basis that as the employers they were deemed to have paid the GST in respect to the moving allowances. The Minister disallowed the tax rebate claims on the basis that the moving allowances, paid to employees were personal expenses incurred by the employees and that the supplies were not in relation to activities engaged in by the Appellants pursuant to paragraph 174(a)(iv) of the Act.
[5] The issue is whether the Appellants are entitled to claim input tax credits, pursuant to section 174 of the Act, in respect to these employee relocations and in particular whether the supplies of property or services acquired by the employees in the move were in relation to activities engaged in by the employer, Zellers, pursuant to paragraph 174(a)(iv) of the Act. Respondent also argued that section 170 and in particular paragraph 170(1)(b) of the Act precluded any entitlement to input tax credits in respect to these allowances.
Submissions of Appellants and Respondent:
[6] Respondent has submitted that sections 169, 170 and 174 provide the statutory framework within which these issues must be reviewed. Section 169 provides the general rule and formula for determining entitlement to ITC's. From my understanding of the Respondent's argument, Zellers has a problem fitting into section 169 to claim ITC's as these expense items were not for consumption, use or supply in the course of its commercial activities. Section 169 begins with the words "subject to this part". This is appropriate as there are other provisions here which can have an effect on a claim for these credits. One of these provisions is section 174, part of which contains deeming provisions. Respondent argued that if we momentarily deleted section 174, Zellers would not be entitled to claim ITC's for personal expenses because section 169 determines entitlement to ITC's based on whether the property or service was consumed, used or supplied in the course of commercial activities of Zellers. Respondent submitted that despite the deeming provisions of section 174, this section does not give Zellers the right to claim ITC's in respect to moving expenses that have a largely personal element attached to them. The Respondent argued that section 174 is the only vehicle by which Zellers could claim ITC's under section 169, as Zellers did not acquire the supplies directly or pay tax on them directly and in particular did not use them in the course of its commercial activities. Section 174 contains a number of deeming provisions but before getting to those provisions you must meet the other requirements of section 174. The Respondent agreed that Zellers paid an allowance to the relocated employees and that all or substantially all of these items were taxable supplies. However the Respondent argued that there must be a relation or connection test which would directly connect the supply for which the tax is paid to the commercial or business activities of Zellers. Respondent argued that items such as internet hook up, cable connection or window dressings are clearly not related to Zellers' business activities but are for the exclusive personal use and enjoyment of the relocated employees of Zellers. Therefore, according to the Respondent, the requirements of section 169 are not met. Because section 174 is the only section that the Appellant can utilize to get into section 169 to claim ITC's, the Appellant has failed, as the moving expense supplies, on which GST was paid by the employees, are strictly personal to the employees. Therefore section 174, the Respondent argues, does not apply.
[7] The purpose of section 174 is to deem certain things to be a reality. The Respondent argues that before one gets to the deeming provisions in section 174, the requirements of paragraph 174(a)(iv) must be met but in this case they are not, as the moving expenses are personal to the employees and are not in any way related to the employer's commercial activities. Therefore according to the Respondent's argument, we never get to the deeming provisions of (d), (e) and (f) of section 174 because not all of the requirements contained in (a), (b) and (c) of section 174 are met. As there is no connection between the personal expenditure by the employees and the commercial activities of Zellers, the requirements of subsections 174(a), (b) and (c) and in particular paragraph 174(a)(iv) are not met which prevents the application of the deeming provisions in section 174. Without section 174, Respondent argues that the Appellants do not qualify for ITC's under Part 9 of the Act or more particularly section 169.
[8] The Respondent contends that even if this Court is persuaded that section 174 does apply, paragraph 170(1)(b) denies the ITC. Respondent argues that paragraph 170(1)(b) simply states that there is no ITC respecting any supply on which tax is paid, where the supply is exclusively for the personal consumption, use, or enjoyment of the employee. In this case Respondent argued that all of the expenses are clearly for the exclusive personal use of the employees. Respondent went on to argue that there are two exceptions listed in section 170 at subparagraphs (1)(b)(i) and (1)(b)(ii). The applicable subparagraph here is 170(1)(b)(ii). To determine if the exception at subparagraph 170(1)(b)(ii) permits an ITC, Respondent argued that one must also look to section 6 of the Income Tax Act. According to the Respondent's argument, subparagraph 170(1)(b)(ii), which would allow an ITC where it is otherwise precluded, only operates if an employee does not have to include in income that particular amount pursuant to section 6 of the Income Tax Act. The Income Tax Act is relevant therefore for the purposes of paragraph 170(1)(b), because we must look to that Act to determine if the exception will permit an ITC. According to the Respondent, subparagraph 170(1)(b)(ii) permits an ITC provided an employee does not have to include any benefit, under section 6 of the Income Tax Act in computing the employee's income under that Act. Here the employees do include the allowances as income pursuant to section 6 of the Income Tax Act.
[9] The Appellant contends that all of the conditions of section 174 are met, that is subsections 174(a), (b) and (c), which in turn triggers the deeming provisions that then enable Zellers to claim the ITC's under section 169. Once Zellers falls within section 174, these deeming provisions will apply for the purposes of all of Part 9 of the Act. The Appellants argue that the requirements of paragraph 174(a)(iv) have been met. Of course it is the final phrase of this subsection "... in relation to activities engaged in by the person" that is in contention. Counsel for the Appellants argues that the relocation of employees is integral to the success of the business operations of Zellers and as such the allowances paid to the employees, to assist in their moving, are incurred in the course of the commercial activities of Zellers. This moves Zellers, according to the Appellant, into the deeming provisions of section 174. According to the operation of these deeming provisions, Zellers would be deemed to have received the supply of the property or services pursuant to subsection 174(d), would also be deemed to have consumed or used the property or service pursuant to subsection 174(e) and finally would be deemed to have paid tax on that property or service pursuant to subsection 174(f).
[10] The Appellant argues that payment of this allowance, as part of the employee moving expenses, is essential to the success of Zellers business operations and for this reason the allowances are incurred in the course of the commercial activities of Zellers. Appellant submits therefore that Zellers is entitled to claim ITC's for these moving allowances pursuant to section 174 and paragraph 169(1)(c). The Appellant also argued that the Minister incorrectly applied paragraph 170(1)(b) to deny rebate claims, when in the Minister's Notice of Decision of May 24, 2002, Zellers was informed that this paragraph denied ITC's because the supply was incurred personally by the employees in their relocation. Since the allowances were incurred in the course of the commercial activities of Zellers, the requirements of subsections 174(a), (b) and (c) are met. Therefore pursuant to subsections 174(d), (e) and (f), Zellers is deemed to have received and consumed or used a supply of property or service and to have paid GST on these moving allowances. There is nothing in section 174 which subject these deeming provisions to any other section of the Act. The Respondent is incorrect, Appellant argues, in its application of paragraph 170(1)(b) because the deeming provisions of section 174 operate to remove any personal element that could be attributed to the employee under paragraph 170(1)(b).
Analysis
[11] The key provision here is section 174. This section contains deeming provisions. These deeming provisions connect the employer directly to the supply so that the employer, Zellers in this case, can claim ITC's under section 169, as if the employer had consumed, used or enjoyed the supply directly. If the requirements of (a), (b) and (c) of section 174 are met, the deeming provisions in (d), (e) and (f) of section 174 come into operation, thereby effectively deeming the employer to have received the supply of the property or service, not the employee, and to have paid GST on that amount, not the employee. Whether these deeming provisions should apply here is dependent on whether the conditions in (a), (b) and (c) of section 174 are first met. If the conditions are met, then the deeming provisions are triggered, enabling an employer to claim ITC's. The relevant portions of section 174, in respect to the facts of this case, are as follows:
For the purposes of this Part, where
(a) a person pays an allowance
(i) to an employee of the person,
...
for
(iv) supplies all or substantially all of which are taxable supplies (other then zero-rated supplies) of property or services acquired in Canada by the employee, member or volunteer in relation to activities engaged in by the person, or
(emphasis added)
...
the following rules apply:
(d) the person is deemed to have received a supply of the property or service,
(e) any consumption or use of the property or service by the employee, member or volunteer is deemed to be consumption or use by the person and not by the employee, member or volunteer, and
(f) the person is deemed to have paid, at the time the allowance is paid, tax in respect of the supply equal to the amount determined by the formula
A X B
where ...
[12] The Respondent contends that the conditions of paragraph 174(a)(iv) are not met as the facts relate to the following clause:
...in relation to activities engaged in by the person,
It was agreed that the other conditions in this section are satisfied on the facts.
[13] In summary only subsection 174(a) applies to the facts in these appeals and it is only the last phrase of paragraph 174(a)(iv) that is in dispute. If the Appellant has been successful in persuading me that the contentious phrase in paragraph 174(a)(iv) is satisfied then we look to the deeming provisions of section 174 contained in subsections (d), (e) and (f). If paragraph 174(a)(iv) is satisfied, subsection 174(d) deems Zellers to have received the supply of property or service; subsection 174(e) deems Zellers to have consumed or used it; and subsection 174(f) deems Zellers to have paid the tax.
[14] The moving allowance is provided to employees so the employees can purchase certain items required as a result of relocation. These items attract GST. Zellers has paid GST through the payment of the allowance to its employees. Provided the contentious provision of paragraph 174(a)(iv) is satisfied, these deeming provisions would permit Zellers to claim ITC's, as a portion of the allowance would be GST. So the first step is to determine if paragraph 174(a)(iv) is satisfied. Again it is only the last few words or phrase at the end of paragraph 174(a)(iv) which is in issue here.
[15] The Respondent has argued that this condition is not met because the allowance was used by the employees to purchase items that are exclusively for their personal consumption. The Appellant argued that employee relocations and consequently payment of allowances were integral to Zellers business operations and were therefore incurred in the course of the commercial activities of Zellers.
[16] I agree with the Appellants' submissions that employee promotions and relocations to other geographical regions go hand in hand. These elements are essential to the growth and economic viability of this national retailer. Such allowances foster and support good employer/employee relations allowing upward mobility within the corporate structure, although at the expense of a relocation. Each employee was reimbursed the direct expenses attributable to such a move and also paid an allowance of 10% of salary to cover those expenses not directly receiptable. I agree with the Appellant that there is no personal benefit or employee perk here. The executive compensation package is provided to make the employees whole again after their move. More importantly I agree that there is the definite benefit to Zellers of promoting deserving employees while inducing them to remain with the company by paying allowances that would return them to somewhat the same level financially as before the move. Employee promotion might well be contingent upon moving, possibly to an undesirable location from the perspective of the employee. There is an element of reciprocity here and Zellers definitely benefits by having its employees stay with the company and accept relocations.
[17] From the employee's perspective, if they wanted a promotion and accepted a move, they were simply put in the same position financially that they were in prior to the move. This would be accomplished through reimbursement of direct moving expenses and the payment of a specific allowance for those types of expenses listed in paragraph 8 of the Reply to Notice of Appeal. This can never completely compensate an employee for the upheaval of a move, which in many instances could involve a move to a less desirable location from the employee's perspective. Since relocation is an integral part of corporate operations, Zellers must ensure continuity of management in potentially less than ideal geographical locations, through payment of these allowances. This ensures the continued viability, growth and health of the company. Zellers would certainly view payment of these allowances as a prerequisite to retention of essential staff and as key to its future economic stability. I conclude that these allowances relate directly to the corporate operations of Zellers. They simply enhance employee dedication and loyalty and foster better employee/employer long-term relationships.
[18] Appellant's counsel referred me to GST Ruling 11650-7, entitled Input Tax Credit Entitlement and Removal Expenses (issued February 16, 1996). This ruling deals with section 175 not 174. Section 175 deals with employer reimbursements of employee expenses, specifically legal fees and real estate commissions, but does not deal with allowances. However both sections 174 and 175 are similarly structured. The ruling stated that an employer should be able to claim ITC's for reimbursements of relocation expenses incurred by employees pursuant to sections 169 and 175. CCRA ruled that these reimbursements would be considered to have been made in the course of the registrant's commercial activities. Appellant argued that this ruling was directly on point. Respondent distinguished this ruling on the basis that it dealt with reimbursements not allowances. I agree with Respondent that this ruling is dealing with an entirely different section (section 175) and an entirely different topic (reimbursements).
[19] I conclude that Zellers pays these allowances to relocated employees in relation to its commercial activities. Requirements of subparagraph 174(a)(iv) have therefore been met and the deeming provisions are now engaged for the purposes of Part 9 of the Act. The opening phrase of section 174 ("For the purposes of this Part") is a reference to Part 9 of the Act and dictates the scope for the application of these deeming provisions.
[20] Appellant's counsel referred me to comments by Driedger (Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, Fourth Edition, by Ruth Sullivan Butterworths) on deeming provisions. At page 69 Driedger states:
When "deems" is used to create a legal fiction, the fiction cannot be rebutted. The facts as declared by the legislature govern even in the face of irrefutable evidence to the contrary. The difficulty that arises in interpreting legal fictions is determining the scope of the fiction.
[21] In the facts of the case, it is clear that the relocated employee received the cable hook up, for example, not Zellers, the employer. The deeming provisions however operate to create the legal fiction, which allow Zellers to claim the ITC's.
[22] The deeming provisions of section 174 create a legal fiction that the employer, Zellers, and not the employee, used the moving allowance to directly pay for property and services and that it was Zellers, not the employee, that consumed or used the property or services. Therefore pursuant to subsections 174(d) and (e) Zellers is deemed to be the recipient of the supply of property or services, not the employee. Subsection 174(f) then deems that Zellers paid the tax on the property or services. Section 169, which permits a registrant to claim ITC's, begins with the phrase "Subject to this Part". I conclude that this essentially means "subject to everything else in Part 9", which would include these deeming provisions contained in section 174.
[23] I believe this is sufficient to dispose of these appeals and to allow them and refer them back to the Minister for reassessment. However Respondent counsel made representations respecting paragraph 170(1)(b) which I believe should be addressed.
[24] The Minister's Notice of Decision dated May 24, 2002 made the following ruling:
Your entitlement is based on Section 174 of the Excise Tax Act, which allows a registrant to claim ITC equal to 7/107 on certain allowances. Upon further review, paragraph 170(1)(b) denies eligibility for an ITC if the supply is used for the personal use of an officer or employee. The moving allowance in question was granted to cover personal expenses of an officer or employee involved in a move. These expenses include, for example, school uniforms, personal cable and phone connections, and a host of other personal use items.
[25] There is nothing within the wording of section 174 which makes it (and in particular the deeming provisions of the section) subject in any way to any other section or provision in the Act. It operates within the scope of Part 9 of the Act and having concluded that Zellers meets the requirements set out in section 174, the deeming provisions take effect to deem that Zellers was the recipient of the supply, that Zellers consumed or used the supply and that Zellers paid the tax. Respondent counsel argued that section 170 is to be interpreted in conjunction with section 174.
[26] Respondent argued that:
... the deeming provision does not remove the fact or change the fact they are still cable services, Internet services, housekeeping or school uniforms. Those are still personal type expenditures, not qualifying for input tax credits under Part 9 of the Excise Tax Act, more particularly section 169 of the Excise Tax Act, without even referring to section 170, which we will get to.
(transcript pages 49-50)
[27] Respondent goes on to argue that because these moving allowances are included as taxable benefits to the employees pursuant to section 6 of the Income Tax Act, then we must refer to paragraph 170(1)(b). This section sets out certain restrictions in claiming ITC's with respect to a supply on which tax is paid, where the supply is exclusively for the personal consumption, use, or enjoyment of the employee. The requirement of paragraph 170(1)(b) is that the supply be acquired for an employee's exclusive personal consumption or use. Respondent argued that all of the items in this case were clearly and exclusively for the personal consumption of the employees. Respondent referred me to the definition of "exclusive" contained in paragraph 123(1)(a) of the Act:
"exclusive" means
(a) in respect of the consumption, use or supply of property or a service by a person that is not a financial institution, all or substantially all of the consumption, use or supply of the property or service, and
(b) in respect of the consumption, use or supply of property or a service by a financial institution, all of the consumption, use or supply of the property or service;
[28] Subsection 123(1) has defined the term "exclusive" to mean "all or substantially all". While CCRA has interpreted this to mean 90% or more, this Court is not bound by that departmental interpretation.
[29] Now if we return, as Respondent would have me do, to paragraph 170(1)(b), his argument follows that by incorporating this definition and looking again at the wording of paragraph 170(1)(b), as the tax is paid by the employee on these items under section 6 of the Income Tax Act (the parties agreed that they are included as taxable benefits), and the supply is exclusively for the personal use of the employee, there can be no claim for ITC's by Zellers. There are two exceptions to paragraph 170(1)(b) listed at subparagraphs (1)(b)(i) and (1)(b)(ii). Only subparagraph (1)(b)(ii) applies in this case and it states that an ITC may be claimed provided there is not an amount payable by the employee in respect to a taxable benefit under section 6 of the Income Tax Act. Certainly I agree with the Respondent that section 6 is relevant for the purposes of applying paragraph 170(1)(b), in determining if an ITC is payable. I also agree that it was Parliament's intent to deny ITC's for any item that is exclusively for the employee's personal use, consumption or employment within the context of that section.
[30] I have concluded however that it is section 174 that applies to the facts of this case, not section 170, and with the requirements of paragraph 174(a)(iv) having been satisfied, this automatically triggers the deeming provisions in subsections 174(d), (e) and (f). The deeming provisions operate to allow Zellers to claim ITC's without anything further. I believe that this section was specifically included in Part 9 of the Act to address this very type of case which is before me. Once the deeming provisions are engaged, section 174 applies and that is the end of the matter. There is no personal consumption, use or enjoyment which implicates section 170. Section 170 just does not apply here.
[31] Respondent, in an alternative argument, submitted that if I did find that the requirements of paragraph 174(a)(iv) are met, then "...the deeming provision does not go so far as to remove the inherent 'personal consumptive' element of that expenditure" (Respondent's submissions paragraph 16). Respondent is dead wrong in his interpretation of these deeming provisions. If he were right, in any sense of the word, there would simply be no reason to include the deeming provisions in the section.
[32] And finally Appellants' counsel referred me to the case of BJ Services Company Canada et al v. The Queen, [2002] G.S.T.C. 124 (T.C.C.) which dealt with fees incurred for particular types of professional business advice and legal fees as a result of a merger and acquisition. This case was not particularly helpful as it not only involved entirely different expenses from those in the present case but BJ Services centered around entirely different sections of the Act.
[33] Respondent's counsel referred to the case of Attorney General of Canada v. MacDonald, 94 DTC 6262. This case can be distinguished because it dealt with a housing subsidy or allowance, which I view as an entirely different type of allowance from those provided in the present case.
[34] In summary once the requirements of section 174 are met, the deeming provisions become operative. The deeming provisions cannot be clearer. The intent is unequivocal and paragraph 170(1)(b) is shut out from applying in these appeals.
[35] The appeals are allowed, with one set of costs, and are referred back to the Minister for reassessment and reconsideration on the basis that the Appellants are entitled to claim ITC's for moving allowances paid to employees, pursuant to sections 174 and 169 of the Act.
Signed at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, this 24th day of July 2003.
|
"Diane Campbell" |
Campbell, J
|
CITATION: |
2003TCC501 |
|
COURT FILE NO.: |
2002-3291(GST)I, 2002-3293(GST)I 2002-3294(GST)I |
|
STYLE OF CAUSE: |
Zellers Inc. and |
|
PLACE OF HEARING |
Toronto, Ontario |
|
DATE OF HEARING |
May 27, 2003 |
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: |
The Honourable Justice Diane Campbell |
|
DATE OF JUDGMENT |
July 24, 2003 |
|
APPEARANCES: |
|
Agent for the Appellant: |
Bradley E. Berg and Allan Gelkopf |
|
Counsel for the Respondent: |
John McLaughlin |
|
COUNSEL OF RECORD: |
|
For the Appellant: |
|
Name: |
Bradley E. Berg and Allan Gelkopf |
|
Firm: |
Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP Toronto, Ontario |
|
For the Respondent: |
Morris Rosenberg Deputy Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Canada |