Tax Court of Canada Judgments

Docket: 2000-2261(IT)G

BETWEEN:

MUKHTIAR HANS,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

Appeals heard on July 8, 9, 10 and September 10, 2002, at Toronto, Ontario,

By: The Honourable Justice E.A. Bowie
Appearances:
Counsel for the Appellant:	Richard G. Fitzsimmons
Counsel for the Respondent:	Bobby Sood

____________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

          The appeals from reassessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years are allowed and the reassessments are referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment on the basis described in paragraph 21 of my Reasons for Judgment. There will be no order as to costs.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 14th day of August, 2003.

"E.A. Bowie"

Bowie J.

Citation: 2003TCC576

Date: 20030814

Docket: 2000-2261(IT)G

BETWEEN:

MUKHTIAR HANS,

Appellant,

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,

Respondent.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BOWIE J.

[1]      Mr. Hans appeals from reassessments under the Income Tax Act (the Act) for the 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 taxation years. At the relevant times, he was employed as a factory worker on a full-time basis, and he also operated a driving school from his house in Brampton, Ontario as a proprietorship under the name United Drivers Training of Canada (the school) on a part-time basis. The business had its fiscal year end on February 28 each year. The reassessments under appeal are predicated on the Minister's conclusion that the Appellant correctly stated his revenues from the school, but substantially overstated his expenses in each of the years under appeal. The adjustments made by the Minister may be summarized as follows:

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Business expenses claimed	$28,316	$29,186	$26,128	$28,119	$23,617
Expenses disallowed	16,813	21,241	20,959	22,433	18,738
Total expenses allowed	$11,503	$7,945	$5,169	$5,686	$4,879

The Minister also assessed penalties under subsection 163(2) of the Act for each year. It is not disputed that the 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994 taxation years were statute-barred, and the 1995 year was not. The issues before me therefore are:

1.      Has the Minister discharged the burden of proving that the Appellant made one or more misrepresentations attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default, in filing his returns for the 1991 to 1994 taxation years?[1]

2.      If so, to what extent can the disallowance of expenses by the Minister for each of those years reasonably be regarded as relating to such misrepresentations?[2]

3.      Has the Appellant satisfied the burden of showing that the assumptions of fact on which the Minister based his last reassessment for the 1995 year are incorrect?

4.      Has the Minister discharged the burden of proving that the Appellant knowingly, or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence, made a false statement or omission in his returns for each of the taxation years in issue,[3] and of establishing that the penalties assessed were correctly computed?[4]

taxation years 1991 to 1994

[2]      The Minister's right to reassess the statute-barred years in this case is governed by subparagraphs 152(4)(a)(i) and 152(4.01)(a)(i).

152(4) The Minister may at any time make an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment of tax for a taxation year, interest or penalties, if any, payable under this Part by a taxpayer or notify in writing any person by whom a return of income for a taxation year has been filed that no tax is payable for the year, except that an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment may be made after the taxpayer's normal reassessment period in respect of the year only if

(a)         the taxpayer or person filing the return

(i)          has made any misrepresentation that is attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or has committed any fraud in filing the return or in supplying any information under this Act, or

(ii)         ...

152(4.01)          Notwithstanding subsections (4) and (5), an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment to which paragraph (4)(a) or (b) applies in respect of a taxpayer for a taxation year may be made after the taxpayer's normal reassessment period in respect of the year to the extent that, but only to the extent that, it can reasonably be regarded as relating to,

(a)         where paragraph (4)(a) applies to the assessment, reassessment or additional assessment,

(i)          any misrepresentation made by the taxpayer or a person who filed the taxpayer's return of income for the year that is attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or any fraud committed by the taxpayer or that person in filing the return or supplying any information under this Act, or

(ii)         ...

[3]      Counsel for the Appellant argued that the Minister could not sustain his reopening of the statute-barred years in this case because he had failed to plead with any specificity the alleged misrepresentations on which he relied, as Rule 49 requires. He relied upon Shaughnessy v. The Queen[5] and Gardner v. The Queen,[6] both cases in which this Court has recently criticized the Deputy Attorney General's all too frequent practice of not pleading the specific facts that he alleges and intends to prove at trial, but simply a general failure to comply with a provision of the Act, expressed only by a recitation of the provision that he says was not complied with. Subparagraphs 7(h) to (l) of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal in the present case are perhaps as bad an example as I have seen of this particular violation of the rules relating to pleading. Subparagraphs 7(k) and (l) are particularly offensive. They are the elements of the pleading that are supposed to aver the facts that justify the reopening of the statute-barred years and the imposition of the penalties, as to both of which the Respondent has the burden of proof. They simply parrot the words of the statutory provisions referred to in them, and are nothing more than conclusions of mixed fact and law that the Deputy Attorney General hopes that the Court might someday reach. Had the Reply been attacked, as it was in Gardner, I would have made the same Order that I made in that case. However, the fact that the Appellant was entitled to have particular allegations of fact pleaded in the Reply does not entitle him now to have the Respondent's efforts to show misrepresentation as to the statute-barred years, and gross negligence to justify the penalties, foreclosed. Nevertheless, I take the view that in attempting to justify reassessing the statute-barred years, the Minister is confined to those misrepresentations that were known to her and upon which she relied to justify making the reassessments at the time they were made. She cannot reassess and then later fish for reasons to justify having done so.

[4]      The Minister reassessed the Appellant for the taxation years 1991 to 1994 on August 18, 1998, as a result of an audit performed by Mr. Peter Mutch. The Appellant objected to those reassessments, and as a result he was reassessed again for slightly lesser amounts on March 23, 2000. It is these latter assessments that are now under appeal, and so the reasons for reopening the 1991 to 1994 taxation years stated by Mr. Mutch in his Audit Report dated May 6, 1998[7] and those stated by Orest Bozyk, the Appeals Officer, in his Report on Objection dated February 22, 2000[8] are relevant. These read as follows.

1.          Opening of Statute Barred Years

Subsection 152(4)(a) of the Income Tax Act provides that a reassessment or assessment of tax, penalties and interest may be made at any time, if the taxpayer or person filing the return has made any misrepresentation that is attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or has committed any fraud in filing the return or in supplying any information.

During the initial audit review (audit period: 1994 and 1995 taxation years), it was found that the t/p did not maintain proper books and records, and the majority of expenses claimed could not be supported, or were personal in nature. Thus it was the Department's contention that the t/p was neglectful and careless in the filing of his income tax returns.[9]

Reason for opening prior years under Par 152(4)(a):

The expenses claimed by the taxpayer are grossly overstated. It was found that the taxpayer did not maintain proper books and records and the majority of expenses could not be supported and were personal in nature. The taxpayer did not maintain any journals, which could reconcile to the statements filed (log books, appointments, General ledger, synoptic, etc.) and the taxpayer has claimed over $120,000 in business losses over 6 calendar years. It appears that the taxpayer has made misrepresentations in filing of his income tax returns through neglect and/or carelessness.[10]

In summary, then, the Minister's reasons for reopening the 1991 to 1994 years amount to this: the taxpayer could not establish the quantum of his expenses, and to some unspecified extent the expenses that he claimed were personal and not business related. This resulted from neglect or carelessness, which included his failure to keep proper records. Certain detail as to some items is added in the balance of the reports, however.

[5]      An examination of the Audit Report shows that the expenses that Mr. Mutch concluded had been overstated by Mr. Hans in his returns fall into eleven categories. The table below shows for each of these the amount that Mr. Hans claimed in each of the statute-barred years, together with the amounts that were disallowed by Mr. Mutch in making the August 1998 reassessments.

Year	1991	1992	1993	1994
Advertising
Claimed	$6,478	$6,324	$5,356	$5,121
Disallowed	770	5,884	5,132	4,712
		Automobile
Claimed	$12,432	$13,123	$11,862	$13,972
Disallowed	9,474	9,977	9,674	11,691
Business Tax and Licences
Claimed	$200	$250	$250	$300
Disallowed	(130)	50	-0-	-0-
Insurance
Claimed	$650	$675	$695	$786
Disallowed	650	675	695	786
		Interest
Claimed	$0	$240	$235	$239
Disallowed	$0	$240	$235	$239
Maintenance and Repairs
Claimed	$725	$675	$642	$650
Disallowed	725	675	642	650
Office in Home
Claimed	$2,661	$2,603	$1,970	$1,776
Disallowed	889	2,258	664	1,042
Legal and Accounting
Claimed	$600	$800	$856	$214
Disallowed	386	386	386	-0-
Telephone
Claimed	$1,150	$1,198	$1,063	$989
Disallowed	1,096	1,144	1,009	935
Salaries and Wages
Claimed	$3,000	$2,990	$2,925	$3,210
Disallowed	3,000	2,990	2,925	3,210
Capital Cost Allowance
Claimed	$420	$307	$274	$220
Disallowed	420	307	274	220

[6]      Mr. Mutch decided that many of the expenses claimed were excessive simply because Mr. Hans was unable to produce receipts to substantiate them. In some cases, he seems to have felt intuitively that the amounts were unreasonably high. He dealt with the claims for insurance and for maintenance and repairs as part of the home office expenses. He reduced the claim for home office expenses from the 50% of the total house expenses claimed by the Appellant to 10% of the expenses that the Appellant could substantiate. He also applied subsection 18(12) of the Act, which precludes deduction of the expenses related to a home office if they would contribute to a loss from the business for the year, but permits a carryover of the excess to succeeding years. Close scrutiny of the audit report, the oral evidence of Mr. Mutch, and the Appellant's income tax returns for the statute-barred years does not reveal any clear evidence of a specific misrepresentation having been made by the Appellant as to his expenses in the categories other than automobile expenses, wages, telephone, and home office expense. I will return to these shortly. It may well be that Mr. Hans exaggerated some of his expenses in the other categories; certainly he did not keep proper books, nor did he have vouchers to establish the amounts that he claimed. However, the Respondent was not able to show any specific misrepresentations as to the expenses claimed in those other categories. It appears that Mr. Mutch simply took the view that once a misrepresentation as to any claim for expense in a statute-barred year was shown, it became permissible to reassess the Appellant for that year, and in doing so to review and disallow any claim for expense of the business in that year.

[7]      The Appellant duly objected to Mr. Mutch's reassessments, and so Mr. Bozyk reviewed them, along with additional information supplied and submissions made on the Appellant's behalf. Mr. Bozyk, for the most part, agreed with the approach taken by Mr. Mutch, and with the resulting reassessments that he had made, including the penalties imposed. His single disagreement with Mr. Mutch was as to the allowable automobile expense. I shall return to the automobile expenses later, but it is sufficient at this point to say that Mr. Mutch, in his assessments, had estimated the total distance driven by the Appellant each year, and the percentage of that distance that pertained to the business, and had allowed that percentage of the total automobile expenses that Mr. Hans was able to support with vouchers. Mr. Bozyk considered that it was more fair to the Appellant to take the business kilometres as estimated by Mr. Mutch, and to allow Mr. Hans 31 ¢ per kilometre as a reasonable vehicle operating expense. The Appellant argues that there was no evidence to support the view that 31 ¢ per kilometre was the cost of operating his vehicle, and he does not accept Mr. Mutch's estimate of the distance that he travelled for the purposes of the driving school each year.

[8]      In my view, the approach that was taken by Mr. Mutch and Mr. Bozyk does not give proper effect to subparagraph 152(4.01)(a)(i) of the Act. Generally, a taxpayer becomes immune to reassessment by the Minister for any taxation year when three years have passed since the initial assessment for that year. Subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) creates an exception to permit reassessment in those cases in which the taxpayer has misled the Minister. Subparagraph 152(4.01)(a)(i) was enacted to ensure that the effect of any such reassessment is confined to those matters as to which the taxpayer had misled the Minister. In other words, proof that the taxpayer misled the Minister as to one category of expense does not become a licence for the Minister to disallow some or all of the expenses of another category that were allowed in arriving at the previous assessment, and require that the taxpayer discharge the onus of proving each one of them on appeal. Proof of misrepresentation of a fact relating to the computation of the taxpayer's automobile expenses will reopen for the Minister all the elements that make up the claim for automobile expenses in the year, and she may reassess accordingly, but it will not permit her to revise the previously allowed expenses in other categories such as rent or utilities.

[9]      I do not propose to say any more about the Appellant's claimed expenses for the items other than automobile, telephone, wages and his office in the home for the taxation years 1991 to 1994. On the basis of the evidence, and in particular pages 4 to 11 of Mr. Mutch's Audit Report, I have concluded that the Appellant was entitled to have those left undisturbed by reason of subsection 152(4.01). I turn now to the claimed expenses for automobile, the office in the home, salaries and wages, and telephone, for the statute-barred years. Before doing so, however, I must comment upon the quality of the Appellant's evidence.

[10]     I do not consider the Appellant's evidence to be at all reliable. I believe that his approach to giving evidence was to say whatever he thought would be most helpful to his case. There was much evidence about the odometer readings on a Plymouth Reliant automobile at various dates. Below is a schedule of the dates and odometer readings for this vehicle as they appeared on various repair and maintenance invoices.

Date	Odometer reading
April 22, 1991	24065
May 6, 1991	25859
Oct. 11, 1991	48435
Oct. 25, 1991	49830
Nov. 1, 1991	50667
Nov. 1, 1991	50701
Nov. 5, 1991	51000
Feb. 7, 1992	60123
Feb. 18, 1992	61020
Nov. 5, 1992	82130
Nov. 5, 1992	82142
Nov. 6, 1992	82188
Dec. 9, 1992	82312
Mar. 22, 1993	091430
Nov. 18, 1993	106478
Dec. 1, 1993	107124
Dec. 30, 1993	108566
Jan. 28, 1994	109819

During his evidence, at one point the Appellant took the position that the odometer reading on one of those dates should be greater by 100,000 kilometres because the odometer had only five digits and it was on its second cycle. It is difficult to reconcile this with the reading on March 22, 1993, which records six digits, of which the first was 0. Counsel for the Appellant called a witness who had owned a car of the same make and year, and who is an automobile mechanic. He gave evidence that vehicles of that make and year had only a five digit odometer. Whether that is so or not, and I make no finding as to that, it is clear from the dates and the corresponding odometer readings, which come from documents produced by the Appellant and which he accepted as accurate during his evidence, that the vehicle in question here had not been driven more than 85,754 kilometres between April 22, 1991 and January 28,1994. There is simply no period in the schedule of odometer readings between those dates when the vehicle could have been driven an extra 100,000 kilometres.

[11]     The Appellant also sought to justify his claim for business vehicle use with evidence that he had used a Cadillac that he owned to pick up students who lived in the northeastern suburbs of Toronto, drive them to Brampton, where he was licensed to teach driving, and then return them home. I consider this evidence to be simply fabrication on his part. He had not claimed that the Cadillac had been used in his business until it became apparent to him that he could not rationalize the number of business kilometres that he had claimed to have driven in the face of the odometer readings from the Reliant that had been recorded on the documents. He had insured the Cadillac on the basis that it was driven less than 12,000 kilometres annually, and only for pleasure and driving less than 50 kilometres per week to work. In a questionnaire that he had completed for Mr. Mutch in July 1997, Mr. Hans said that he had used the Toyota (which had replaced the Reliant) in his business. There is no mention of the Cadillac having been used for any business purpose. There was no claim made in his income tax returns for capital cost allowance on the Cadillac. The distance that he claimed to have driven it was inconsistent with the other evidence as to its use.

[12]     There were many other discrepancies in the Appellant's evidence. He admitted that he kept no log to record his vehicle use for personal and for business purposes. He explained the statements of the total use and business use on his returns by saying that he wrote the odometer reading down at the beginning and end of each year in a book, and then gave the numbers, either on a piece of paper or the book itself, he could not remember which, to his accountant. He had no explanation for how this would permit him to divide the distance travelled between business and personal use. His evidence as to the loss of his records when moving from one house to another in 1995 was also incredible. Some of the records he claimed to have lost were apparently available to be given to his tax preparer in the spring of 1996 for the preparation of his 1995 return. He said that he kept the records in a filing cabinet, and yet the filing cabinet was not lost in the move, nor were some records that he was able to produce to Mr. Mutch long after the move. His memory was very selective. There were significant matters as to which he simply had no recollection, and yet he was able to remember that a specific pizza, for which he produced a receipt dated in 1991, had been eaten by him and his students following a lesson. I also find it difficult to give much weight to the Appellant's evidence-in-chief, because most of it was given in answer to leading questions from his counsel, even though only a few of these were objected to.

[13]     I have no doubt that in filing his income tax returns from 1991 to 1994 the Appellant greatly overstated the number of kilometres that he drove his vehicle for the purpose of earning income. He reported the following numbers of kilometres:

year	total kilometres	business kilometres
1991	82,500	66,900
1992	75,266	60,210
1993	58,613	47,506
1994	56,675	45,526
total	273,054	220,142

Remembering that the 1994 year of the business ended on February 28, 1994, and that by January 28, 1994, the Reliant used in the business had travelled a total of 85,754 kilometres since April 22, 1991, it is clear that distances reported by the Appellant were fictitious.

[14]     I accept Mr. Bozyk's approach of allowing the Appellant 31 ¢ per kilometre travelled on business as being a fair and realistic way to estimate the automobile expense in these circumstances, where there is no reason to have confidence that the vouchers produced represent the true expense incurred by the taxpayer. The Minister need not prove the exact cost of operating the vehicle. Once misrepresentation has been established as to the claimed automobile expenses, as it has been here, it is for the Appellant to prove his expenses. He produced no credible evidence to do that. I accept the Minister's estimate of 31 ¢ per kilometre as being a reasonable one. I do not, however, accept that Mr. Mutch's approach to determining the ratio of business distance to total distance travelled for each year is a valid one. By applying a reasonable amount for business travel to an inflated total distance travelled he arrived at an unrealistic ratio of business to total expenses. In my view, it is more appropriate to estimate the business kilometres for each of the years from the gross revenues reported for each of those years, bearing in mind that the parties are in agreement as to the amount of the revenue for each year. Each lesson was 45 minutes. If one assumes that the average speed of the vehicle during a lesson was 30 kilometres per hour, which is generous considering that driving lessons involve parking practice and discussions while the vehicle is stopped, then the distance travelled during the year while giving lessons would be derived by the formula gross revenue ÷ rate per lesson x ¾ x 30. The Appellant's evidence was that the rate he charged per lesson was $10 when he began to teach in 1990, and that it increased by $2 each year thereafter. Applying that formula, and 31 ¢ per kilometre, produces the following estimate of kilometres per year for business use, and estimate of expense:

1991	20,953	$4,330
1992	19,153	$3,958
1993	10,903	$2,253
1994	10,661	$2,203
1995	4,884	$1,009     - to February 28
	3,314	$    685     - after February 28

[15]     It is normal for a driving instructor to pick up the students and to take them home after the lesson. I do not accept Mr. Hans' evidence about picking up students in the east end of the metropolitan area and returning them there. It was vague at best and improbable at worst. In the absence of any reliable evidence, I would add 50% to the distance driven, and so to the cost of operating the vehicle, to account for pick up and drop off of students. The total automobile expenses for the five years, estimated by this formula, followed by the amounts allowed by Mr. Bozyk, in parentheses, would then be:

1991	$6,495	($5,197)
1992	$5,937	($5,542)
1993	$3,379	($3,605)
1994	$3,304	($3,966)
1995	$2,541	($3,389)

Both sets of numbers are imprecise estimates. The Appellant's failure to keep proper records makes it impossible to determine the amounts that he is entitled to deduct with any precision. Mr. Mutch and Mr. Bozyk attempted to allow him reasonable amounts. Although the numbers that I have estimated and those that Mr.Bozyk estimated differ somewhat year-by-year, the aggregates for the five years are remarkably close. In the circumstances, I see no reason to alter the deductions that were allowed by Mr. Bozyk in the reassessments under appeal.

[16]     Mr. Hans claimed in his returns for each of the years from 1991 to 1994 to be entitled to deduct as expenses of the office in his home 50% of the expenses associated with ownership of the house. Implicit in this is the assertion that 50% of the house was used for business purposes. It is abundantly clear from the evidence that this was a gross exaggeration. There were eight or nine people living in the house, which the Appellant testified was 2,000 square feet; Mr. Hans used one room of ten feet by twelve feet for his part-time business. Mr. Mutch allowed him 10%, which was generous. Counsel suggested to Mr. Mutch in cross-examination that he should have allowed the capital cost allowance that was claimed on the contents of the office. I cannot fault him for not doing so; he had no basis on which he could establish the cost, actual or deemed, of the contents when the business was begun. Nor was this established in the evidence before me. I would not make any change to the amount that the Minister allowed for the office in the home. He properly applied subsection 18(12).

[17]     The Appellant also claimed to be entitled to deduct telephone expenses on the basis that he had a telephone dedicated to the business; in fact all the occupants of the house used the same telephone line. At one time (it is not clear when) there had been a separate ring for the household and one for the business, with different numbers, but I did not understand Mr. Hans to say that there had ever been a separate business line in the house. He also claimed as a business expense the cost of long distance calls to Vancouver and to England. In his evidence, he claimed that these were calls to people who would be moving to Toronto and that he was calling them for business reasons. I do not believe him. There is no reason to change the amounts allowed by Mr. Mutch and Mr. Bozyk.

[18]     The final item is the claims for salary and wages. The amounts claimed by the Appellant were:

1991	3,000
1992	2,990
1993	2,925
1994	3,210

Mr. Hans completed and signed a questionnaire on July 10, 1997 in which he said that there were no employees of his business. His evidence before me was that these amounts were paid to his children to wash the car and to answer the telephone. As in so many other areas, his evidence about this was extremely vague, and it lacked the ring of truth. It was not corroborated by anyone who could testify to having been paid by him for these or any other services. In the questionnaire, he said that no family members helped him in his business, and that he did not pay any family members to do work for him. I conclude that the payments as to which he testified were imaginary, and that his claim that they were made was a misrepresentation. Mr. Mutch and Mr. Bozyk were correct to disallow them.

the 1995 year

[19]     The 1995 year was open for reassessment. The onus is on the taxpayer to establish that the assessment is wrong. Mr. Fitzsimmons tried to establish through his cross-examination of Mr. Mutch and Mr. Bozyk, and also through a great many leading questions directed to his client, that it would be fair and reasonable to allow certain additional items of expense to be deducted in computing the Appellant's business income for the year 1995. The only one of these as to which there was any evidence that I found to be at all persuasive was the claim to deduct interest. The Appellant claimed a total of $251, and Mr. Mutch agreed that this was a reasonable claim. I estimated at paragraph 15 above that his automobile expense for the 1995 year, in the aggregate, was $2,541. The Minister's assessment allowed him $3,389. I cannot, of course, increase the amount of the Minister's assessment,[11] but I am far from being persuaded that it is too high, in spite of his failure to allow any amount for interest. I would therefore make no change to the tax assessed for 1995.

[20]     There remains the issue of the penalties. I agree with Associate Chief Justice Bowman's view, as he expressed it in Urpesz,[12] that the Minister can only sustain the penalties if he puts before the Court some evidence to establish that they have been correctly computed. He has not done so in this case. Although I consider that to a considerable degree the Appellant's income tax returns were a work of fiction, I must allow the appeals insofar as the penalties are concerned. The Minister has not discharged his burden of showing that the precise penalties imposed were justified. Neither the Reply nor the evidence reveals how the Minister computed the penalties that he imposed.

[21]     In summary, then, the appeals from the reassessments for the taxation years 1991 to 1994 are allowed, and the assessments are referred back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment on the basis the Appellant is entitled to deductions for the expenses of advertising, business tax and licences,[13] interest, and legal and accounting as allowed by the last assessments prior to those of August 18, 1998. The deductions for the expenses for automobile, office in the home, including maintenance and repairs and capital cost allowance on the contents of the office, and for telephone are to be as allowed by the reassessments made on March 23, 2000. No deduction is to be allowed for salary or wages. The penalties are to be deleted. The appeal from the reassessment for the 1995 taxation year is allowed, and the assessment is referred back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment on the basis that only the penalties are to be deleted.

[22]     Success being divided, I make no Order as to costs.

Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 14th day of August, 2003.

"E.A. Bowie"

Bowie J.

CITATION:

2003TCC576

COURT FILE NO.:

2000-2261(IT)G

STYLE OF CAUSE:

Mukhtiar Hans and Her Majesty the Queen

PLACE OF HEARING:

Toronto, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING:

July 8, 9, 10 and September 10, 2002

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:

The Honourable Justice E.A. Bowie

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

August 14, 2003

APPEARANCES:

Counsel for the Appellant:

Richard G. Fitzsimmons

Counsel for the Respondent:

Bobby Sood

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For the Appellant:

Name:

Richard G. Fitzsimmons

Firm:

Fitzsimmons & Company

For the Respondent:

Morris Rosenberg Deputy Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Canada

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